

TURKEY AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: STRATEGY MODELS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

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This article includes two parts. In the first part, four different strategy models have been developed in order that Turkey could maximize her foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region and the Central Asian republics. In the second part, certain positive and negative scenarios that Turkey would possibly face following the application of the mentioned strategy models have been analyzed. However, after consulting the responsables of Stradigma, we decided to publish this rather long article in two parts in order to respect for the scholars and other specialists whose papers take place in Stradigma e-journal. So, in this volume of the journal, "Strategy Models", which is the first part of the article and in the next volume, "Future Scenarios", the second part of the article, will be published. I hope, the readers will enjoy the article, which is completely based on little mind games.

Introduction

In the first part of the article, in order to maximize Turkey's policies in the Central Asian region, we propose four different "cooperation strategy models"; Strategy Model I: Turkey – U.S., Strategy Model II: Turkey – U.S. – Israel; Strategy Model III: Turkey – U.S. – Iran, and Strategy Model IV: Turkey – Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAECO). The strategy models are numbered from the most probable to the least probable. In other words, in the study taking the fact into consideration that cooperating with these five states will not present equal political and economic advantages for Turkey, we include the U.S. in Strategy Model I assuming that cooperating with U.S. would present more political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model I seems the most probable; we include Israel in Strategy Model II assuming that cooperating with Israel would present less political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than U.S. but more than Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model II is less probable than the realization of Strategy Model I but more probable than Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV; we include Iran in Strategy Model III assuming that cooperating with Iran would present less political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region than U.S. and Israel but more than India and Pakistan, and that the realization of Strategy Model III is less probable than the realization of Strategy Model I and Strategy Model II but more probable than Strategy Model IV; we include India, Pakistan and Iran in Strategy Model IV assuming that these three states would present the least political and economic advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region, and that the realization of Strategy Model IV is the least probable. Furthermore, we distribute the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan into strategy models according to the

intensification of their political and economic interests in the Central Asia region. Depending on this reason, we include the U.S. in Strategy Model I taking its diversified political and economic interests in this region; Israel in Strategy Model II taking its relatively less political and economic interests in the region; Iran in Strategy Model III taking its small scale security and economic doubts in regard to the region; and India and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV taking their only one-sided (economic) interests in the region into consideration.

So, depending on these explanations, the detailed answers to be given to the questions "Depending on which criteria we determine/prefer the states for the strategy models?" and "Why we propose only cooperation strategy model but not any other strategy type?" will also explain the basic aim of the first part of this article.

"Depending on Which Criteria We Determine/Prefer the States for the Strategy Models?"

Our determination in regard to including the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan in strategy models is based on two criteria: Firstly, their economic or political or cultural capabilities and possibilities which can directly facilitate and maximize Turkey's policies in the Central Asian region in case Turkey cooperates with them and secondly, their direct or indirect interests and benefits in the Central Asian region since national interests of the states bear vital importance in international relations.

For example, in Strategy Model I we choose U.S. considering the "political and economic advantages" she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also the U.S.' political interests in the Central Asian region. We include the U.S. in all Strategy Models assuming that U.S can support Turkey financially through allocating money necessary for the realization of Turkey's oil politics and some other investments in the Central Asian region, U.S. can support Turkey politically in international platforms in regard to Turkey's attempts to realize its economic, political and cultural interests in the region; and also taking the U.S.' "political interests" through Turkey-U.S. cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as breaking the influence of Iran, providing the transportation of oil to world markets via a secure state like Turkey, integrating the Central Asian states into the world community.

In Strategy Model II we choose Israel considering the "political and economic advantages" she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Israel's aim to gain U.S. back in regard to its political interests in the Middle East region. We include Israel in Strategy Model II assuming that Israel can support Turkey's policies in regard to the Central Asian region, provide necessary fund which would help Turkey realize some investments in the region; and also taking Israel's "political interests" through Turkey - U.S. -Israel Cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as providing U.S back in her Middle East policies, intensifying bilateral relations with Turkey in order to reinforce its position in the Middle East region.

In Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering the "political advantages" she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Iran's "political and economic interests" in its own region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV assuming that Iran might look for the ways of developing good-neighborly relations with Turkey, behave more carefully in regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist activities on its own territory against Turkey and also taking Iran's "political and economic interests" through Turkey – U.S.– Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as getting rid of international isolationism prevailing since Islamic revolution and Iran–Iraq War, improving relations with the U.S. through this strategy model, having a share in oil transportation from the Central Asian region, reinforcing its political and economic position in the Middle East region.

In Strategy Model IV we choose India and Pakistan considering the "political and economic advantages" they might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also their "political and economic interests" in Southern Asian region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include India and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV assuming that through this Strategy Model Turkey might eliminate various probable economic and political attempts of these two states (in regard to Central Asia) which might endanger Turkey's economic and political interests in the Central Asian region and also taking India's and Pakistan's "economic and security interests" through Strategy Model IV into consideration such as eliminating nuclear threat against each other in Southern Asian region, benefiting from economic wealth in the Central Asian region and gaining power in world politics through this Strategy Model.

"Why We Propose Only "Cooperation Strategy Model" But Not Any Other Strategy Type?"

There have been several reasons, which direct us to propose and concentrate on only "cooperation strategy model" in the first part of this article. First of all, in terms of economic possibilities Turkey is not capable of realizing its goals in the region by itself. When we take the importance of "win-win strategy" (the strategy developed by the American strategists is based on the idea that the states should realize economic, political and military investments or attempts in any region or any state and should not refrain from any expense if this region or state is able to present some more advantages to the state who propose cooperation in any field) it can be said that the Central Asian states who are strongly in need of economic support which would facilitate their transition to market economy will improve relations as long as Turkey continues to have share in rehabilitating their economy. Depending on the reasons above, we find it necessary for Turkey that it should cooperate with an economically powerful state, such as the U.S., to realize its economic goals in the Central Asian region.

Secondly, it seems obvious that Russia would resist any intimate political, economic and cultural initiatives in the Central Asian region taking its political and economic interests in the same region into consideration. Parallel to this determination, it can be said that Turkey would have difficulties in realizing its political, economic and cultural goals in the region by itself. For this reason, in our

study we propose the Turkish decision-makers that in order to realize its political, economic and cultural targets in Central Asia, Turkey should cooperate with the state/s, such as the U.S., which are economically and politically strong enough to overcome Russian resistance.

Thirdly, as mentioned before several states have appeared to gain political or economic, or both, or some other advantages in the Central Asian region following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India and global powers such as China, Japan and U.S can be included in this power rivalry in the region. When we take various advantages they can present to the Central Asian states into account, it can be said that neither the Central Asian states, who regard political or economic capabilities of some regional or global powers as vital for their political and economic development, nor the regional or global powers, who take place in the power rivalry in the region for their political and economic advantages, would not leave Turkey to realize its goals independently. Regarding the probable obstacles to be put by some regional or global powers before Turkey, in our study instead of excluding some important regional and global powers we choose some, such as the U.S. and Israel, and integrate them in our cooperation strategy model.

