"The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams."

Eleanor Roosevelt

Overview

The year 2023 marks the centennial for the Turkish Republic - a critical benchmarking date against which Turks are set to achieve their strategic mission for a world-class ethical democracy, competitive, knowledge-based economy, proactive and innovative foreign policy, cultural renaissance befitting their ancient history, bridging role between the east and the west, and religions, and greater integration with the global system in every domain. This ambitious endeavor can fail or succeed, depending on the decisions and choices to be made and their effective implementation between now and 2023.

The usual problem with future-oriented stories, which diagnose the "existing dire situation" and promise a "wonderful, bright future", is how to navigate, in practical terms, from point A to Z. Our story in this paper is not unfamiliar at all and has indeed been repeatedly spelled out by the country's government, business and civil society leaders. Our storyline, which we hope can be transposed into a national action-oriented roadmap, with intermediate steps, is as follows:

"Turkey is a country, sitting on one of the world's most valuable real estates, inhabited by a young, dynamic and entrepreneurial people, but it is unable to unleash the vast potential because of long years of poor governance and unimaginative leadership. The country is drowned in a vicious cycle of foreign and domestic debt service soaking up four times what the state spends each year on health and education. Enormous resources wait to be effectively and efficiently harnessed. People are in search of a future vision for themselves and their children in which they can trust. Hence, there is urgency for sustained actions to put Turkey on a rapid economic growth path and democratic governance towards 2023 in harmony with emerging global trends and the country's truly unique strengths".

To realize Turkey's long-standing and unfulfilled aspiration to become one of the world's high-fliers over the next two decades, it is imperative to begin with the pressing task of putting its house economically and politically in order and restoring confidence in the political system, public administration, and private sector, while at the same time framing this effort in the broader strategic vision to be mapped out in genuine consultation with key stakeholders and following up its implementation with vigor, devotion and creativity. The depth of the current economic crisis, the uncertain prospect of European Union (EU) accession, the continuous erosion of the country's competitiveness and the ruling elite's incompetences all add to further clouding the country's skies. Ankara-centered political and regulatory institutions and practices are widely believed to be outdated, incoherent, ineffectively managed, and undermined by lack of trust in government, widespread non-compliance and in some cases corruption. They need to be complemented (and in some cases, replaced) by vibrant regions, municipalities, private sector and civil society partners, who are increasingly inclined towards taking their futures in their own hands.

Yet, without an overarching and unifying grand vision, the chances of fragmentary or patchwork reform packages coming into life are rather slim. As a first step in this direction, Turkey is required to prioritize a range of key goals: from attaining higher standards of education for young population to moving to high-tech agriculture and promoting sustainable tourism, from cultivating ethical values to home-grown technological innovation in textile, from building physical/digital regional hub to fine-tuning foreign and security policies. The resultant "Turkey 2023 Vision" will shed light on the nation's future aspirations and direction - a solid anchor for private sector enterprises, public administration, regions, civil society, foreign actors and individual citizens. Yet, the government must focus on a number of key priorities, which can be achieved in two to four years, to showcase the success stories for building stronger public and international support.

While having great difficulty in anticipating what's to come in the next few months and coping with chronic day-to-day problems, it may be ironic to ask Turkish people to consider a vision twenty years down the road. But there is good reason for asking this precisely because most of the deep-seated problems Turkey faces today are closely related to the past's short-termism, clumsiness, excessive prudence, and lack of innovation. At the current juncture Turks need to be motivated to imagine better futures, believe in and make them happen. Better futures cannot be safely left to the workings of either fate or governments. The broad segments of the society should feel a sense of ownership in, and benefit from, them and engage meaningfully in the process without having to wait too long. Because uncertainty is unavoidable, several possible futures, not just one, should be articulated particularly in such a country as complex and unpredictable as Turkey.

This paper is far from being all-embracing and complete. There are many important issues, which are knowingly or unknowingly left out. At this stage, it is intended only as an initial, modest introduction to coloring Turkey's current "visionless" panorama and planting a few seeds, on the basis of the future trends and best practices in other parts of the world, for a realistic strategic architecture of Turkey between now and 2023. There is evidently no shortage of good analysis, ideas and projects in this line of thinking (i.e., TUBITAK's technology foresight, EGEV's Aegean projects, TUSIAD's strategy papers, State Planning Organization's plans and the like); the key challenge is to embed them in an embracing vision, communicate them effectively, organize ourselves effectively and embark on the result-oriented intermediate steps to showcase the progress under the government's leadership which can inspire trust, galvanize the nation's collective intellect, domestic and foreign resources, and masses around commonly shared goals and success stories.

Scenes From Turkey's "Missionless" and "Visionless" Panorama

We all know what our country's major shortcomings are. They should neither be underestimated nor exaggerated. Most are rooted and aggravated in the absence of proactive, foresighted and resourceful policies and can be resolved. Viewed from the outside, Turkey gives the impression of a country, which has not yet fully settled. It has long been experimenting with the 'critical' and 'transitional' periods, seemingly with no end in sight. The national identity in terms of where it actually belongs is yet to take shape. Its EU accession process is still unclear for reasons emanating from both Brussels and Ankara, while 10 new members are set to join the EU in May 2004 nearly 15 years after the fall of the Berlin wall and more than 40 years following Turkey's first application to the then EEC. Turkey looks like a country at peace neither with itself nor with the countries around it, engulfed in a mindset of paranoia about perceived threats to its domestic and foreign security. Regrettably, it offers neither any ray of hope for its own future, nor a strong reference for its younger generation to follow.

Turkey represents a country, which has so far been unable to use its scarce resources rationally and effectively, and which is crippled by huge domestic debts, with limited capital available for real investment in its human capacity, technology development and promising industries. There is a huge underground economy, which both energizes and distorts the country's fundamentals. The leadership stubbornly and unnecessarily drags feet instead of rejuvenating the country and adapting at the right tempo and scale to the rapid transformations unfolding in the world as they can be translated into national interests. The heavy price of all this has for decades been paid by an increasingly impoverished people as they patiently wait for the promised, but hardly showing, light at the end of the tunnel. As a result, its democracy has visibly degenerated; its unsustainable economy is running from one crisis to another; and its foreign and security policy has created stories of frustration from Central Asia to Cyprus, from EU to Iraq.

The recent economic crises over the past decade have also removed the gloss from the Turkish private sector, which we used to praise as being 'dynamic' and 'the driving force' at every opportunity. In 2002, Turkey ranked 46th (as opposed to 38th in 1999) in the world competitiveness league among a list of 49 countries, according to a poll of business leaders by the International Institute for Management Development in Switzerland. Corruption is widespread in all sectors of public management, particularly in public procurement, at customs entry points, in tax offices, traffic, deed office, rental of public property and forested lands, granting of credit from public banks, and siphoning off of funds of private banks. Last year in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International Turkey's position was 64th among 91 countries (as opposed to 54th a year ago).

Although the Turkish economy grew by 7.8 percent in 2002 after the worst ever contraction of more than 9 percent in 2001, the nominal GDP size reached only $180 billion (only 0.6 percent of the world GDP), with per capita income of $2,584. This can be compared with the 1993 GDP of $178 billion and per capita income of $3,000, which shows a considerable decline of prosperity in real terms over the past decade. If GDP calculations are given in purchasing power parity terms, the situation may not look so damning. Rentiers earn more than real economy producers. Turkey's total debt is $157.4 billion as of April 2003, which corresponds to 86 percent of its GDP. The country invested $422 billion in 1993-2002, both public and private, while it had to pay a total interest of $211 billion during the same period for public and private debt. Domestic savings rate is low.

Industrial, agricultural and labor productivity are well below the international average. Turkey has one foot in the world of productive modern industry, but it also has the other deeply planted in traditional, inefficient methods. Modern segments in the cement and automotive parts industries, for example, have productivity rates higher than counterparts in the United States. And yet traditional segments of many sectors are indexed as low as 20 percent of U.S. levels. And, in most sectors, traditional operators employ a substantial majority of labor. Turkey has to solve that problem. It must successfully extend liberalization into its key utilities sectors.

Added to this are high inflation (around 35 percent in March 2003), the chronic and constantly rising budget deficit (over 11 percent of the GNP, while the authorized ceiling in the EU is 3 percent), an alarming possibility of not servicing internal and external debt, structural and hidden unemployment, a widening gap of income distribution at the expense of the working population and a reform deficit in public life. Each year 700,000 new jobs need to be created. Turkey has not fully grasped the importance of three Es - economic growth, energy security and environmental protection. Its rural development is a failure, prompting more migration to urban shantytowns. A bottom-up regional development drive is yet to take root.

In its poorest cities such as Mus, Agri, Bitlis and Bingol, people live on an annual per capita income of less than $600; subsistence agriculture is still prevalent; land inequality is at large proportions; and the climate is harsh. Other regions are not doing much better either. There is a huge untapped potential for these diverse regions to fuel rapid growth and develop democratic governance. In response to the wide disparities in the Southeast, and in recognition that strengthening this region socially and economically will benefit all of Turkey, the government has initiated a comprehensive socio-economic development project -- the Southeastern Anatolia Project, or GAP in its Turkish acronym. But the region has not profited much from potential spillover effects of this $32 billion mega-project.

Although Turkey is the largest economy in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea basin, the Middle East and the European Union's sixth biggest trading partner, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Turkey have rarely reached $1 billion in any one year - a fraction the level of FDI attracted to countries of comparable size and development like Argentina and Mexico and only one-quarter the level of FDI attracted into Poland. The reasons for Turkey's dismal performance in attracting large FDI inflows are not hard to find. Economic reasons include high transaction costs of entry and operation for foreign investors, chronic high inflation, economic instability, lack of intellectual property rights protection, lack of internationally acceptable accounting standards, insufficient legal structure and physical infrastructure. One can also add to this list non-economic causes such as political instability, internal conflicts, fear of foreign political domination within the civilian and the military bureaucracy, widespread corruption, lack of strategic investor targeting, and the structure of family-owned Turkish business.