Fourthly, culture and history also necessitates adopting cooperation strategy model by Turkish decision-makers for the Central Asian region. Though Turkish decision-makers insist on common features, which Turkish and Central Asian peoples share, in fact these common features diversify immensely. While Anatolian Turks acquired an Islamic-Imperial identity, Central Asian Turks developed differently bearing tribal and mongoloid features. Persian had been the language of the cultural centers of Bukhara and Samarkand, and Turkestani elites were generally equally at ease in Chagatay Turk and Persian. Along with Russian dominance cultural and historical difference grew more and after the Bolshevik Revolution, Central Asian peoples had to follow a different path culturally and the elites of Central Asia had been Russified. In today's southern Central Asia, the cultural world bears imprint of centuries of Iranian influence. In northern Central Asia, shamanistic rituals are still strong, and Islam is far weaker than in Turkey. Furthermore, the region's local languages are more distant from Turkish. Lastly, almost half of the residents of the region are Slavs or Persians who are away from Turkish origin. (Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.198) Depending on the explanations above it can be argued that historical and cultural ties are motivative factors which lead Central Asian peoples to regard Turkey as one of the most important cooperation partners in the region and which help Turkey realize its policies in Central Asia. Parallel to this, we find it quite reasonable for Turkish decision-makers to cooperate with the state/s, such as Iran, which is still quite influential culturally and religiously over the Central Asian states.

Lastly, geography restricts Turkey to realize its political, economic and cultural goals in regard to the Central Asian region independently since there is no continuity between Central Asia and Turkey. In the newly-emerged geography Iran represents one of the most important routes for the Central Asian states to reach global markets. So, it can be said that regarding the transportation possibilities Iran plays vital role for the Central Asian states and Turkey – Iran cooperation would

be a development in favor of Turkey.

The following part includes the explanation of four different strategy models, developed for the betterment of relations with the Central Asian republics.

1. Strategy Model I: Turkey – U.S. Strategy Model

In Strategy Model I, we propose Turkish–American cooperation in the Central Asian region since we believe that this Model would give the most advantageous results for Turkey's Central Asian policies depending on several reasons.

First of all, through cooperating with the only superpower in the world, Turkey will be able to find necessary political and economic support to realize its policies in the Central Asian region. Secondly, Turkish–American cooperation for the Central Asian region will not be the first example of these two states' cooperation in history. Particularly after the World War II, these two states cooperated with each other several times in order to realize their goals, and both of them became content about these cooperations. Thirdly, it is clear that there is no obstacle before U.S. to refuse this kind of cooperation for the Central Asian region since America has specific political and economic interests in regard to this region. Fourthly, we believe that U.S. will fully back Turkey economically and politically during cooperation process. Fifthly, since the U.S. government has some other expectations from Turkey in regard to realizing its goals related with other regions, in which she has vital interests, we can assume that U.S. would do its best to satisfy Turkey's needs in the mentioned cooperation process. Sixthly, we support the idea that since the U.S. will have the chance of influencing the states (Iran, India and Pakistan which she has deep–rooted political problems) included in Strategy Model III and Strategy Model IV through involving herself in the mentioned strategy models, she will be quite willing to cooperate with Turkey for the Central Asian region.

We should also mention that taking U.S. and Turkey's expectations from each other in this cooperation process into consideration, Strategy Model I is largely based on economic and political concerns of both states.

a. Advantages of Strategy Model I

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for Turkey

First of all, Turkish government through cooperating with the only super power like U.S. might automatically enlarge its sphere of action (performance) in the Central Asian region; **secondly**, with the U.S. back, Turkish government might realize its promises given to the Central Asian republics particularly at the very beginning of their independence. When we remember the economic assistance given to Turkey by the U.S. government after 1945 through Truman Doctrine

and Marshall Plan in order to break the USSR's possible penetration into the Middle East region, we can easily understand the importance of the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey; **thirdly**, Turkish government, lack of enough economic and political power in international platforms, might reinforce the U.S. economic and political support necessary for the construction and realization of Baku–Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline project through this cooperation. Baku–Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline project is one of the oil and gas transportation routes project based on transporting oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region to the world markets following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the largest energy reserves in the Caspian region. Currently, the proven oil reserve in the region accounts for 15–31 billion barrels. However, exploitation and transportation of oil in this region is rather difficult since the Caspian Sea Basin is landlocked. Since the Caspian region has no outlet to the seas, the region is regarded as one of the most difficult and dangerous regions for the exploitation and transportation of hydrocarbon. During 20 years before the year 1914, Caspian region was one of the largest and one of the most developed oil production areas. However, following the 70–year of Soviet rule, Caspian states were left behind oil exploitation technologies. Currently, there have been only two installations in the region, one in Primorsk city in Azerbaijan, and other in Astrakhan city in Russia, which can construct or repair oil wells. Furthermore, it costs rather high to bring modern oil exploitation equipment abroad. Oil exploitation is not the only problem in the Caspian region, the political problems in regard to the construction of new pipelines, and also the high cost of the construction of these new pipelines consist other side of the issue. It is possible to carry Kazakhstan oil over Russia to the port of Novorossisk. However, Russia might use this pipeline in order to increase its control over Kazakhstan. The pipeline from Azerbaijan over Daghistan and Chechenia to Novorossisk is confronted by increasing stability in these states. As for the exportation of Azerbaijan's oil, there are two alternatives: The pipeline over Turkey and the pipeline over Iran. Although the transportation of Azerbaijan's oil over Iran would cost cheaper than the transportation of this oil over Turkey, U.S. government opposes the oil pipeline project over Iran since she sees Iran as a terrorist state. U.S. backs Baku–Ceyhan pipeline, which would also carry Turkmenistan's natural gas and Kazakhstan's oil to the western markets without constructing an additional pipeline, depending on geopolitical reasons. She regards Turkey as her and Israel's vital ally, and she wants to increase Ankara's prestige in the Caucasus and Central Asia against Iran and Russia. However, the oil companies of the states (except for the U.S. oil companies), which are involved with the transportation of oil and gas in the Caspian region to the western markets, regard the pipeline project over Iran as less risky than the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline project, which would pass through three problematic regions. According to them, although the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nogorno–Karabakh ended in 1994, it still has the potential or reemergence. Furthermore, PKK factor in Turkey is another problem. And Georgia has also problems with Abkhasia, she could not establish its authority over South Osetia, Cakavetia and (see IISS Strategic Comments in Milliyet, 23 June 1999; Blank, 1994; Forsythe, 1996)

Cumhur Ersümer, the then Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, summarized the

probable advantages Turkey might gain when the Baku–Ceyhan project is materialized as follows: "When the project reaches the full capacity, 50 million tons of oil will be transported from Baku to Ceyhan annually! We should emphasize that oil consumption in Turkey is 30 million tons in a year, this consumption will be 45 million tons in the year 2010! We should also point out that Turkey will purchase 16 billion m³ natural gas and we will be able to sell the same amount of natural gas to Europe. In addition to these it should also be kept in mind that the construction of 2.4. billion dollars pipeline will have an important positive impact on Turkish economy..." (Milliyet, 18 November 1999)

When we take Iranian and Russian governments' proposals related with alternative transportation routes into consideration, it could be assumed that the U.S. economic and political back might be the most important instrument for the realization of the mentioned oil and gas transportation route.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for the U.S.

First of all, although the U.S. government is extremely interested in the Central Asian region due to the mentioned economic and political reasons, geographical realities restrict the mentioned U.S. desire to become real. Because geographically U.S. is so far from Central Asia that even if she intends to play an active role in the region, she can not do this. For this reason, it can be said that similar to the policy she adopted for the Balkans and Middle East region during the Cold War period; in the new world order, she favors a foreign policy pattern which is based on supporting one of her faithful allies to become actively involved in the regions in which she has vital interests, and by doing so, she has word on these regions. So, through Turkey–U.S. cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might realize its policies in regard to this region; **secondly**, as mentioned before U.S. has been observing Iranian interest and attempts in the Central Asian region closely since the states in the region gained their independence, and she intends to break the influence of Iran in this region since she believes that any probable Iranian political or economic active involvement in the region will evoke Islamic sentiments, which were suppressed under Soviet regime during 70 years, and parallel to this development Central Asian republics and the Central Asian region will be closed to Western interests. So, it can be assumed that through this cooperation, U.S. might decrease the influence of Iran in this region, and by backing Turkey, she might present laic, secular and democratic model against radical Islamic model before the Central Asian republics; **thirdly**, through this cooperation, U.S. government might restrict any possible Iranian–Russian coalition aimed at gaining full control over Central Asian republics. When we remember the negative results of Iranian–Russian close relationship in the Middle East region in the period after Shah Reza Pehlevi, the possible negative results of the emergence of Iranian–Russian coalition in the Central Asian region will become clearer; **fourthly**, through this cooperation, U.S. might reinforce its position in the Middle East region, in which she has vital interests, too; and **last**, the U.S. government might reinforce Turkish–Israeli relationship/cooperation in the Middle East region. When we take these two states' presence and roles in Middle East in terms of U.S. into consideration, we can assume that Turkish–U.S.

cooperation in the Central Asian region might be quite advantageous for the future projections of the U.S. in some other regions such as Middle East.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for the Central Asian Republics

First of all, it is quite clear that the independent republics of Central Asia have been attempting to transform the established institutions and rules into western-type democratic institutions and rules. They strongly believe that in order to realize the mentioned transformations they need western political support. At that point we can assume that through the active involvement of the U.S. as the result of Turkish–American cooperation in their region, these republics might obtain the support of a super power, and this kind of development will accelerate the intended transition period; **secondly**, Central Asian republics are also aimed at transforming their economies into liberal economy. However, largely due to economic reasons they have not succeeded to realize this until now. So, it can be assumed that by the help of U.S. active involvement in their region, they might provide economic assistance from the U.S necessary for the rehabilitation of their economies and transition to liberal economy; **last**, although the Central Asian republics recognized the fact that the CIS membership would increase the Russian control and authority over their governments, they joined the CIS, set up by Russian Federation, Belorussia and Ukraine, firstly regarding their security and economic concerns and secondly since they did not have any other alternative except for this. For the time being, Russian political approaches toward these republics and Central Asia proved this assumption to be true and Russian Federation began to be regarded as the ideological, social and cultural successor of the Soviet Union by these republics. It can be said that currently, these republics are aware of the fact that Russian officials do have some economic and political plans related with them and for this reason they still face Russian threat. So, it can be assumed that through Turkish active involvement in the Central Asian region, they might gain power before the Russian Federation. When we take common features such as historical, cultural, religious and linguistic ties between the independent republics in Central Asia and Turkey in the past into consideration, the importance of Turkey's presence in the Central Asian region for these republics will be understood better.

b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model I

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy I

It should be kept in mind that any serious attempt by any external power in regard to the Central Asian region would face Russian objection. So, it can be argued that the cooperation strategy models to be developed by Turkish officials for the Central Asian region would face Russian objection, too. However, it should be mentioned that the content of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against each of the four cooperation strategy models will be completely different. For example, while the content of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkey–U.S. Cooperation Strategy Model might be more Iran, Armenia

and Central Asian– orientated; the content of contra–policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkey–Israel–U.S., Turkey–Iran–U.S, and Turkey–CAECO Cooperation Strategy Models might be more diversified. So, it can be said that the most probable contra–policies to be developed by the Russian officials against Turkish–American cooperation for the Central Asian region might be as follows:

Firstly, in order to prevent Turkish–American cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russia might seek the ways for reinforcing the established bi–lateral economic and political relations with Iran for the Central Asian region. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of political science at Pennsylvania, and senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in his article "Moscow and Tehran The Wary Accommodation" explains the reasons which bring Russian Federation and Iran closer in the Central Asian region. According to Rubinstein the causes which lead them to behave commonly in Central Asia are based on shared political, economic and security concerns. The reasons, explained by Rubinstein, can be summarized as follows: – Along with the changes emerged in the geopolitics of Central Asia and Caucasus, both Moscow and Tehran feel insecure before these radical changes; – In the Cold War period both Russia (following the bi–polarization) and Iran (following the Iran Islamic Revolution) observed the U.S. policies closely and adopted common contra–policies against the U.S. increasing influence in the Middle East region; – In order to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East region, Iran backed Russia's military and political attempts in this region in the Cold War period; – Both the Russian Federation and Iran find the establishment and continuity of stability in Central Asia and Caucasus regarding their economic and security concerns; – Russia does not see Iran as in economically and politically powerful condition which can endanger her projections in regard to Central Asia and Caucasus; – Russian Federation, in order not to lose her influence, and Iran, in order to prevent the emergence of any attempt which might endanger her national security, are in favor of the continuation of status quo in Central Asia and Caucasus; – Both the Russian Federation and Iran support the idea that the U.S. must have a limited influence particularly in the Central Asian region; – In the new world order both the Russian and Iranian governments are in favor of developing good relations with the West particularly with the U.S. (see Rubinstein, 1995, pp.26–57)

Furthermore, İhsan Çolak, Research Assistant at Fatih University in İstanbul, explains the developing relationship between Russia and Iran from a different perspective and tells that "Although Russian – Iran relations have lost its former intimate phase as the result of the dismantlement of Soviet mentality and the Russian attempts to develop relations with the West, both of these two states' similar stand before the West forces them to behave commonly in regional relations. One of the most important reasons which leads Russia to develop relations with Iran is that the West, particularly the U.S., is in favor of being with Turkey in the attempts in regard to the region (former Soviet geopolitical area)". (Çolak, 1999, p.211) Disregarding the fear related with the awakening of Islamic sentiments in the Central Asian region, Russian officials might back Iran to play an active role in this region. This might lead the uprising of radical Islam in Central Asia, which in turn would result in the rejection of laic and secular Turkey's Central

Asian-orientated political and economic attempts by the Central Asian republics; **secondly**, Russian officials might also attempt to benefit from political contradictions and fragility prevailing between Iran and Turkey, and they might use the policy of "double containment". Double containment is a kind of policy, which is used (particularly by the U.S.) to weaken political, economic and military potentials of any two states, which have problems in several fields by suggesting the use of contradictions between them. U.S. government succeeded to gain advantages from this policy through using the contradictions between Iran and Iraq. The most important aspect of this policy is that the state, which uses the "double containment", is never actively involved in the process of the mentioned policy. D. Baluev, in his article "Moderation in the National Idea", published in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, regards the use of double containment policy between Iran and Turkey as a means of weakening Turkey's role in the Caucasus. (Baluev, 1996, p.107) In order to materialize this policy, Russian officials might develop some strategies. Firstly, they might provoke Iran to violate the rights of Azeris and Turkmens, which consist large proportion of Iran population. Secondly, in order to create obstacles before the U.S. backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, they might give support to Iran to construct an alternative pipeline, which would carry Azerbaijan's oil to the world markets. Thirdly, they might also increase its support to the activities of illegal groups such as PKK and Hezbollah through backing Iranian policies related with these two groups. Fourthly, they might suggest Iranian government setting up alliances with the states with which Turkish government has deep-rooted political, diplomatic and historical problems. Iran - Syria alliance in the Middle East, or (or both) Iran - Syria - Greek Government of South Cyprus - Armenia - Greece alliance both in the Middle East and Central Asia might be quite well-established alliances determined to restrict Turkey's influence in the Central Asian region indirectly; **thirdly**, Russian Federation might restrict economic relations with the Central Asian republics in order to prevent them from joining Turkish-American cooperation in Central Asia. When we take the fact into consideration that Russia has the largest share in Central Asian republics' foreign trade (these republics realize 80% of their foreign trade with the Russian Federation), the mentioned probable attempt of Russia might affect the political stand of these republics toward Turkish-American cooperation in their region badly; **fourthly**, Russia might cause conflict in Central Asian region deliberately, as she did in the Caucasus region, and following the internal chaos emerged in these republics she might play peace-keeping role in this region. By doing so, she might automatically increase her control and authority over the states in Central Asia. As the result of this development it is highly possible that the republics in Central Asia might be rather hesitant towards any external initiative which would endanger their relations with the Russian Federation in the region; **fifthly**, in order to prevent Turkish government from concentrating on Turkish-American cooperation strategy model in the Central Asian region, Russia might establish a "Slavic-Orthodox quasi-coalition" under the aegis of herself. (1) By doing so, she might motivate the Slavic-Orthodox origin nations in the Balkans to adopt negative policies toward the Muslim-origin Turkish population living in the same region; **sixthly**, Russia might cause an Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in the Caucasus region, which would directly close Turkey's passing route to the Central Asian region; **seventhly**, in order to draw Turkish officials' attention to other issues, Russia might support Syrian policies in regard