On the political front, Turkey has been rowing against the current under a democracy, which hardly reflects the will of the people, is unable to attract quality to its stall and, more importantly, is 'unable to govern.' The civilians do not seem to possess the capacity to govern the country without frequent (open or discreet) intervention from the military, which remains one of the few strategic thinkers and trusted organizations in Turkey. Since the state justice system fails to work, "privatized laws" have taken root. Almost everything the elite Turks boast of is imported. No matter how many determined, ambitious and qualified people there may be around, the world-class politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, industrialists, artists and scientists are either in short supply or they face difficulties in reaching the stage. Despite their rich civilization, traditions and ethics, Turks have not been able to offer much to the global culture, arts and commonly upheld values.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has moved from the periphery to the center of Eurasian and Middle Eastern security. With a landmass and population larger than France's, Turkey is regarded as a pivotal actor in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Its growing role in these regions will likely have profound implications for the international arena and spawn debates over the future trajectory of Turkish foreign policy. However, it is difficult to argue that, based on its performance so far, Turkey has risen to the delicate challenges confronting its foreign and security policies towards these regions as well as the EU, the United States and the emerging centers of power in Asia over the past decade. Creative, foresighted, flexible, and well-articulated strategies are needed to redefine the national interests, commensurate with the country's strengths and needs, as well as in keeping with the global trends.

Why Such a Poor Strategic Thinking?

Clearly, Turkey needs a strategic vision to (i) give a commonly shared sense of direction, (ii) inspire self-confidence and hope for young generation, (iii) achieve "efficient" growth and sustainable development, (iv) develop benchmarks for judging its achievements, and (v) become an innovative society able to proactively cope with emerging challenges and grasp future opportunities ahead of other competitors.

Yet, Turks usually have inadequate data, analyses, projection tools, inventory studies or scientific support before making key decisions or fateful choices. The long-term strategies they attempt to develop are often frozen in time. Centrally taken decisions are usually far removed from the genuine circumstances of life. They are often short-lived and grounded on the unquestioned fate and destiny. Matters, embarked upon with great hope and enthusiasm, soon end in disappointment, and the wait begins for miraculous solutions to work their ways. Strategic and tactical steps are hardly taken in tandem with the perceived future goals. It is for these reasons that Turkey's vast potential cannot be duly exploited, and people continue to naively wonder "why?".

If one key reason for Turkey's being laggard is the slipperiness of its political and economic base over the past decades, another is the lack of self-confidence, strategic planning and a culture of systematic analysis.

The way that for many years elections have failed to offer the opportunity for one single party to take power and implement its own vision has also been a serious handicap. Consecutive coalition governments, based on fragile balances, were unable to think of anything but surviving for a few more months by continuous recourse to populist policies. However, the November 2002 elections delivered a strong one-party government, which has the legislative majority behind it - essential for achieving any significant visionary movement. It remains to be seen how the new government will make use of this historic opportunity in tackling the critical challenge of forging and moving towards a viable future vision for Turkey, but the prevailing signals do not offer much hope.

Just like in most other countries, Turkish political leaders tend to avoid the future as much as possible which they fear and perceive as a waste of time, when their immediate priority is to cope with the day-to-day management of the country's pressing challenges and preparing for the next elections. In every society, therefore, there is a need for brainstormers to rise above the barren day-to-day arguments and short-term perspectives, to evaluate the country's future strategic challenges and opportunities, and to chart practicable long-term strategies compatible with global trends and national interests in the light of alternative scenarios.

In a nutshell, Turkey is yet at another crossroad in history. Situated in such a valuable piece of real estate on the planet as it does, Turkey will not be let carry on in a business-as-usual mode. If Turks fail to set their own internal dynamics in motion and keep up the momentum for change, then sooner or later the system will be forced to reinvent itself under imposition from the outside - probably at a higher price. Such a radical change, prompted by the forces of globalization and the altering domestic balance of power, may get out of Turks' own control. Hence, Turkey must blow the starting whistle for change itself and blow it well; otherwise, what will transpire may not reflect the country's foremost national interests and priorities.

Vast Potential to Be Harnessed

Under a competent leadership who understands the country's strengths and weaknesses, as well as the sweeping changes that are unfolding in the global system, Turkey has the potential to move fast on the way to become a strong regional economy and power to be reckoned with. In fact, the Turkey of the 2000s is already experiencing large-scale positive changes in its demography, culture, social diversity and economic integration, despite many internal and external constraints. Clearly, under a trust-inspiring vision, a lot better can be achieved.

One should not forget that in terms of purchasing power parity Turkey is still among the world's top 17 economies. In arable land, it stands 10th in the world. It is the world 17th most populous nation - that is, one in every 1100 world citizens live in Turkey. The fear of an 'aging population', which so concerns the West, has not yet reached Turkey. According to the forecasts by DRI/McGraw-Hill, its population will be 74-77 million in 2010 and 92 million in 2023. The fact that between 1990 and 2030 the elderly population in the OECD countries will nearly double from 13 to 25 percent may make Turkey a principal source of Europe's well-educated young workforce and brainpower. (Bear in mind that an uneducated, fast growing young population with little sense of direction for its future could conversely a serious headache for the nation).

It is no longer predominantly a rural and agricultural society, but increasingly an urban and industrial one. Income levels in the "metropolitan" areas and their hinterlands are close to those of Europe. Turkey's economy showed great progress between 1960 and 1975. According to World Bank data, its national income increased tenfold between 1970 and 1980. However, during the twelve years between 1980 and 1992 it barely increased twofold and stood still in the following "lost" decade. According to some estimates, Turkey's GDP could rise six-fold to $1.2 trillion by 2023. This, divided by a population estimated to have reached 92 million by that time, means that average per capita income would be around $13,000. In other words, a business-as-usual scenario will allow Turkey only to attain the per capita income enjoyed by Greece in 1999 only a quarter of a century later. That, of course, is without bearing in mind negative changes, wars, or natural disasters such as earthquakes that might occur anytime.

However, Turkey can strive for a more ambitious and robust strategy, based on "high growth" (at least 9 percent per annum), "investment in people" and "a leap to the highest levels in technology". Under normal circumstances, Turkey could grow by an average of 6 percent per year until 2010 and then step it up to 9 percent by 2023. The fast catch-up is possible in this age of speed and technology. Turkey is projected to become a major world consumer market. In the coming twenty years, alongside other big emerging markets -- Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Poland, and South Africa -- which will likely absorb 40 percent of all the imports in the world.

While Turkey is often seen as a failure story in inward FDI attraction, Turkish firms have been very successful in investing abroad - from Arcelik's takeovers in Germany, Austria and Romania, to Efes Beverage Group's facilities in nine countries. Not all Turkish outward FDI is carried out by large Turkish firms. Many small firms, especially in the textile and apparel sector, which still accounts for the lion's share of Turkish manufacturing exports, have been investing in central and eastern Europe, especially in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania, attracted by these countries' more favorable business environments and in anticipation of their EU membership ahead of Turkey.

Turkey stands a good chance to become an attractive location of production for its own entrepreneurs, as well as for foreign investors. It already has many top multinationals and can interest even more from several perspectives, specifically as a manufacturing or service provision base from which to supply European, Central Asian and Middle Eastern markets, as a source of raw or processed materials, as a pool of talent and innovation to be deployed in a Turkish "Silicon Valley" that is readily transferred abroad, as a market for both imports and domestic goods and services, and as a potential joint venture partner anywhere in the world. These all suggest that it should be performing better. One should also add to these advantages the dynamism of Turkey's entrepreneurs, the quality of management and the discipline of workers, which are no less important factors in attracting FDI.

Turkey's playing an active role in Caspian energy politics is closely related to its foreign policy approach that considers energy security in the region as a top national interest. Several factors continue to hinder Turkish efforts to increase its role and influence in the region:

o First, Turkey's own domestic problems, in particular Kurdish separatism, the growth of Islamic influence, and economic weaknesses, diverted attention away from the region.

o Second, Turkish diplomatic energy in the Caspian region was drained by other more pressing security challenges, including threats to the south from Syria, Iraq, and Iran, instability to the north in the Balkans, and disputes to the west with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean.

o Third, Turkey's lack of geographic proximity to Central Asian countries limited Ankara's ability to project greater influence there.

o Fourth, as it became abundantly clear that cash-strapped Turkey lacked capital for large-scale economic aid and investments, Central Asian countries lost much of their interest in Turkish proposals for regional economic integration.

o Fifth, Turkey's pretensions to leadership offended the sensibilities of many Central Asian leaders, especially in the face of fewer common cultural, social, or even linguistic links than many of the parties expected. The peoples of the south Caucasus and Central Asia have a strong sense of national pride, and-having suffered for years under the Soviet Union-were not about to become the "little brothers" of Turkey or any other outside power.

o Sixth, as many of the Central Asian countries developed their own relations with Western countries, they felt less need to rely on Turkey as an intermediary with the West.

o Seventh, Turkey's capabilities to project military power are limited, especially beyond the south Caucasus.

o Finally, Ankara remains wary of taking actions, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan that might antagonize Russia, a major trading partner and significant source of energy and the only country still capable of bringing heavy military pressure to bear on Turkey.

So, Turkey is playing on a crowded Caspian chessboard, but its engagement in the region remains substantial, and the long-term prospects are promising for increased bilateral co-operation and a steady, if unspectacular, expansion of Turkish influence. For now, Ankara has a more realistic appreciation of the difficulties it faces and has trimmed its policies and expectations to fit these realities. The challenge that has recently opened up after the Iraqi war is not a less complicated one as it raises the question about the future of the Kerkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline and how the additional future oil and gas production from western Iraq could be piped through the Turkish territory to the international markets. The goal must be to make Turkey a regional hub for energy trade, transportation and investment with oil, natural gas and electricity inter-connection deals involving Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran.