to the PKK. **Furthermore**, she might violate Montreux Convention on Straits, which might in turn deprive Turkish officials of focusing on Central Asian region and of conducting strategy models in this region; furthermore, Russia might do her best to transport Azerbaijan's oil over its own territory but not over Turkey. In order to exclude Turkish option (Baku–Ceyhan pipeline) to carry Azerbaijan's oil to the world markets, she might emphasize that the mentioned pipeline project, proposed by Turkey depending on political and economic reasons and strongly backed by the U.S. due to geostrategic reasons, is under the risk of Kurdish problem which is confronted by Turkey particularly in southeastern Anatolia through which the Azeri oil will flow when this pipeline project is materialized. Presenting the mentioned handicap in Turkey, Russian officials very often put forth the idea that the flow of Azerbaijan's oil must be through the Russian pipeline. The planned outlet for the Russian pipeline would be the port of Novorossisk on the Black Sea. According to this plan the oil would be carried by tankers through the Bosphorus Straits. If the Russian pipeline project is materialized, the population living in Istanbul would face serious risks due to the probable environmental problems to be caused by tankers, and the tanker traffic through the Bosphorus Straits would be on the maximum limit; and **last**, Russia might benefit from Armenian–Kurdish ties in order to provoke Kurdish population living largely in southeastern Anatolia of Turkey. Moreover, she can increase her support to several Moscow–based Kurdish organizations and Kurdish Council, which was set up in Moscow. (2) By doing so, she might strengthen Kurdish separatist movement under the leadership of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which would badly affect Turkey's internal political order.

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Iran before Strategy I

Before presenting the probable disadvantages to be caused by Iran before Strategy Model I, it should be mentioned that Iran would oppose any external attempt determined to obtain maximum political and economic benefit from the Central Asian region, and particularly she will oppose the attempt actually made by Turkey. However, it should be kept in mind that Iran will not be able to develop any direct contra–policies against the attempts in which the U.S. is actively involved since she has several political and economic expectations from the U.S. after Khomeini period. So, it can be said that probable opposition to be showed by Iranian government against Turkish–American cooperation in the Central Asian region will be directed towards Turkey, and Iran will develop some policies determined to weaken Turkey's influence in Central Asia. These would naturally lead the emergence of several disadvantages before Strategy I. The probable disadvantages to be caused by Iran before the mentioned Strategy Model might be as follows:

First of all, although the present Iran government's political ideology in regard to the Central Asian region and Central Asian states is not based on transporting Iranian–type political model to these republics, Iranian officials might use Islam factor in this region in order to prevent these republics from intensifying relations with Turkey and by doing so, Iran will be able to develop closer relations with them. This development might lead two negative outcomes. **Firstly**, political order in these states might be destabilized and this might retard the period necessary to transit

into democratic system. Secondly, Central Asian republics, provoked by Islamic sentiments, might refrain from cooperating with a laic and secular state such as Turkey in their region; **secondly**, in order to cause problems before Turkish–American cooperation for the Central Asian region, Iranian government might increase its support for PKK and Hezbollah. (3) This would force Turkish officials to focus on solving internal problems rather than developing strategies for the regions in which Turkish government has political and economic interests; **thirdly**, parallel to this policy, she might reinforce her relations with Syria in the Middle East; and with Russia and Armenia in the Central Asian region. It can be argued that Iran might look for the ways to turn these relations with the mentioned states into a kind of strategic alliance. In any case, development of any close relations or establishment of any strategic alliance among these states might weaken Turkey politically; and **last**, Iranian officials might conduct political pressure over Turkish population living in Iran.

2. Strategy Model II: Turkey – Israel – U.S. Strategy Model

In Strategy Model II we propose Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region since we believe that this Model would give secondarily advantageous results (compared to the advantages which Turkey would obtain from Strategy Model I) for Turkey's Central Asian policies depending on several reasons. First of all, it sounds quite reasonable to prefer Israel and America for Strategy Model II since Turkey and Israel have been close allies in the Middle East region for years depending on similar political, economic and security concerns related with Arab Middle East states; and since both Turkey and Israel have been inevitable allies of the U.S. in regard to her policies in the Middle East. Secondly, Turkish–Israel cooperation in Central Asia would not be the first example of these two states' cooperation. Particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union, both of them have been in favor of developing bi–lateral economic, political and military relations in order to strengthen their economic, political and military stand in their own regions. Thirdly, they are aware of the fact that the probable positive results to be obtained from Strategy Model II would have a multi–dimensional impact on both Israel's and Turkey's stand before Arab states in the Middle East region. For example, both Israel and Turkey will be able to foster their political and economic position before Arab Middle East states, with which they have deep–rooted conflicts. In addition to this, via this cooperation, Turkey will be able to prevent Israel state from supporting the realization of a Kurdish state project. Furthermore, Israeli officials, who would have a chance to become closer to the U.S. officials via Strategy Model II, will be able to obtain the U.S. political support more in regard to Arab–Israel conflict, prevailing in the Middle East region for years. As for the U.S., via the mentioned cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. will be able to reinforce relations with Turkey and Israel, which represent vital importance in regard to her stand in the Middle East. It can be assumed that parallel to this cooperation, while Turkey will consist military leg of the U.S. in the Middle East region, Israel will consist political leg of her in the same region. Besides the probable advantages that the U.S. government will obtain from this cooperation in regard to her Middle East policies, she will be able to obtain political back of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which plays an important role in the determination of the U.S.

foreign policy.