Another asset Turkey has is its unique synthesis of Western and Eastern cultures unparalleled anywhere in Europe. It straddles between the east and the west, between Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The mixture of Turks with the already assorted population of Anatolia and later with the Balkan peoples has produced a collection of faces and a variety of cultures visibly different from anything else in Asia and Europe. Samuel Huntington's " clash of civilizations " theory should not be allowed to come true. Vilification of Islam asserting that this religion is synonymous with backwardness, terrorism and authoritarian regimes serves no purpose, but only deepens the mutual mistrust. The issue is not just of Islamic fundamentalism. It occurs in other religious traditions. And it exists within cultures as much as between them. Turkey as the "only model of a European state, which combines modern capitalism and secular democracy with a moderate brand of Islam", could find a credible role for itself as a bridge between the two communities.

To complete the picture, we should not forget to add Turkey's other precious assets: key geostrategic position linking the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Caucasus; NATO's second largest army; water reserves; deep-rooted institutions and distilled traditions that go back hundreds of years; natural environment, touristic attractions; and rare mineral resources such as chromium, bor and torium. The picture, which emerges from the foregoing, is a Turkey whose basic fundamentals are sound. Indeed, this country has almost all the ingredients to build a better future if it always looks forward and selectively use part of its past as a "pivot" to get to the future, while leaving behind part of its past considered to be "excess baggage".

All nations, Turkey included, have parables about the good that can come from the bad. There are increasing reasons for cautious optimism in Turkey. The financial system has been materially overhauled thanks to a stringent IMF program. The commitment to market liberalization remains very strong. For the first time in more than a decade, Turkey has a single party government, one apparently committed to change. Labor, business, and government constituents are aligned, as they have not been in a generation, in the desire to break Turkey's "boom-and-bust" cycle and "debt trap".

It is a demanding time, but also a time for new ideas and bold reforms. Such periods of crisis in which the dust is yet to settle may well serve to spark off great leaps forward. History has witnessed striking examples of this in Japan, Germany, Korea and South East Asia. In its very darkest days Russia too began the process of carrying out difficult changes under a young leader, and reforms are currently under way. It is time for Turks, too, to do likewise. At the beginning, there may be a need for the winds of radical change to blow from the top down. Hence the key question is how the Asian Tigers did and Dragons get their act together when their fundamentals 50 years ago looked even worse than Turkey's? What determined the critical path there? Following the Japanese model - the key reform was compulsory primary education, especially women-swiftly enforced by the sanction of the sword. The same holds true for Singapore from cess pool to modernity!

What Do We Know About The Future?

Before proceeding to Turkey's 2023 priorities and the process to make them happen, it is essential to understand better what the future holds for us. Trying to predict, project, propose and sometimes pre-empt the trajectories of the planet's future has become somewhat of a growth industry. Tarot-card readers, astrologers and palmists have been joined by a whole army of scholars and academics who claim expertise in being able to read the signs of the stars-or certainly the data spreadsheets-to tell us not only where the world is heading, but where it should be going instead, and how to get there.

While some futurists do indeed border on the absurd, there is also significant work in this genre that is not only sensible but absolutely essential. The utility and relevance of such scholarship tends to be directly proportional to the rootedness of one's projections in an understanding of the constraints and the predicaments we face today as much as in their talent from conjuring up new opportunities for tomorrow.

Presenting a comprehensive picture of what the world and Turkey are likely to look like in 2023 is not our goal here. We want the reader to imagine a future made possible by changes in technology, life style, geopolitics, regulation and the like. And there are many viable futures as there are imaginative countries, companies, institutions and individuals that can understand deeply the dynamics at work right now which hold opportunities to become the author of the new. The future is not what will happen. The future is what is happening. The present and the future do not abut each other, neatly divided between the x-year plan and the great unknown beyond. The long-term is not something that happens someday; it is what every country is building by its daily decisions. As a prominent writer once said, "Destiny is no matter of chance. It is a matter of choice: It is not a thing to be waited for; it is a thing to be achieved. Only those who can imagine and preemptively create the future will be around to enjoy it".

Beyond the simple endeavors of fortune-tellers, forecasting has gained considerable respectability and momentum in the last quarter of the 20th century with 'futurist' interventions based on scientific foundations. Skeptical writers still consider it risky to raise such efforts to the level of a "science". In one sense, astrologers, physicists and men of religion are the true founding fathers of this science. Recall that Dr. Nostradamus of St. Remy de Provence made such wide-ranging predictions concerning a time 500 years after his own. His 1550 'Almanac' apparently foresaw the French Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Apollo 13 space mission and the Watergate scandal.

Paradigm shifts during the 20th century such as those associated with relativity, genetics and fractals could not have been predicted, so how can we presume to predict those of the 21st century? There are many foresighted writers just trying to do that: Lester Brown's warnings on sustainable development; Stephen Millett and William Kopp's scenarios regarding the top 10 technologies that they believe will revolutionize the next decade; Gregory Stock's "Redesigning Humans", which provides a sweeping overview of possibilities afoot in the biotech revolution, elaborating upon developments for improving health, preventing disease, boosting longevity, and enhancing quality of life; Nancy Ramsey's alternative forecasts as to the future of women; The extraordinary developments that Clement Bezold says will give rise to a radically different health system in the next quarter of a century; GM's new car designs that will run on fuel cells and electricity, and then on solar power and finally hydrogen; the genetic garden in Yalding in southern Britain, and many other developments point to what's awaiting us in the future.

True, the immediate unknowns of today are of more interest and relevance to us than projecting the future trends. Some may argue that predicting the future should be best left to prophets or fortune-tellers, considering who knows whether we will still be around in 10-year time, let alone after 2023. However, as the speed of change increases, individuals and institutions will inevitably feel the need for perspectives on the future, in order both to survive in the increasingly competitive environment and to turn the emerging opportunities to their full benefits. Practically speaking, many respected organizations - primarily foresighted dynamic business groups - are diligently considering what the future may hold for them and what preparations they need to be making as from today. Some companies even recruit futurologists, and others use them as external advisors. The entry into a new millennium has stepped up curiosity in the offerings of the future - more so than in the past. In short, it can be safely said that the future is becoming a "growth business".

Scientists who make their living from the future generally take a 10 to 50-year period as the basis. Statisticians look at the present and the short term and hesitate to go beyond three years. For centuries, theorists and historians have attempted to predict future economic conditions, but with only limited success, because the economy is both complex and unstable: It is constantly changing in unexpected ways. Yet, producing long-term projections regarding the future is not as difficult as is thought. Forecasting methods range from sophisticated econometric systems to plain guesswork. One can simulate 'golden age' or 'doomsday' scenarios and drown the reader in a sea of statistical projections. For example, 'scientific' projections concerning the size of Turkey's GDP in 2023, export to import ratio, per capita income level, volume of external debt and similar figures can be generated through extrapolation from today's statistics and trends. At the end of the day it is only a matter of data being loaded to computer in such a way as to support the pre-destined scenario option.

But, the right approach is, instead of resorting to modern-day fortune-telling, to identify the strategic vision's common denominators, parameters and goals. The rest can be fleshed out according to this or that preference through a dynamic process as exercised successfully in many countries without reinventing the wheel. Furthermore, these exercises should not be too much obsessed about being "scientific" for the simple reason that a static, dogmatic approach may condemn us to stay where we stand. Unconventional views and radical changes can only emerge from the brains of those who are not the prisoners of fixed moulds, but who are innovative, revolting and creative. Innovation has become a lot more important to government and corporate leaders, in the last decade in particular, because of the changes in the global environment brought on by increased technological capabilities, speed, hyper-competition, and faster rates of diffusion enabled by greater connectivity.

Where Are We Heading For?

This is the fundamental question that many strategists have been bedeviling with. In their book '2020 Visions,' two futurologists, Richard Carlson and Bruce Goldman, stress that technology, change and economic conflict are propulsive forces and predict that a 'technotopian' society will emerge from the unification of television, computers and telephone; biotechnology will compete with information technology as regards influence; nation states will turn into mega-states; the 21st century will go down in history as the 'European Century'; some Canadian states will join the United States; China will maintain its rising trend; world energy demand will go up by 50 percent; and the use of drugs will gradually cease to be a criminal offence. Some others foresee a convergence of monotheist religions, arguing that "The God is too big to fit into one religion".

We anticipate that the following forces for change will deeply influence all of us from today to 2023 and hence, will likely determine (and step up) the evolution of Turkey's future vision:

World Population and Its Geographical Distribution. The in-built population momentum will ensure that despite falling growth rates, the planet will be home to considerably more people - possibly several billions more by 2023. The impact of these people will be a function not only of how many there are but of who they are and where they live. Economically, they will be mostly poor; socio-culturally, they will be nearly entirely non-white (i.e., non-Western); and politically, they will mostly be in the developing countries. In essence, they are likely to compound rather than sooth the existing faultlines in today's global society.

The existing econometric models indicate that the world population will rise from its present 5 billion to 8 billion by 2023 and exceed 10 billion by 2032. This, of course, rests on the assumption that there is no natural or human disaster in the meantime. The greatest population rise will be seen in the equatorial and southern hemisphere. Developing countries will represent 87 percent of the world population in 2030. The African population will double in 24 years, although Europe will have to wait 1,025 years to see a comparable population expansion. The US population is expected to rise from 261 million in 1994 to 350 million in 2025.

The increasing age of the population in most post-industrial societies will make its effects increasingly felt. Advances in medicine and biomedical technology, and a healthier lifestyle will extend the average life expectancy. On the other hand, countries, which have not completed their industrialization, will continue to be unstable and unsatisfied societies where the young and middle-aged prevail.

Geopolitical Balances In The World. Globalization has created two different imperatives for policy-makers. The more `technical' challenge is to adapt, reform and establish international institutions to manage new actors, forces, and vulnerabilities in the global economy. The second, more political, challenge is to find a way to 'connect' or reconnect these institutions to voters and to a large number of citizens who increasingly see globalization as a threat to welfare and democracy in many parts of the world.

Politically, neither war, nor violence, nor authoritarianism, nor the abject use of power (military, political or economic) in the pursuit of self-interest is likely to go out of currency. The essential nature of the North-South distinction will remain relevant in global politics, although minor changes in the particular makeup of each might take place. Southern unity (i.e., the G-77) is unlikely to disappear despite internal differences. If anything, Northern solidarity will face mounting stress. Nations will be no more willing to cede on sovereignty; the powerful will be no less inclined to impose their clout; and the weak will be as wary as ever of the motivations of the powerful. A most significant change is likely to be in the evolution of civil society rather than of the state. It is not clear how the increasing 'North-South' tensions within the ranks of the global civil society will eventually manifest themselves; however, this might well be the most important political change of the next twenty years.

States will not become irrelevant or obsolete, but the number, influence, and power of non-state actors will increase. Criminal, ethnic, and religious groups will be more active in the world stage. Air, sea, and land piracy, smuggling, trafficking in outlawed goods, blackmail, theft of information, industrial espionage, technology sabotage, and other activities will bring states into conflict with these groups. The Sicilian, American, Colombian, Turkish, Kurdish, Chinese and Iranian mafias and their partners in Russia will form an unrestricted underground world. It is currently estimated that global organized crime makes an annual profit in the region of $1 trillion (4 percent of the size of the total world economy) and this "business" will likely grow bigger and stronger.

With its capital, technological superiority and military power, and its ability at establishing consensus among other states, the United States will likely remain the world's foremost power until the middle of the 21st century. Among the other regional power centers we may count China, Germany (especially if a powerful EU identity emerges), Japan, Russia, India, and perhaps Brazil. A multi-polar world will emerge in which states are loosely organized in the framework of confederations. Initiatives aimed at regional integration, such as the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the ASEAN, the Organization of American States and the NAFTA will gain strength in this new order.

We must not expect traditional sources of conflict such as the acquisition of land, regional rivalry and former ethnic or religious hostility to disappear entirely compared to the economic wars of the future. Racial, ethnic, religious, social, political or private interest differences between groups and the fragmentation of society will prepare the groundwork for conflict, both within states and between them. It will come as no surprise if, as happened in the former USSR and Yugoslavia, wars of ethnic self-determination give rise to new states. The 'international community,' which currently consists of some 180-190 states, could turn into a 250-member 'global village' with new states drawn up along tribal or ethnic lines in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

International Economic System. There is a tremendous gap between the rich and the poor. People in low-income countries mostly located in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia, and the Eastern Europe are still suffering from small per capita incomes of less than $700. There is also a large digital divide between high and low-income countries in terms of penetration rate of basic telecommunications technology. However, there are fair grounds for optimism that the world as a whole will be a richer and more prosperous planet over the next two decades.

Trends indicate that markets will, indeed, expand. One might safely predict that at least some corporations that do not even exist today will be global giants in products and services that have not even been conceived yet. The world- despite its net prosperity-is likely to be as, or more, unequal in 2023 as it is in 2003. The distance between the richest and the poorest-measured nationally and internationally-would have increased. The attendant social and political pathologies that go with gross inequity would also increase.

The axes of the world economy, the US, Europe and Japan, are all in a weak position and are likely to remain as they are in the near future, but the world's GDP is projected to double by 2023, assuming an average annual growth of 3.2 percent. The US will remain the world's largest national economy, but its percentage of the world's GDP could be less than the current 22 percent. New players are rapidly advancing in the global economy. China might overtake the US as the planet's largest economy on the basis of purchasing power calculations by 2023. New international linkages will take place through multinational outsourcing, stock markets' interaction, foreign direct investment and increased information flows.

Economic security will preoccupy the world leaders more than military security. The fact that the importance of the economy in national security will keep rising may bring this more and more onto the agenda as a source of conflict. The trade wars of the present will be as nothing. It is becoming hard to think of international and national security in separate terms as multinational companies join the economies of the world together. Despite the crisis, the strongest GDP growth in the world is still in the Pacific Basin. It appears that, albeit with a little delay, the slogan 'Pacific century' is on the way to becoming fact.

A great part of the world will use more intensive technology, and will continue to live in a more materialistic and selfish manner. Wealthy countries will try to raise the well-being of their own people by means of information control. These countries will also try to assist poorer nations, but since they will be unwilling to make sacrifices for others, these efforts will fail to have the desired effects. Indeed, due to a rise in individualism there may be a crisis of values caused by a clash between concern over education, transport, justice and public heath and the individual's desire to obtain capital.

New Technologies. We are standing on the verge of a revolution as profound as that which gave birth to modern industry. It will be the environmental revolution, the genetic revolution, the materials revolution, the digital revolution and, most of all, the information revolution. Entirely new industries will soon be born and existing industries will be dramatically transformed. No single nation is likely to control all the technologies and skills required to turn these opportunities into reality.

Immense technological advancements are nearly certain in every area. The greatest of these advancements will be in health related technologies. The benefits of technology will remain as unevenly distributed as ever. In the health domain, for example, the persistent misery of millions was entirely and affordably avoidable in the last twenty years, and will remain so in the next. Predictions for the post-genome era are made by increments of 10 years, from 2010 to 2030. In 2010 there will be numerous aging-related genes discovered and there will also be artificial heart implants that do not require an external power source. Moreover, human cloning will exist but no one will know where or when it will happen. In 2020, we will enter the era of the genomic therapy revolution. Human life expectancy will increase a few years, and the problems of wrinkles and baldness will disappear. And finally in 2030, intelligence enhancement using molecular chips will be available.

The 'global' challenge in terms of technology is not about the providing opportunities for technological advancement; that will happen of its own accord, without need of assistance from the international system. The challenge relates to the creation of political and social will so that technology and its benefits are shared wide and equitably. Advances in micro-electronics will speed up communications all over the planet and provide the basis for the existing social and economic relations to turn into a 'global information society.' Such a society could spark off impressive changes in industry and social relations, in the same way that the Industrial Revolution transformed the agricultural societies of the time. When computer chips' micro-miniature and nano-technology are combined with artificial intelligence, this will lead to another revolution in the product development process. It will be possible for robots to be more widely used in our daily lives. Information technology and supercomputers will assist the understanding of the genetic architecture of our lifestyles. By 2023 the world will witness the beginning of a genetic engineering revolution. This new technology will greatly improve the quality of life.

Biotechnology has the potential to open the way to great advances in agricultural productivity, health services and environmental protection. Advanced materials could create a revolution in the aerospace, automotive, electronics, textile and construction sectors. Alternative energy sources for transport, heating and electrical manufacturing could be developed. Thanks to advances in transport infrastructure and the use of information technology in services, far wider opportunities will be created in tourism and international commerce, and global transport will lower costs. Increasingly lower costs will bring even developing countries to a level whereby they can attain these developed technologies.

Even though the knowledge revolution gives low-income countries opportunities to develop their economies, they cannot use and implement knowledge. Therefore, there is a serious gap between the rich and the poor in terms of knowledge. Low income countries' investment and industrial development in knowledge will likely lag behind high-income countries over the next decades.

Challenges for Energy Security. In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 and the Iraqi war, it is now widely appreciated that volatility in the oil market poses significant risks to economies. Adding to this, world energy consumption is projected to increase by 60 percent (mainly in developing countries) between 1999 and 2020. During this period, it can be anticipated that near-to-market reserves will be depleted and that the need for additional volumes to be transported long distances will increase. The balancing of oil supply and demand is therefore likely to become more delicate than it is at present. The scene is being set for a potentially serious conflict between oil producers, which could lead to great instability in the oil markets. To some extent, oil prices have become desensitized to the geopolitical alarm bells that are frequently sounded in the market.

The future investment in the global energy sector is potentially the most important single issue of international economic development other than the management of the world economy itself. As noted in a recent UNCTAD report: "… energy is one of the most important drivers of economic development and is a key determinant for the quality of our daily lives … it is probably the biggest business in the world economy, with a turnover of at least $1.7 - 2 trillion a year … global investment in energy between 1990 and 2020 will total some $30 trillion at 1992 prices." Any delay in investment will seriously affect the future supply and lead to eventual energy insecurity.

The common concern is still the possibility that new events such as in Iraq could produce a reoccurrence of the price shocks. Nor has the strategic importance of energy, and oil and gas in particular, diminished because the world economy is as dependent, or even more so, on energy than in the 1970s. Even though the share of oil in the world energy mix has been reduced, oil remains a strategic commodity critical to national strategies and international politics. The fundamental link between economic growth and energy consumption remains in place.

The present day energy security problems have their roots in the fundamental imbalance in the location of world oil reserves. Three quarters of the world's oil reserves are located in the Gulf region, and these represent the lowest cost supplies. Middle East producers accounted for 31 percent of world oil supply in 2000, and this figure could grow to 63 percent in 2020, so there is still scope for OPEC to act as a cartel, as it did in the 1970s. In general, this interdependence means that events in the Middle East will appear to threaten, or will actually threaten, large quantities of oil and hence produce price reactions larger than might be expected from other areas.

Policymakers in most economies have been complacent about the energy security risk for decades. In almost 30 years since the 1973 energy crisis, the main focus of international efforts to reduce energy supply risk has been on short-term responses and on producer-consumer dialogue, principally through the OPEC and the IEA. However, because of demand growth and shifts in centers of global demand, the vulnerability of economies to supply disruptions and price shocks has been increasing at a greater rate than any short-term measures could ever have hoped to control. There is a pressing need to move beyond short-term responses and to find sustainable solutions to the causes of energy insecurity. This requires amongst other things, a co-operative search for mechanisms to overcome impediments to exploration and development, to accelerate the development of cross-border power and gas projects and to enhance national self-reliance.

Ecological Restrictions And Natural Environment. Environmentally, twenty years is too short a period for planetary changes. However, catastrophe can always strike suddenly and trends tend to exacerbate over time. The world would not have become a greenhouse, just yet; biodiversity would not have all gone extinct; the forest cover would not have been all cleared. However, each of these and other vital ecological systems would most likely have gone somewhat worse even though technological and policy interventions may well make some minor headway in certain areas.

However, the two most important environmental tests for the near future relate not to 'environmental' indices but to political and social choices. First, would the leadership of the world-North and South-have mustered the political will to meaningfully respond to these and such challenges? Second, would the affluent societies-North and South, but obviously more in the former-be willing to change their excessive-consumptive lifestyles? Much as one would be like to wrong, there is little evidence to suggest that, absent a major ecological crisis, either of those questions could be answered in the affirmative by 2023.