So, taking the mentioned reciprocal political, economic and security expectations of Turkey–Israel and the U.S. from each other, it can be assumed that these three states' cooperation in the Central Asian region will become quite effective, and Turkey will be able to maximize her policies in the mentioned region through setting up Strategy Model II. This Model is based on political, economic and security concerns of the participating states.

a. Advantages of Strategy Model II

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for Turkey

First of all, via Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Turkey's political stand before the U.S. might raise gradually. When we remember the strategic importance of Turkey through being one of the most trustable allies of the U.S. related with her counter–policies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War years in terms of America, it can be assumed that Turkey, through cooperating with the U.S. and her historical friend, Israel, in Central Asia, in the region which American and Israeli governments have direct or indirect interests, might obtain the U.S. support more, and this might help Turkish officials be more powerful before the states with which Turkish government has had economic and political problems, and in international platforms; **secondly**, Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might help Turkish government gain political power before Iran and Syria strategic grouping in the Middle East region. Although this kind of cooperation seems unable to remove these states' foreign policy attempts, intended to weaken Turkey politically and economically, this might prevent the mentioned three states from developing future projections, which would endanger national security of Turkey; **thirdly**, parallel to the realization of Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, the policies of fundamentalist Arab Middle East states against Turkey might become less severe; and **last**; through this cooperation, Turkish government might stop the attempts of the U.S., Israel and the Jewish lobby in U.S. congress in regard to the realization of Kurdish state project. (4)

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for the U.S.

Firstly; via this cooperation, the U.S. government might raise the political and economic support of the Jewish lobby in the Congress; **secondly**, Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might strengthen the U.S. policies on Middle East. When the prevailing conflict between Iran–U.S., Iraq–U.S. and Syria–U.S. in the Middle East region, and also Russia's political expectations in the Middle East are taken into consideration, it can be assumed that via this cooperation the U.S. might foster its stand in the Middle East before the states mentioned above by the help of Turkey and Israel. Along with developing relations with these two states in the Central Asian region, while Turkey might consist military leg of the U.S. in the Middle East

region, Israel might consist political leg of the U.S. in the same region; and **last**, Turkish–American–Israel cooperation might also have a positive influence on American policies on Central Asian republics. It is obvious that U.S. government strictly backs the continuity of current political systems in these states. By doing so, she believes that Russian policies and probable Iranian fundamentalist attempts in Central Asia will be kept aloof. So, it can be assumed that along with Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, an extensive Israeli economic penetration into this region might present a Western, rather than Islamic, orientation for the political systems of the Central Asian states. (Ehteshami, 1994, pp.96–97)

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for Israel

Firstly, Israel, such as Turkey, has lost its strategic importance before the West relatively following the end of the Cold War. However, despite the mentioned downgrade in its strategic position before the West, U.S. is still Israel's one of the most important allies. So, it can be assumed that by actively involving herself in the Central Asian region, in which the U.S. government has vital interests, and by adopting policies similar to the policies of the U.S. in this region, and by helping the U.S. officials enlarge American sphere of influence in Central Asia, Israeli government might compensate the mentioned loss before the West, and particularly U.S.; **secondly**, through taking place in Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Israel will be able to develop its relations with the U.S. government. Parallel to the developing relations with the U.S., Israel might realize its policies in the Middle East region more independently. At least, Israeli government might foster its political stand in Arab–Israeli peace process through gaining U.S. support more; **thirdly**, if Bernard Lewis' assumption "The emergence of Turkish states world, such as the emergence of Arab world appeared following the disintegration of British and French empires, will be viewed quite important in the following years, and this Turkish states world will have fairly important influence on Middle East." (Göka, 1999, p.181) becomes real, it can be assumed that Israel, which will have a word in Central Asian policies through participating in this kind of cooperation in the Central Asian region, might gain political power before Arab Middle East states. Parallel to this development, anti–Israel policies of the Middle East Arab states will become less effective on Israel's political stand in the Middle East, so, the mentioned political burden before Israeli government in the Middle East region might decrease gradually; **fourthly**, along with Israel–Central Asian states cooperation in the Central Asian region, Islamic world, particularly Muslim–origin peoples in the Middle East region might think that Israeli government will soften her political discourse and political attempts in regard to the Arab Middle East states and particularly to the Palestine conflict. This development might help Israel remove political oppression in its own region gradually; and **last**, Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region might also be advantageous for Israel in regard to solving its problems with Iranian government. The main problem between Iran and Israel is not "Islamic fundamentalism". Simply, in terms of Israel, the problem is that Iran insistently opposes to the peace process, and to the Israeli government's enlargement through Jerusalem, and struggles with Israel for this enlargement issue. (Aras, 1999, p.205) So, parallel to developing relations with

Turkey, Israel might benefit from Turkey's potential mediating role in solving the mentioned problem with Iran. Although this possibility seems rather weak, still, it should be kept in mind.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for the Central Asian Republics

Since we explained probable advantages which U.S. and Turkey might present for the Central Asian republics in Strategy Model I, we will only explain probable advantages which Israeli government might present for the Central Asian republics along with Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region in Strategy Model II.

Firstly, along with Israel's active involvement in the Central Asian region, Central Asian republics might benefit from Israel's close relations with the West, and particularly with the U.S. These republics might regard Israel as a gateway to the West, and particularly to the U.S.; **secondly**, Israel's economic assistance given to the Central Asian states since they gained their independence has been welcomed by them since these states are in need of any economic assistance by any state. So, along with Israel's developing relations parallel to Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, the states in Central Asia might obtain more economic assistance from Israel, which would in turn help these states rehabilitate their economies; **thirdly**, it is obvious that the mutual fear shared by Israel and the Central Asian states related with the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and with the increasing influence of Iran in the region has been one of the most important factors which leads these two sides to develop closer relations.

b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model II

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by some in the Middle East region Before Strategy Model II

First of all, it seems obvious that Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region will have a negative impact on Turkey's economic and particularly political relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East region because most of these countries have had deep–rooted political problems with Israel since the establishment of this state. So, it can be said that Turkish state's cooperation attempt with Israel will cause discontent among the Arab Middle East states, and these states will adopt a negative stand against Turkey. Parallel to this development, Turkey might be deprived of these states' political and economic support which is necessary for the political stability and economic well–being of Turkey in the Middle East region; **secondly**, along with Turkish–American–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, Iran might show its reaction in two ways. Firstly, Iran might raise its political opposition against Israeli state's enlargement policy through Jerusalem, and the mentioned political attempt of Iran might cause problems in Arab–Israeli peace process. Secondly, Iran, in order to create obstacles before Turkish–Israel cooperation attempt in the Central Asian region, might raise its political support for

PKK and Hezbollah, which might prevent Turkish officials from concentrating on the mentioned cooperation process; **thirdly**, such as Iran, Syria might show its reaction against Turkish–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region in two ways, too. Firstly, Syria, in order to break the probable influence of Turkey in the Middle East region as the result of her attempts in the Central Asian region, might foster its political support for PKK. Secondly, Syria might reinforce its relations with Iran, and Greek Government of South Cyprus, and even she might be willingly involved in establishment of Syria–Iran–Armenia–Greece probable quadripartite strategic alliance against Turkish–American–Israel tripartite alliance.

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy Model II

First of all, Russian Federation, in order to endanger Turkish–Israel cooperation in the Central Asian region, might search the ways for backing Arab states' anti–Israel policies. By doing so, she might create problems before Arab–Israeli peace process, and this might result in the downgrade in Israel's concentration on the mentioned cooperation process; **secondly**, Russian Federation might convince Arab states that Turkish–Israel alliance in the Central Asian region will in turn help Turkish and Israeli states become politically and economically more powerful in the Middle East region before other states in the same region. Arab Middle East states, provoked by Russia, might foster their anti–Turkish and anti–Israeli policies; **thirdly**, she might develop her relations with the states such as Iran and Syria in the Middle East region, Armenia in the Caucasus, Greece in the Balkans, and Greek Government of South Cyprus, with which Turkish state has had rather fragile political relations for years, and she might suggest these states set up a kind of strategic alliance against Turkish–Israel alliance in the Central Asian region; and **last**, Russian Federation might continue to house PKK terrorists in order to weaken Turkey politically and economically.