As the world population rises, its pressure on the environment will also increase. Past civilizations were forced to live as nomads because of poor use of resources - recall why early Turks were forced to migrate to Anatolia from Central Asia. Environmental pollution will reach terrible dimensions in those countries, which will experience the most powerful population rises. Some regions will experience extreme changes in climate, and that will inevitably impinge on water and food production capacity. The major natural resource loss can be expected in fresh drinking water. These regions may be dragged into chaos and people may be forced to migrate. Just like today, the poor will be left to deal with the serious problems facing them on their own.

Scientists draw attention to the fact that global climate change has the potential to affect human beings' bio-systems. A new super Ebola virus or currently threatening SARS could spread across the whole world. The rapid consumption of energy sources, particularly fossil fuels, will speed the search for alternative and renewable sources of energy. Giant steps will be taken to harness energy and raw materials from space, and in that context, lunar, solar, wind and hydrogen energy will be increasingly used.

Bleak as it might sound, the above projections are based on past trends and current indications. In terms of broader aspects, it is likely to be a world that is strikingly similar to our own. Just as the basic pathologies of the planet have not changed at all significantly in the last twenty years; they are also unlikely to change dramatically in the next twenty. Sure enough, there will be innumerable changes-many of them positive-in the gadgets and gizmos some of us would be using, or the brands and products that would be holding sway, or the nature and means of interpersonal communications. But the fundamental questions that the international system will be faced with are unlikely to be at all different from what they are today. The central challenge to the international system, then as today, is not about how best to cope with emerging issues, but how to tackle the enduring fundamental problems.

Questions For Strategists

Some of the questions regarding the future that keep most strategist minds busy include:

· How much longer can the United States remain as the world's only superpower? Might Turkey be compelled to choose between the EU and the US in order to avoid being a "Trojan Horse" in Europe and the Middle East, particularly after the Iraqi war? Or will Turkey develop into a truly strong regional power in its own right, which can interact with all groups of countries?

· Will the EU head in the direction of a 30-member federal state, or will the existing cracks between "old" and "new" Europes open still further? Can Turkey become a full member of the EU in the true sense? Will it be condemned to a watered down, loose integration strung out by intermediate phases? Or will the EU continue to fabricate new excuses to keep Turkey at bay?

· Is there a danger of the euro threatening the dollar and yen zones? Could the EU leave behind its identity as an 'economic giant but political and military dwarf' and engage in interventions in the Middle East and Caucasus to the exclusion of Washington?

· Will China be economically divided into eastern and western regions, or will it continue growing at the same speed to achieve the long cherished goal of a superpower status by 2023? Is the Greater China Economic Area a dream or becoming a reality? Will China and Japan settle their historical animosity when Beijing will be able to flex its muscles economically and militarily?

· Can Russia sustain its stable economic course under the Putin administration and draw the former Soviet republics in its 'near abroad' back to the Moscow line through new regional integration initiatives? How will the new generation of leaders that will replace the existing regimes in the Turkic republics in Central Asia behave? Will Turkey become the regional focus for these nations' future orientation and continue rivalry with Russia and Iran?

· Might Syria and Iraq unite? Could the Iranian Azeris, said to number 25 million, unite with Azerbaijan to the north? Can Turkey remain silent in the face of the Russian and Armenian reaction to this move?

· Is it possible for a new group of countries including China, Russia, India, Indonesia and Brazil to challenge the G-7 group? Could the 'Shanghai Five' group formed under the umbrella of China and Russia turn into a defense mechanism to rival NATO/the United States in Central and East Asia? Will Iran be China's strategic "bridge head" partner in the Middle East/Caucasus? Where will Turkey stand in this newly emerging equation?

· Can the emerging markets generate unique syntheses to invalidate the blind, 'fanatical' free market approach to democracy and free market economy? Will globalization fuel further nationalism or greater liberalization? How can its benefits be fairly shared?

· Will there still be a risk for democracy in Turkey to be marginalized due to the Kurdish separatist movement and Islamic fundamentalism, or will the polarization in the country recede?

· Does OPEC have a future in the world oil market? Could the supply of oil be endangered in the decades to come? How will alternative sources of energy, space and ocean energy technologies affect the world oil/gas markets?

· Can wars over the security of food, energy and water supplies be prevented, particularly in Turkey's part of the world? Will Turkey be a main exporter of genetically modified food? What will Turkey's role be in the transportation of water by pipelines and tankers to the needy regions, and the setting of prices on the international water market?

· How realistic is the UN plan to eradicate hunger from the face of the earth by 2025 in the framework of its 'War against Hunger' plan of action? Will access to water and sanitation be possible for all by 2015, as targeted by the United Nations?

· Why is foreign capital not going to poor countries? Would multinational enterprises continue affecting domestic policy-making more than elected governments? Is a new international economic architecture realistic? What about an international police force in the fight against corruption and protecting the global environment?

Experiences Of 'Visionary' Countries There are a variety of country or business visions that may carry lessons for Turkey such as Singapore's 21st century projects, Mahathir Muhammad's Malaysia 2020 vision, Iowa's 2010 strategy, Dubai Internet City, APEC eminent persons' 2020 Vision, EU 2020 goals, Future City of 2020-Reading, South Africa's vision for growth, employment and redistribution, Poland's Strategy for Growth to 2020, Australia's 2020 Business Vision, 'Destino Colombia' project and Shell's 2050 future scenarios. The track record varies considerably, with some considering their visions as holy book and sticking to them while some others do not even open its pages after publication and have little relevance to country's real prospects. They may not be directly relevant to Turkey's particular circumstances but still could inspire some ideas as to the process, which set these visions in motion and their substance. 21st Century Singapore In the context of future vision, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is probably the best example of a living visionary. He is remarkably down-to-earth, and yet a man with telescopic vision. Just after Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, he delivered an emotional speech, which was not really an exceptional performance. But what was remarkable was his choice of the word 'robust' to describe the kind of society that he wanted to build. The transformation of Singapore from an Asian have-not to a developed nation within 50 years is his greatest achievement. The rulers of this tiny island state today see that their future in the new millennium lies in knowledge-based industries such as information technology, biotechnology, medical sciences, logistics and finance. In its vision for the 21st century, unveiled in March 1999, the Economic Development Board issued a call for 'Singapore's knowledge industries to be a lively and enterprising global connection center.' The aim is for Singapore's manufacturing industry and service sector to make major investments in technology, renewal and value-added capabilities, and for Singapore to be made attractive for multinationals engaged in knowledge-intensive activities. In this way, it will be possible for 40 percent of Singapore's annual GDP to consist of knowledge-based activities within the next 10 years. As has been seen in the successes of Silicon Valley and Boston-Route 128, world-class universities are of critical importance in the construction of an information-based economy. They invited the world's 10 best universities to build schools, advanced research facilities and powerful industrial links in Singapore by 2010. Six universities have so far responded positively: MIT, Johns Hopkins, Wharton, University of Chicago, Georgia Institute of Technology and INSEAD. Singapore currently provides talented engineers, social scientists, industrialists and entrepreneurs with all kinds of material and professional opportunities to attract them to the island. The existence of world famous educational institutions means that the improvement of Singapore's intellectual and educational standards is also targeted. Companies will make use of this high quality, increasingly growing human resources pool. Moreover, this will make the commercialization of new technologies and the clearing of the way for companies and industries possible. The emphasis in Singapore's vision of the future lies on human capital and advanced technology. Malaysia on Track for 2020 Vision The Malaysian government wants to transform this developing nation of 22 million people into a first-world country within the next generation. At the heart of the government's future national architecture is the "Vision 2020", which is an aggressive, comprehensive project. While Malaysia faces many challenges as a developing country-primarily, a slow recovery from the Asian economic crisis and difficulty in retaining skilled information technology workers-its prospects for first-world success built on a high-tech foundation are good. The population is well educated, the country is politically stable, and, perhaps most important, the government has demonstrated a real commitment to establishing Malaysia as a global information technology hub. Rounding out its investment in infrastructure along the Multimedia Super Corridor, the Malaysian government is keen to stimulate Internet usage among its entire population. With a variety of innovative programs-for example, giving employees the opportunity to purchase computers through their pension plans, and bringing Internet-enabled computer workstations to remote villages via a "cyber bus"-the government hopes to bring the entire country into the information age. The government expects its programs to help increase Internet penetration rate to 25 percent by 2005 from about 7 percent today. Economic crisis may have delayed the rapid Internet adoption that Malaysia initially hoped for, but its vision is ultimately of a more connected country, and its ambitious approach seems to be paying off. The result is not only a positive outlook for the country's first-world aspirations, but a wealth of investment and business opportunities for global companies. In the 10 years before the economic turmoil of 1997-1998, Malaysia was growing at 8 percent plus, higher than its 7 percent growth target needed to double its per capita income every 10 years for 30 years. (Note that China's vision envisages a quadrupling of GDP between 2000 and 2020). Even if growth for the next 10 years averages slightly less than 7 percent, Malaysia will still be on target. Its domestic savings rate has always been high at almost 40 percent of GDP, while its foreign debts, both public and private, are very low. Under the Vision 2020, there is also liberalization of educational policies leading to the democratization, privatization and decentralization of the Malaysian educational system. In conjunction with mass education, both the primary and secondary school curricula were revised with great emphasis on the development of an all-round individual, the acquisition of basic skills, the inculcation of moral values, and the abolishment of early specialization. The educational administrative system has been decentralized to promote school-based management and teacher empowerment. Furthermore, the private sector has been encouraged to play an active role in providing higher education. Poland's Strategy for Growth to 2020 Poland, which is set to become a full EU member in May 2004, aims to achieve a level of development in 2020 similar to that represented by the current weakest members of the EU, namely Portugal and Greece. The level of per capita GDP in Poland in dollars, in terms of the zloty purchasing power, was estimated in 2000 at about 37 percent of the average level in EU countries. In order to maintain this level, GDP should grow annually by at least 3 percent to match the growth forecast in other EU member states. In Poland, average annual growth of 4-6 percent of GDP can be expected over the next two decades. This would not enable Poland to catch up with the average level in the EU countries by 2020, but it would greatly narrow the gap. The Polish vision group believes that through 2005 the prevention of unemployment growth needs special attention from the government in view of the imminent arrival of the young generation on the labor market. In 2006-2008, foreign debt repayment should be the government's main priority, involving higher domestic savings and a pro-export orientation for the Polish economy. Lower debt levels after 2008 should be used as an opportunity to increase investment and speed up structural economic reform. Demographic changes due in 2016-2020, expected to reduce unemployment, will permit the faster migration of rural population employed in agriculture to towns. Poland's economy today, in European terms, features a relatively high proportion of sectors with no developmental prospects and dwindling economic importance. In Poland, every eighth employee works in such sectors of the economy, while in EU countries-only every twentieth. At the same time, the share of sectors capable of stimulating economic growth and featuring fast-growing demand is insufficient. However, limited budgets will only permit technological modernization within existing sectors. The best remedy for the shortage of economic restructurization funds should be foreign capital attracted for direct investments in Poland, as well as the reorientation of budgetary spending in the wake of foreign debt payment reductions. The strategy of Poland's development through 2020 is so far-sighted that it has not yet aroused much interest on the part of state authorities. A New Japan by 2010 In the 1970s, Japan's Keidanren recommended the 'Programme for the Creation of a New Japan by 2010.' The recommendation stressed that it was essential to take action for the development of a long-term vision of how the economy and society would take shape and for this vision to be realized. The main objectives of this programme, known as 'Action 21,' include: · The building of a society free of strict state regulations by means of a regulatory reform, · The implementation of administrative, financial and tax reforms for a transparent, small and effective government, and a revision in this context of the relative weights of direct and indirect taxation, · A reconsideration of the functions of capital and the building of a decentralized state structure, · The development of a national resources policy, which makes effective use of natural and regional characteristics, · The raising of urban standards, the construction of new national arteries and the improvement of local transport networks, · The construction of airports equipment to allow connections between domestic and international lines, and the modernization of existing ones, · The improvement of the communications infrastructure and the wider use of information technologies in public administration, · The building of a recycling-oriented socio-economic system, · The consolidation of the R&D mechanism conducive to a leading global power, · The development of creative human resources for the construction of a society, which regards diversity as a source of national strength, · The declaration of a ceasefire in the educational 'entry exam wars', · The creation of an environment, which encourages workforce mobility, · The building of effective, achievable and transparent money and capital markets befitting an international finance center, and the encouragement of the global use of the yen, · The taking of measures to cope with an aging population and falling birth rate and allowing people to live longer, · The encouragement of the independent activities of non-profit-making civil organizations in a flexible and tolerant society, · Strengthening the diplomatic staff and resources, accepting the responsibilities of a dynamic and global state, and · The launch of new initiatives within the World Trade Organization, the OECD and APEC for further liberalization in trade and investment.

Old Leaders And Young Society

No doubt, one of Turkey's great assets is its young population - 44 percent of the people are under 24 and 35 percent under 15. Yet, for this population to be a "real" asset at a time when industrial world is aging, they should be better educated and trained if we do not want to used once again as a source of crude labor. They should also be drawn increasingly into the existing governance structures so as to make best use of their dynamism.

No matter how well intentioned they may be, it is very difficult for Turkey's aging and relatively unsophisticated cadre of leaders both to deal with the current problems and to seize the opportunities offered by the 21st century. Their interests lay more in maintaining the status quo and enriching their own supporters than in upgrading their country's competitiveness and human capital. Turkish politicians are generally conditioned to share out the unearned revenues of the state, to channel anger and express reactions to day-to-day problems. Whereas starting from common foundations and values, new designs for the future would make the society look more warmly on the system and bring forth the hope, which nobody has been able to raise for such a long time in a credible manner.

In societies such as Turkey, in which the institutions have not yet firmly settled and acquired an established order, leaders who can be a driving force are of crucial importance. If they are able to put together teams devoted to their ideals, then they can deploy democratic mechanism in the direction of specific objectives. In the hands of ill-prepared, authoritarian and visionless leaders, the trend will inevitably be downward. Yet the example of kicking a man when he is down should not be attributed to politicians alone. All sections of society bear a greater or lesser share of responsibility for the present difficulties. The current weakness of civil society, the lack of a strong middle class to take on radical change and be the driving force for progress (and which itself receives no favors from the state) and the way society has become apathetic and indifferent all add to the culprit sheet.

The emergence of brand new, young, qualified figures on the right, left and center spectrum, who are capable of carrying Turkey forward will provide some hope for the future. Firing the starting gun for a visionary movement depends on the existence of such a core leadership team, which does not hesitate to tell the public the truth, is capable of keeping its promises, and is charismatic, knowledgeable, honest and capable. They should have a dream, a mission, and a strategic objective, capable of explaining that vision to the public, manage effectively those who will carry it out and interact with the outside world on the same wavelength. Successful people are usually reluctant to enter politics in order not to "waste" their energies in an area, which is so much despised and seen as corrupt.

Since new generation leaders cannot be grown in laboratory conditions or be imported, the ground should be prepared for the emergence of a political system, which will reward the quality and merit. Furthermore, what is also needed is a clear articulation of the final goals and good communication skills to mobilize public opinion behind it. Then a major drive, with much greater resources, needs to be devoted to education. In other words, how does Turkey stack up on human capital and institutional infrastructure relative to the large pack of emerging market economies that are seen as future heavy weights? And why do we think that Turkey will do better or worse than this group?

Prerequisites For A Rapid March Towards Turkey 2023

If Turkey does not wish to be aimlessly carried along hither and thither by the wind, as has been the case so far, to drown in a swamp of chronic problems awaiting solution, and to avoid the efforts of interest groups/advisors to constantly divert decision-makers in the direction they consider to be 'important,' it is imperative to draw up a list of priority actions on which energies, abilities and resources can be squarely focused - particularly, a clear roadmap to set a hierarchy of priorities, guidelines, necessary conditions, an operational timeframe and implementation mechanisms to drive the reform process via transparency and political accountability.

We believe that the rapid march towards 2023 should focus on achieving the following key priorities:

> Building New Political Architecture, Good Governance and Domestic Peace

Turkey's current governance structures are largely inadequate, outdated and ineffective in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century. We are all aware that they must be reconstructed to respond to evolving realities and requirements. We also know that Turkey's macroeconomic performance is not unrelated to its weak governance and regulatory structures. The reforms that have thus far been proposed, and much less frequently implemented, are usually ad hoc adaptations. To remedy these disconnects in a more fundamental way, Turkey needs a novel political paradigm in a comprehensive package.

The foremost priority is the transition to a 'democracy capable of effectively governing', be it in a presidential, semi-presidential or reinforced parliamentary system, with checks and balances in place. The new political structure should open the country to competition, innovation, dynamism, accountability, transparency, and greater democracy. It should be designed in such a way to attract the nation's best brains and talents. Unless these reforms are sufficiently debated in the public arena, unless participants are open to practical measures, unless majority concerns are fairly addressed, they will fail to receive general acceptance and will not be implemented effectively.

In this vein, the ongoing EU accession process can serve as a powerful incentive for stepping up internal reform as Turkey strives to meet membership criteria by December 2004. In spite of all obstructions, vulnerabilities, deficiencies and hardships of Turkey's political and economic system, the long march towards a more democratic and efficient rule of law still remains a national priority. In this process, different dimensions of the democratic system as well as its forms and means of materialization have been debated in Turkey while various political bodies have brought suggestions for constitutional and legal amendments. The success of these changes is contingent upon the continuation of this process, the idea of a transparent and efficient state and maybe even a new understanding of the state-individual relationship.

The restructuring of the public sector in Turkey is also a serious concern for the private sector. The need for public reform is better understood when we take into account that the changes will help establish a more effective and efficient public governance, curb corruption, and shrink public spending waste. However, limiting the reform process in Turkey only to the public sector or to the macro-economic matters and expecting change only from these sectors is not right. No sector of the society can be excluded. There absolutely must be change at the micro level as well. Companies that cannot keep up with the restructuring process will need to surrender their positions to those who can keep up with the change.

Another overriding goal is to achieve lasting reconciliation in Turkey, riddled with multitude of domestic conflicts. 'Peace is not merely the absence of conflict, but it is the existence of justice,' says one Turkish thinker. Both the climate of conflict and widening income and regional disparities pose a serious threat to the country's long-term political and economic health. Turkey needs to have an open welcoming approach to its citizens, irrespective of their political persuasion, gender, ethnicity and religious beliefs. Diversity should be recognized as richness. Regions should compete among themselves for attaining stronger competitiveness both nationally and globally and for achieving grass-roots democracy.

It is clear that, unless Turkey puts its own political and administrative house in order at once, Turks can forget about their ambitious 2023 goals.