Probable Disadvantage to be Caused by Islamist and Nationalist Circles in Turkey Before Strategy Model II

When we take rather fanatic political discourses developed, and rather severe political stand adopted by Islamist and nationalist circles in Turkey just after the former Soviet republics in Central Asia had declared their independence in the beginning of 1990s into consideration, it can be assumed that these circles will oppose Turkish officials' attempt to cooperate with Jewish–populated Israel state. So, the ones who follow either Islamist or nationalist ideologies in Turkey might prevent the emergence of a fully agreed political consensus in Turkey, and this might cause the emergence of some problems in domestic policy, which might in turn lead lack of concentration on Central Asian region and Central Asian republics.

3. Strategy Model III: Turkey – Iran – U.S. Strategy Model

In Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering the "political advantages" she might present to Turkey through this strategy model; and also Iran's "political and economic interests" in its own

region, in the Central Asian region and in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model III assuming that Iran might look for the ways of developing good-neighborly relations with Turkey, behave more carefully in regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist activities on its own territory against Turkey and also taking Iran's "political and economic interests" through Turkey – U.S.–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region into consideration such as getting rid of international isolationism prevailing since Islamic revolution and Iran–Iraq War, improving relations with the U.S. through this strategy model, having a share in oil transportation from the Central Asian region, reinforcing its political and economic position in the Middle East region.

Despite the handicaps before Strategy Model III we believe that along with the realization of Strategy Model III; political, economic and security differences and expectations of these states related with the Central Asian region will become less disturbing, and the mentioned political, economic and military conflicts among them will be taken under control although these conflicts will not be completely removed because the eventual goal of Strategy Model III is to minimize political, economic and security differences and expectations of the states included in this kind of cooperation, and to remove any political, economic or military conflicts among them in the Central Asian region. So, along with the realization of Strategy Model III, Turkish government will be able to realize its goals in Central Asia and foster her economic and social progress at home easier.

It should be also mentioned that Strategy Model III is mainly based on political and security concerns of the participating states.

a. Advantages of Strategy Model III

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for Turkey

First of all, along with Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russian–Iran relations might downgrade gradually. As the result of this development Russia might be deprived of one of its power centers in the Middle East region. Moreover, Russian–Iran close relationship in Central Asia will leave the floor to Turkish–American–Iran partnership; **secondly**, Iran, accepted to cooperate with Turkey in the Central Asian region, might give up backing PKK and Hezbollah. Parallel to this, Turkey might eliminate one of the states which houses and gives political support to the mentioned illegal groups; **thirdly**, probability of the emergence of Russia–Iran–Armenia tripartite strategic partnership in the Central Asian region, which is uttered very often recently by the Russian officials in order to break the influence of Turkey in this region, might be removed parallel to Turkish–American–Iran partnership in Central Asia. As for the probability of the emergence of Russian–Armenian strategic partnership in the Central Asian region, it can be claimed that these two sides' partnership will not be as effective as Russia–Iran–Armenia strategic partnership since both Russian Federation and Armenia have been busy with internal political and economic problems; **fourthly**, along with the realization of Strategy Model III, Iran might refrain from taking place in Iran–Syria–Armenia–Greece–Greek

Government of South Cyprus strategic alliance; **fifthly**, as mentioned before, Turkey and Central Asian republics are not geographically contiguous. Access to these republics is rather problematic. Overland routes, which connect Turkey with Central Asia, traverse Iran, or pass through the Transcaucasus and Russia, or run via Transcaucasus and the Caspian Sea. (Winrow, 1996, p.129) So, it can be said that along with Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Turkey might safeguard its transportation route which traverses Iran; and **last**, Iranian government expecting to obtain various political and economic advantages from the U.S. as the result of Turkish–American–Iran cooperation might no longer oppose Baku–Ceyhan route which is supported by Turkey and America.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for the U.S.

Firstly, it seems possible that U.S. foreign policy on Central Asia, which is mainly based on isolating Iran from the Central Asian region, will lead the mentioned state to cooperate economically and politically with the Russian Federation, and in the end to become politically marginalized. So, the U.S. government through accepting to cooperate with Iran might prevent this state from developing close relations with Russia, and so, Iran might no longer remain as a political threat against the U.S. in the Middle East and Central Asian regions; **secondly**, by the help of Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might eliminate one of the most important negative factors such as Iran in the Middle East region. Taking the importance of economic and political advantages to be obtained through U.S.–Iran cooperation into consideration, Iran might soften its anti–American policies, and adopt more cooperative political stand in its own region. This development might bring two different practical ends. First of all, U.S. political maneuvers in the Middle East region might face less Iranian opposition. Secondly, Iran might support the Middle East peace process through obeying the rules of law, refraining from backing the activities of illegal groups, removing its negative political stand against Arab–Israel peace process. These both might lead the U.S. government to enlarge its sphere of influence in the Middle East; and **thirdly**, through Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. will have a chance to become involved in Central Asia with these two Muslim countries, which have deep–rooted cultural, historical and social ties with the Central Asian republics. By doing so, U.S. might realize its Central Asian policies more easily.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for Iran

Firstly, Iran, through taking place in Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region might have a chance to remove political conflicts with the U.S. As the result of this promising development Iran might convince the U.S. government to cancel the prevailing embargo, get rid of isolation through reintegrating itself into the world community, and rehabilitate its economy. So, it can be assumed that the probable advantages that Iran will obtain from Turkish–American–Iran cooperation might be larger than the probable advantages that the same state will obtain from Iran–Russian strategic alliance in the Central Asian region; **secondly**,

because of the immense power of Russia which extends to the north, historically Iran has always sought to balance off Russia with other potentially balancing powers. France (under Napoleon), Germany, America, and even Japan and China have functioned as these potentially balancing powers in some ways in more recent periods. (Fuller, 1991, p.182) So, through cooperating with the only superpower of the world, Iran might also have the chance of ensuring that she will not be entirely at the mercy of a state such as Russian Federation, which the political and economic future is unforeseen; thirdly, as mentioned before, Iranian Azeris living in northwest of Iran consist 20% or 30% of Iran population, and Iran has always had some concerns about this Azeri population. This concern is based on Iranian assumption that Azeris living in Iran might attempt to unite with the Azeris living in Azerbaijan, or visa versa. So, through developing relations with Turkey for the Central Asian region, Iran might benefit from close relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and remove this threat; and last; although Iran has deep-rooted historical ties with the peoples of Central Asian republics, there are still some limits which prevent Iran from enlarging its ideological, cultural influence through the Central Asian republics fully. Firstly, Iranians are Shiites while the peoples of Central Asian states are Sunnis, secondly, Iranians strictly follow Islamic traditions while the peoples of Central Asian states prefer more 'Asiatic' traditions, **thirdly**, historically the states which existed in the Central Asian region never belonged to the sphere of influence of Persia. (Zagorski, Zlobin, Solodovnik, Khrustalev, 1992, p.8) When compared to Iran, Turkey has more detailed ties with the Central Asian peoples in terms of religion and tradition. So, depending on these explanations it can be assumed that through Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Iran might be more influential on the republics in this region.

b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model III

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian Federation Before Strategy Model III

First of all, as mentioned before although Russian officials do not declare openly that Russia houses and gives political and economic support to PKK, they do this in a hidden way. So, it seems highly probable that Russian Federation, in order to weaken Turkey politically and economically, and in order to break the influence of Turkish state on Central Asian republics, might begin to house and give political and economic support to PKK supporters, who might probably be isolated from Iran following Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region; **secondly**, Russian Federation; which might think that Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian region might revive Islamic sentiments in the region, and that this development might endanger Russian political stand before these republics; might upgrade its influence on them, and force the Central Asian states to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran actual involvement in the region; **thirdly**, Russian Federation, which will lose one of her most important partners in the Middle East region, might concentrate on developing closer relations with other Middle East states, such as Syria, with which Turkey has harsh problems, and might help these state develop anti-Turkish policies.