Essential Pillars Of Good Governance For Future What makes societies and economies successful - availability of natural resources, climate, religion, ethnic multiplicity, or access to foreign markets? Intuitively, each of these variables seems influential, even if a direct relationship between them and a country's success is impossible to identify. Finland and the United States both rank high on any scale of success, even though their ethnic makeup is very different. Norway and Nigeria both are endowed with similar energy resources, but their success rates could not be more different. There is, however, a positive correlation between success and one variable: good governance, which we believe rests on the following essentials: - Rule of law: A society needs to implement the rule of law. This means that the law is above any individual actor or group, even the most powerful. The law must be equally valid for all members of the society. The legal system must provide justice and equal treatment for all groups and individuals of the society. - Functions of the state: The state must have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in society and guarantee the enforcement of its laws. The state must also offer a political process that guarantees the participation of all members of its society through some type of representative process, and ensure that its checks and balances work properly. Beyond these functions, the state is an institution that must work to maximize the benefits of all of its members. - Securing fair competition: In order to make market economies work efficiently, an effective economic framework is required. The state has to assure that contracts are enforced (which requires an efficient legal and juridical system), a trusted medium of exchange exists (which requires consistent monetary policy and well-regulated financial markets), and that fair competition is guaranteed (which requires anti-trust legislation, consumer protection legislation, intellectual property legislation). - Internalization of external effects: The state is responsible for minimizing the negative side effects of production. If a producer is able to shift the costs of environmental pollution to the public, this externalization has the effect of an (undesired) subsidy to the producer, thereby distorting the market signals. - Public goods: Good governance requires the state to provide public goods which, by definition, are not provided by a market, such as internal and external security (police/military), a basic infrastructure for transportation and communication, the preservation of the society's cultural heritage, basic education, and a social policy that guarantees residents a minimum income and health care. Although the quality and quantity of public goods depends on the economic wealth and foundational philosophy of a society, without these goods a successful society cannot exist. - Education: The state has the responsibility to make optimal use of the intellectual resources of its society. This includes giving all children access to affordable education according to their abilities and protecting them from exploitation for short-term gains, thereby securing a society's longer-term investment in adequate education. - Regional integration and global compatibility: In a globalizing world, economies and societies cannot exist self-sufficiently. Therefore, they need to make themselves more compatible to other societies by adhering to global economic and social standards and integrating into larger markets. This requires a state structure that can guarantee fair domestic competition even against powerful external investors. Regional integration is not merely about issues such as reduction of custom rates; it should focus on the harmonization of legal rules and standards in order to create viable markets and on accords with neighbors centering on the provision of regional public goods (security, water, and environment). These seven essentials offer a guideline for states to succeed in a globalizing world. They are compatible with all cultures, even if the implementation of these principles may not benefit every actor in society equally. But the fundamental question is how do we establish them?

 

>Investing In Human Capacity Development, Technology And Sustainable Development

In the future, as in the present, a country's most valuable asset will be the quality of its people. Brainpower and imagination, invention, and the organization of new technologies are the strategic ingredients in the 21st century. Better education, health, social security and employment will help propel countries to the top ranks of the world competitiveness league.

Education for all is the driving force for change. It is no longer thought of only in terms of the initial phase, prior to full entry into adult life. The need for continuing learning to maintain existing skill levels and to develop new ones adds a strong focus on life-long adult learning. Education is increasingly important to social and economic development. National competitiveness and social cohesion depend on good education. Learning and creativity are qualities of an intelligent society. Technology alters education requirements, as does international trade, while the supply of skills also affects investment decisions.

An education system which prepares the ground for an inquiring mind, which encourages production rather than consumption, which calls for sharing and cultural enlightenment, and which teaches respect for common values, is absolute necessity. The state has a leading role in raising the educational standards and equality of opportunity that will open the way for poorer sections of society. A system must be developed in which women and children are given particular importance. Working people, housewives, senior citizens, and others should be able to participate in interactive distance education programmes that can bring them lectures and classes delivered from the best schools in the world.

Investing in children and the young, who will take over from us, is actually an investment in our own and the country's future. No sacrifices must be spared in the use of public and private resources for this purpose. The advancement of an education system and ethical values compatible with the civilized world, inspired by Turkey's rich cultural, religious and historical variety, as well as by science and technology, will produce people, who are self confident, respectful of the diversity and hopeful for the future.

We must also adopt an attitude that will reduce peoples' uncertainty over retirement and health problems. Furthermore, development must be carried out in a sustainable way, from the future generations' ecological perspective. Ensuring adequate and uninterrupted energy supplies must be placed among the country's priority objectives given that Turkey depend on imported oil - 90 percent of its oil and 96 percent of its gas requirements come from generally unstable regions.

>Enhancing International Competitiveness

Closing the performance gap between Turkey and other major economic partners should be a major national goal. This is a job for business but government must create the right environment for business success by providing an economic framework, which is stable and enterprising. The government should put in place policies and programmes to help businesses innovate and succeed as we all face the challenge of the knowledge driven economy. Knowledge and knowledgeable people have become the most determinant factor in any economy.

Competitiveness - a dynamic process that could be achieved, maintained, or lost over time - is a growth industry. Presidents and prime ministers vow to improve it, legislators debate it, and economists measure it. It consists of all actions at different levels from conventional macroeconomic polices to questions related to technology, infrastructure and human resources development. India developed a niche market in software engineering that is highly competitive without changing neither the landscape of Indian industry nor its overwhelming poverty. This example shows that all depends on the objective to be assigned to competitiveness that a strategy could be drafted.

Public sector activities (central government, public enterprises, and public utilities) have a big influence on the country's competitiveness capacity. At macro-level, competitiveness policies should consist of driving the economy to operate on the international efficiency frontier by promoting liberalization and market economy mechanisms that guarantee efficient resource allocation. The package of the reforms would include, among others, creation of competitive environment, trade liberalization, privatization and divesture, private sector development, flexible exchange rate regime, sound monetary and fiscal policies, infrastructure management, institutional liberalization, financial sector management and prudent regulatory framework.

An open, honest, democratic, efficient and productive state, whose institutions work together and in harmony, is the guarantee of a sound economic system. This vision requires sustained reforms of the market, corporations, administrative and foreign investment regulations, and labor-management relations. Economic policies should be based on democratic values, that is to say, principle, trust, autonomy, balance of power and social integration. Policies should be implemented through a democratic process based on dialogue and compromise, and in a manner designed to create a predictable, vibrant, free and fair market order. The policy-making process should be managed in a fully transparent manner through participation of related parties and open discussions. Good governance will not only accelerate the inflow of FDI; it will also create a more competitive domestic market and private sector.

Fiscal reforms designed to boost exports and investment, by granting concessions, reducing rates, and simplifying fiscal rules and procedures, are very strong tools of international competitiveness enhancing. Expansionist government spending lead to the accumulation of unsustainable public debt. This in turn will create balance of payment problems, high inflation, capital flight, and weakening of the exchange rate, and undermining international confidence. An enabling domestic environment is vital for mobilizing domestic resources, increasing productivity, reducing capital flight, encouraging the private sector and attracting and making effective use of international investment. The key to unlocking Turkey's debt trap is to lengthen public debt maturities on fiscally sustainable terms, to reduce radically short-term foreign exchange exposure, attract more FDI and to vigorously rehabilitate the banking system.

In an increasingly interdependent world, countries' success or failure has come to be viewed in light of their 'efficient growth'. Those economies, which will perform best in the future, are not those, which support chosen or preferred 'strategic' industries, but those able to use their assets in the most effective manner. Turkey will enhance its global competitiveness by capitalizing its considerable economic, political and geographic assets. Its future role in the global economy depends very much on its ability to further integrate with the competitive international markets through attraction of "quality" FDI, increased exports over imports, deployment of advanced technology, promotion of Turkish brands and trademarks and strategically targeted investment abroad.

Production costs should not be allowed to reach such levels as to damage Turkey's international competitiveness, as is currently the case. New know-how must be brought to renovate those industries in which Turkey enjoys a relative superiority, such as agriculture, tourism, textile/clothing, construction and defense sectors, but also explore new industries and technologies which will enhance its standing over the next decades. The forward-looking energy supply and demand scenario must be developed on the basis of energy sources which are clean, renewable, and whose costs do not impinge on competitiveness.

The impact of e-government at the broadest level is simply better government. It enables better policy outcomes, higher quality services and greater engagement with citizens. Governments and public administrations will, and should, continue to be judged against these established criteria for success. Turkey can take giant steps through the promise of digital government, which will connect government actors and the public in entirely new ways. The TUBITAK could provide support to the further development of digital and electronic government.

Turkey should also aspire to be a regional hub for businesses, services, and transportation for the countries of Eurasia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. For many decades, Turkey has failed in assuming its regional role; now, it has a unique chance to position itself as a nerve center and switching node for staging regional and international business operations. Its competitive assets will be an efficient information infrastructure and a work force equipped with the skills and expertise to operate, manage, and get the most out of the infrastructure. The new information infrastructure will also enable Turkey's air and seaports to reinvent value in the movement of goods and passengers.

>'Fine Tuning' Foreign and Security Relations

The new parameters that will potentially shape the course of events in the world system, such as demographic developments and ethnic strife, politics of oil and water, proliferation of mass destruction weapons and terrorism at the doorsteps of NATO and EU, are inevitably bringing Turkey's future into view. The international sea change has vastly changed Turkey's foreign and security policy environment. As a result, Ankara is compelled to shoulder greater responsibilities as a regional political, economic and military power to be reckoned with in Eurasia, the Balkans and the Middle East -- a vast area of ancient civilizations that connects East and West and the nexus of trade, investment and energy routes.

The three wars of the US Administration -- Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Iraq -- have greatly elevated the strategic significance of the greater Caspian basin, Middle East and Turkey. There is currently a considerably higher U.S. presence and profile in the region, which is likely to be enduring over the next decades if not permanent. Despite the difficulties faced during the Iraqi war in bilateral relations with the US, Turkey will likely continue to have strong cards in maximizing its national interests and becoming a powerful regional advocate for its neighbors in the future. As US Secretary of State Colin Powell said after the conclusion of the Iraqi war in April 2003, "all the nations of the region" should now reconsider their position. The particular terms of Turkish engagement in its region will, of course, be dictated by the contingencies of its history, economy, military, and multilateral circumstances. One thing is certain that its "strategic" partnership with the US and "membership" quest with the EU cannot be taken for granted.

As Turkish economy becomes more competitive in the international economy, as Turks resolve domestic problems, invest heavily in human capital, and the population of the industrial world ages, Turkey's EU membership will be accomplished sooner than widely believed in any case before 2012. This will have to be on mutually agreed terms, rather than on the imposition of standard blueprints on Turkey. Since the opening of a line of credit in Helsinki and then in Copenhagen Turkey has been working hard putting its act together, through the achievement of both the economic and political reforms. Make no mistake: Turkey that will join the EU will be different from the Turkey of today and the EU that Turkey joins will have to be different from the EU of today. Not only will Turkey's accession lead to a stable, democratic and peaceful Europe, but it will also make Europe more dynamic and resourceful in the ongoing global economic and geopolitical competition. A win-win situation should be created for both sides. Otherwise, Turkey will not likely consent to be an "annex" of the EU in a diluted membership.