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Israel Before Strategy Model III

Firstly, Israel, surprised before the U.S.' involvement in a cooperation process in the Central Asian region with Iran, might show its reaction against the U.S. government through affecting the Jewish lobby in the U.S. congress; **secondly**, parallel to Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Israel might also criticize Turkish political preference, based on including Iran in such a cooperation process. And she might not favor the development of multi–lateral relations with Turkey, and suspend these relations.

Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Central Asian Republics Before Strategy Model III

Firstly, as mentioned before Central Asian republics have some concerns about Islamic penetration into the region, and see some Islamic states, such as Iran, as potential states which favors to increase their sphere of political and economic influence in Central Asia through using Islamic sentiments. So, it can be said that the fear that these republics do have in regard to this issue might lead them to oppose to Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in their own region; **secondly**, before Russian Federation's highly probable negative stand against Turkish–American–Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region, Central Asian republics might refrain from giving support to this cooperation.

4. Strategy Model IV: Turkey – Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization (CAECO)

The Strategy Model IV is inspired by the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization, established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and became a ten–member organization after the demise of the Soviet Union. The ECO is determined to develop multi–lateral regional cooperation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for regular social and economic development, and to raise the standard of living of the peoples of the member states through obtaining maximum benefit from the social and economic potential of the region) and the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization was established in 1992 by the states neighboring the area around the Black Sea. The BSEC is determined to create an economic cooperation region in which the free movement of goods and capital would be realized. The eleven members of the BSEC were brought together by the common realization that extended multi–lateral cooperation among them is likely to contribute to speeding up those processes and fostering the economic and social progress of everyone of them)

The CAECO, suggested in Strategy Model IV to maximize Turkey's foreign policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region, is intended to include Turkey, Iran, India, and Pakistan under the leadership of the U.S. This Organization is determined to gather the mentioned states, which have different economic and political expectations from the Central Asian region, around the common goal, which is targeted at obtaining maximum benefit from the economic potential of Central Asia.

At the first glance, the realization of the CAECO might sound rather unrealistic due to several reasons. First of all, some of the participating states have had rather severe economic, political and security problems with each other in various fields. For example, between Indian and Pakistani governments Kashmir conflict consists the primary concern for years. In addition to this, Indian government feels insecure before Pakistani governments Islamic initiatives in the Central Asian region and she fears that Pakistan might use largely Muslim-populated Central Asian states against her through emphasizing Islam. Furthermore, Iran has been rather discontent about the Pakistani policies since Pakistani government backed Pashtun Sunnis in Afghanistan conflict while Iran backed Shi'ites and Persian speaking groups in the same conflict. Iranian government is also discontent about Pakistani officials' attempt to develop close relations with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the U.S. government disapproves the nuclear attempts of India and Pakistan against each other since she believes that this would endanger the political stability of south Asia. In addition to this, the U.S. embargo on Iran still lasts since she still regards Iran as a terrorist state. As for Turkey, Turkey has still complaints about Iran in regard to Iranian governments' supports to illegal groups, such as Hezbollah and PKK.

Secondly, the states included in CAECO have rather different political, economic and security expectations from the Central Asian region, and from the mentioned Organization. For example, while Iran might prefer to be a member of the CAECO in order to benefit from the economic potential of Central Asia, to rehabilitate her relations with the U.S., and to break the support given by Pakistan government for Taliban movement; India might prefer to be a member of the CAECO in order to break probable Pakistani influence (through Islamic initiatives) in Central Asia, to find new powerful allies after she had lost the Soviet Union, which had been one of the most important economic, political and military supporter of her during the Cold War period, and to rehabilitate her political, economic and social stand through developing multi-lateral relations with the U.S. via this Organization. Pakistan might prefer to be a member of the CAECO in order to regain the U.S.' economic and military assistance, to develop some new security arrangements to gain power before India, and to reestablish relations with Iran. U.S. might prefer to be the motivating power of this Organization in order to control the nuclear attempts of India and Pakistan in south Asia, and to control the Central Asian region. As for Turkey, Turkish officials might attempt to set up this kind of Organization in order to eliminate probable single attempts of Iran, India, and Pakistan in the Central Asian region, to set up a probable Muslim Security Belt via this Organization in the long run against Russia and Slavic-Orthodox Balkan states, and to break Pakistan's Islamic influence on Central Asian states.

Despite the mentioned handicaps before Strategy Model IV we believe that along with the realization of Strategy Model IV, the mentioned political, economic and security differences and expectations of these states will become less disturbing, and the mentioned political, economic and military conflicts among them will be taken under control although these conflicts will not be completely removed because the eventual goal of these kind of Organizations is to minimize political, economic and security differences and expectations of the member states, and to

remove any political, economic or military conflicts among the member states. So, along with the realization of Strategy Model IV, Turkish government will be able to realize its goals in Central Asia and foster her economic and social progress at home easier.

It should be also mentioned that Strategy Model IV is partly based on economic concern, and partly political and security concerns of the participating states.

a. Advantages of Strategy Model IV

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for Turkey

Firstly, along with Strategy Model IV, Turkey might prevent the states, such as India, Pakistan and Iran, which have different economic and political goals in the Central Asian region, from realizing their policies in regard to this region independently, and by doing so, she might remove different power centers in Central Asia; **secondly**, along with this Strategy Model, Turkish government might establish a "Muslim Security Belt" (although this will remain only in theory in the short-run) against any probable Russian threat, or any Slavic-Orthodox upheaval in the Balkans, or any probable negative Greek policies, intended to weaken Turkey economically and politically; and **last**, through including Pakistan in Strategy Model IV, Turkish government might prevent the realization of fundamentalist policies of Pakistan in the Central Asian region.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for the U.S.

First of all, since the U.S. will be the motivating power of Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization, she might safeguard Central Asian region's security against Russian Federation via this Organization. The U.S. might also have the chance of realizing its foreign policy goals in Central Asia through placing Turkey at the top of the mentioned Organization; **secondly**, U.S. might control the nuclear attempts in south Asia since the states, India and Pakistan, which cause nuclear threat in south Asian region, will be under the control of the U.S. via this Organization; **thirdly**, through this Organization, U.S. might enlarge its sphere of influence in the Central Asian region, and even she might establish military bases in this region in long run. When we recognize the main foreign policy goal of the U.S. in the establishment of the U.S.-backed Baghdad Pact by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, in 1955, we can understand the support to be given by the U.S. to the establishment of Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization. The aim of the U.S. in regard to being the supporter of Baghdad Pact was that through this Pact U.S. intended to take security of the Middle East region under control against Soviet Union's probable attempts in this region through fostering economic and political stand of the states included in this Pact. In the following years U.S. not only enlarged its political influence in the Middle East but also its military influence in this region; **fourthly**, through this organization the U.S. might increase her impact on Pakistan and this might result in realizing its Afghanistan policies more easily via Pakistan. So, depending on this event we can assume that through being the supporter of Central Asian

Economic Cooperation Organization, U.S. might enlarge its sphere of its economic influence in the region in the short run, and political and military influence in the long run.

Probable Advantage of Strategy Model IV for Iran

Through taking part in Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization actually, Pakistan might accelerate to back the U.S. in regard to Taliban movement about which both the regional powers and the Central Asian republics fear. And this might lead Pakistan government to suspend its foreign policy goal, determined to carry Turkmenistan's gas to Pakistan via Afghanistan. As the result of this development, Iran might eliminate both the probability of the emergence of Pakistan as an economic rival in Central Asia against her, and one of the negative factors, which causes threat for its national security.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for India

Firstly, along with this Organization, India might prevent Pakistan from using Islamic sentiments in Central Asia. This might also eliminate probable negative policies of Pakistan, intended to gain power before India with a view to developing multi-lateral relations with Central Asian republics through using Islam; **secondly**, India might compensate the gap, emerged after she had lost Russian back following the demise of the Soviet Union, through developing bi-lateral economic relations and establishing multi-lateral security arrangements by the help of the mentioned Organization; and **last**, it is obvious that slow economic development, internal conflicts, decreasing importance in international platforms motivate India to concentrate on developing foreign relations. So, it can be assumed that India might partly remove these handicaps by the help of Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization.

Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for Pakistan

Firstly, Pakistan might regain the U.S. political and economic assistance, which is regarded as quite important by Pakistani officials for the future of Pakistan state. In addition to this it can be assumed that Pakistani government might never face any severe U.S. punishment such as Pressler Amendment of 1990 (5) in her relations with the U.S.; **secondly**, even though Pakistani government can not succeed to regain the U.S. political and economic support, she might feel secure against India via being a member of this kind of economic organization. Because its is obvious that the eventual aim of establishing CAECO-type economic organizations has been to remove political conflicts among the participating states through raising the economic potentials of the member states. So, it can be said that Pakistan might safeguard herself in south Asia against India through integrating herself in this kind of economic-security arrangement; **thirdly**, through being a CAECO member, Pakistani officials might remove the prevailing discontent between Pakistani and Iranian governments, emerged as the result of Pakistani attempts to develop relations with Saudi Arabia and as the result of the support given by Pakistani officials to Pashtun

Sunnis during Afghanistan conflict while Iranian government supported Shi'ites and Persian-speaking groups in the mentioned conflict.

b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model IV

Probable Disadvantages to be caused by the Russian Federation before Strategy Model IV

Firstly, Russian Federation might transform the CIS, established as an economic and political organization to keep her control over the former Soviet states after disintegration, into a military organization following the establishment of Turkish-American led CAECO. The Central Asian states, which completely refrain from annoying Russian officials, might adopt a negative stand before CAECO, and they might prefer remaining outside this kind of economic (in short run) and political-military (in long run) grouping; **secondly**, Russian officials, in order that they could put obstacles before the development of this kind of Organization, might threaten Central Asian states in the way that they would be deprived of Russian economic assistance and security guarantee in case they get actively involved in CAECO.

Probable Disadvantage to be caused by the Central Asian Republics before Strategy Model IV

Central Asian states, which have been strictly dependent on Russian economic, political and military assistance or support, might present indifference toward taking place in this kind of Economic Organization in order not to annoy Russian officials.

Probable Disadvantage to be caused by the NATO before Strategy Model IV

Turkey, which voluntarily accepted to be covered by common security umbrella through being a NATO member in the beginning of 1950s, might face with NATO members' opposition following the establishment of CAECO, which is intended to raise economic potentials of the member states in the short run, and to set up regional political and security arrangements in the long run.

Following the presentation of four cooperation strategy models for the Central Asian region in the first part of this article, we will explain probable positive and negative impact of these cooperation strategy models on Turkey's position in regard to the Middle East region, U.S., Russian Federation, Greece and EU through developing some positive and negative future scenarios in the next volume of Stradigma.

1. Sergei Kortunov, in his article "Russia in search of allies", published in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, regards nations in the Balkans such as Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians and Greeks as the peoples of the Balkan countries who may potentially become allies to Russia depending on

long historical and cultural ties with her. He mentions that "With the threat of Moslems and Catholics consolidating in the Balkans, the formation of a Slavic-Orthodox quasi-coalition under the aegis of Russia is becoming likely, which, of course, will not be able to be formed, but is necessary to have in mind when conducting corresponding diplomatic, military and political activities". (Kortunov, 1996, p.159)

2. Dr. David Nissman, in his article "Kurds, Russians, And The Pipeline", published in *Eurasian Studies*, Spring 1995, explains the historical ties between the Russians and Kurds, and between the Armenians and Kurds since late 18th century. He also points out the reasons why Russian Federation and Armenia are deeply involved with Kurdish issue. In the mentioned article, the issues such as the support given by Russian and Armenian officials to both the Kurdish population living in Turkey and to the activities of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) are also explained. (see Nissman, 1995, pp.30-34)

3. The explanations of Abdulaziz Tunç, archive responsible of Hezbollah group caught by Turkish security forces in Diyarbakır city in 1999, is quite satisfactory in order to emphasize the ties of Iranian government with Hezbollah group, which is aimed at establishing an Iranian model Kurdish state in southeastern Anatolia in Turkey. In his prosecution Tunç said that "In 1988, with Veliöğlu (Hüseyin Veliöğlu, the leader of Hezbollah, shot in the operation organized by Turkish security forces in January 2000, in Istanbul) and two other friends we arrived in Kelareşe village in Iran. In this village Iran Revolution Guards met us. We arrived in Tehran over Urmiye, Salmas and Tebriz. We settled in a house next to the Turkish Consulate General. Here Iran Security Guards trained us. Then the guns and bombs trainings were provided in the area near Tehran. We came back to Turkey in 1989..." (Durukan, 18 June 1999, Milliyet)

4. Turkish academic Professor Ümit Özdağ in his article "İsrail'in Kuzey Irak Politikası" ("Israel's Policy on Northern Iraq") sets up a correlation between the political stand of the Israel state in regard to the Kurdish state project in Northern Iraq and the share of Israel's political stand in regard to this issue in the determination of Turkey's relations with Israel. He puts it in that way: "In terms of Turkey, elimination of an Israel-backed Kurdish state project in Northern Iraq and termination of PKK terror consist the primary importance in the development of relations with Israel...The main goal of Turkey's policy on Israel is to help Israel succeed to remove the psychology shaped by insecurity through proposing strategic security, and to terminate the Kurdish state project of both Israel and Jewish lobby in U.S.A..." (Özdağ, 1999, p.231)

5. The mentioned Act ended all economic and military assistance to Pakistan since the U.S. Congress believed that Pakistan government had assembled a nuclear bomb. The mentioned amendment embargoed delivery of F-16 and P-3C Orion. However, the Pressler Amendment did not forbid aid to NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations), joint military exercises (if no U.S. funds were used to support Pakistani participation), commercial arms sales, or any service fully paid for by Pakistan government with its own national funds. In 1996, modified the Pressler Amendment through passing the Brown Amendment. The Brown Amendment permitted the U.S. government to deliver 368 million dollars of non-embargoed F-16 equipment, exempted transfer of military equipment, technology or defense services other than F-16 aircraft, extended counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics assistance, authorized some forms of peacekeeping

assistance, facilitated humanitarian and civic assistance projects, and allowed military-to-military contact authorized outside of the International Military Education Training program. (Smith, 1996, p.27)

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