'Regional power' status obliges Turkey to recast its foreign affairs strategy, organizations and staff in line with new requirements and changes. Turkey should aim at forming a genuine belt of peace and security in its surrounding region in order to be able to carry on its reform process. This makes it essential for Turks to develop a new co-operative mentality which places the re-building of trust with their neighbors at the forefront, and to carry out a long overdue 'fine tuning' as dictated by the post-Cold War period and after the Iraqi debacle in relations with emerging world and regional powers - something that has not been fully reflected yet in Turkey's existing policies and mentality.

Furthermore, at a time when economic and commercial interests occupy a central position in foreign relations, Ankara needs to forge a global culture as a 'trading' and 'investing' country. Constructive co-operation and a culture of dialogue must be stressed rather than chauvinistic and challenging attitudes in foreign and security policies. Competition between nations is natural in the global economy, but the overriding goal should not be creating one of the world's 'largest', 'strongest' economies and 'most modern' militaries. What really matters is to be able to create one of the world's "happiest" and "prosperous" nations. For this to happen more energy should be spent on the primacy of building interdependencies on an equal footing in economy, security, culture, human rights and people-to-people relations.

What Should Be The Guiding Principles?

It is important to develop a workable roadmap for a result-oriented future architecture. Whoever you speak to from the villager in Erzurum throwing dice in the coffee house, the Istanbul lawyer representing his client in court, to the youngster from Ankara preparing for university entrance exams or else, they all start by saying, 'If I were the prime minister…' and then offer you dozens of recipes for making 'halva,' setting out the country's shortcomings and what could be done to redress them. That is all fine, but at the end of the day nobody has seriously gotten down to how to make the 'halva.'

We believe that the following fundamental principles to ensure the success of any longer-term strategic vision for Turkey deserve particular attention:

· Leadership and commitment, at both political (by the president, prime minister and parliament), administrative, regional, municipal, enterprises and civil society levels, are crucial to prioritizing, managing change and monitoring progress in implementation. Committed, visionary leaders are required to deal with disruptive change, to persevere when benefits take time to emerge, to respond when things go wrong, and to establish visions and plans for the future.
· Integration of the longer-term vision into broader national/international policy objectives, structural and public management reform processes. Every government programme should take as the base the 2023 goals and pursue their step-by-step implementation.
· Instill sense of ownership, ensure it brings benefits to everyone and build capacities. Precondition for success is not just to elaborate a glossy vision for the future, but is a focus on practical measures whose impact can be felt, beginning from today, and benefits reaped throughout the life of the current generation. Otherwise, securing broad-based commitment to goals will be an uphill struggle.
· The implementation is most effective when public/private agencies work together within common frameworks to ensure interoperability, maximize implementation efficiency and avoid duplication. There should be interactions with future-oriented counterparts in other parts of the world to learn and adapt their experiences to local needs.
· The vision can open up government policy processes and enhance accountability and transparency. Arrangements should ensure that it is clear who is responsible for shared projects and initiatives. Similarly, the use of private sector partnerships must not reduce accountability.
· Any spending on the development of the vision, its process and implementation needs to be treated as an investment in the future. The initiative requires a level of certainty of future funding to provide sustainability to projects, avoid wasting resources and gaining maximum benefit from given funding levels. A central funding to be provided by government, business and international development agencies could help it to be self-sustaining.
· Monitoring, evaluation and public scrutiny. Identifying the demand, costs, benefits and impacts of this process is crucial if momentum is to be sustained. The vision implementers cannot expect support if they cannot articulate potential benefits and benchmark their performance.

How Can The Process Work?

Far away though it may seem today, choosing the 100th anniversary of the Republic as the target is essential in terms of fixing the nation's attention on a highly motivating common goal. Our children today will be the adults of the Turkey of 2023. It goes without saying that an individual, a group of researchers or a political group cannot (and should not be expected to) design, advocate and secure wide social acceptance for the vision. It requires an all-out, collective initiative involving key stakeholders (i.e., government, parliament, business, regions, municipalities, military, civil society groups, scientific community and media). The result should not be producing new fancy reports, which would hit the front-page headlines a few days in the press and then fade away into dusty shelves. The vision should spell out clear missions, be action-oriented, with each step leading consciously towards the achievement of the ultimate goals.

An architect is both a dreamer and a draftsman capable of producing a blueprint for how to turn the dream into reality. Strategic architecture is not a detailed plan as it identifies the major capabilities to be built and "what we must be doing right now" to intercept the future. Creating a detailed plan for a 20-year competitive quest is impossible. By way of analogy, we can liken it to a high-level map of inter-city highways, not a detailed map of city streets. Our vision should inspire a novel paradigm for a better tomorrow worth striving to the present and future generations. It should begin building the future through concrete actions with time-bound targets, clearly identified line of responsibility as to who will do what and how performance will be measured and rewarded.

After the opinions and recommendations from relevant brainstormers have been taken on board, a strategic framework should be put in place. Then, the leaders of the vision initiatives and public at large should be offered the opportunity to reconsider all aspects of this blueprint with a view to incorporating them where possible into their own agendas. Their step-by-step implementation will have to be closely monitored by the mentors and stakeholders of that vision, and will be subject to constant revision as deemed necessary. Political parties' electoral success should be measured on the basis of their relative performance and a set of benchmarks/indicators to achieve the commonly agreed goals.

To realize the objectives, the " 2023 Turkey Vision " could focus initially on the following actions:

· The prime minister must decide whether he will be the driving force for launching, guiding and supervising the implementation of such a commonly shared vision, thus linking his/her political future to the successful mobilization of the implementers and the public at large towards achieving the 2023 priority projects. The mission and vision are clearly non-partisan in the high interests of the nation, but its priorities and successful implementation will hinge on the government, which should effectively take on board other "shareholders" of the country. The progress in achieving the goals between now and the end of the government's term in office will certainly boost its re-election chances.

· On the government side, the prime minister should appoint a powerful, respected, high-caliber executive - reporting directly to him and the cabinet - to manage the process. The State Planning Organization could be reorganized as a dynamic and flexible "State Strategy Development Center". TUBITAK could well serve as the national focus for the 2023 technology vision, which will feed into almost every domain. A regional development agency, which should also incorporate the GAP Authority, should focus on how best empower the regions and municipalities and develop region-specific future initiatives. The prime minister could hold several special cabinet meetings each year exclusively devoted to discuss the priority actions, take decisions and monitor the implementation.

· The Parliament could consider establishing a special commission to provide the legislative umbrella for the 2023 vision-related legislation and harmonize the inter-party dialogue on this matter. The Commission would also exert its scrutiny over the government actions in implementing the vision projects.

· The private sector, civil society partners, and universities should have their own vision task forces. They, the government and the parliament could convene once a year (or as frequent as necessary) possibly under the umbrella of the Istanbul Forum, which can serve as the "brain trust" clearing house for the "2023 Turkey Vision". The Istanbul Forum, as the national forum for informed dialogue, debate, and consensus building among the key stakeholders through its regular meetings and conferences in major Turkish cities and abroad, broadcasts and flagship publications, should continue to:

-- generate timely, state-of-the-art information on key topics related to global future trends and emerging issues that have long-term implications for the Turkish economy, diplomacy and society and disseminate them effectively;

-- communicate the vision challenges and related action programmes to raise awareness and what can be done to solve them, paying special attention to reaching not only the current generation of policymakers, parliamentarians, business executives, researchers, educationists, and other leaders, but also the next generation;

-- help strengthen the capacity of the major stakeholders to conduct their own vision research and development and implement them effectively; and

-- engage in active international co-operation projects with IFIs, think-tanks, business groups, development agencies, universities and sister organizations abroad.

Final Word

Today the uncertainty is the day of the order not only in Turkey but all over the world as our generation is witnessing significant geopolitical shifts, new economic challenges, promises of technologies, systemic risks and unconventional threats to our lives. So, it is critically important that we interpret the global trends correctly in the interests of our current and future gains; then make the right assessments and decisions in order to respond to the challenges and opportunities of today and tomorrow.

In this context, the "2023 Turkey Vision", with a multitude of alternative scenarios, can usher Turkey in the road to increased prosperity and happiness of its people, irrespective of ethnic, religious, and social roots. True, it is a long way. Perseverance, devotion and hard work is needed; but we should not forget that the founding father of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, had accomplished the bulk of his revolutionary vision only in a period of 15 years (1923-1938) as he did between the two destructive world wars and in great deprivation. Ataturk's vision and the trust he inspired had unified the nation behind his profound transformations.

Consider what more can be achieved in this age of speed and information and think of the largely wasted 15 years between 1988 and 2003. We believe that the two terms of government will be sufficient to put the essential pillars of this vision in place and radically change the face of Turkey for better. Turks can and should write the script for their own future if they are united behind a common, ambitious goal. In fact, the necessary broad consensus, rich resources and potential do exist. The existing public, private and local vision initiatives should achieve synergies and cross-fertilization under the Istanbul Forum mechanisms.

A dynamic and enlightened leadership can kick off the process -- in the right order of priorities (the top one being education at the primary and secondary level and mechanisms so that the benefits of technical change are not all captured by the rentiers) -- to make the right taste 'halva' from the abundant ingredients of oil, flour and sugar. It cannot be only a top-down strategy as usual; we need to engage all the dynamic forces of the nation, as well as international partners. Otherwise, Turks may likely continue complaining about "missed opportunities" and unidentified "external forces" attempting to ruin their country in 2023. They will likely play into other nations' scenarios, often without even being aware of the hidden agenda, and their 'roadmap' will be drawn elsewhere, as has long been the case.

The future is now and in our hands. It can be won or lost. Let us be clear: the short-term and long-term do not abut one another with a clear line of demarcation, as both are tightly intertwined. Failure to anticipate and participate in the future will impoverish nations, firms and individuals. So, between now and 2023 the central government, regions and private sector, with strong support from other stakeholders, need to make tangible progress each year, through perhaps demonstration projects in different parts of Turkey, to build up further support for other grandiose projects in the making. Bear in mind that all great achievements in history began initially as dreams often ridiculed, but strong strategic vision, leadership, sense of trust and vigorous follow-up have turned them into realities.

Hence, our message is crystal clear: Prepare and act now because "the future begins today".

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1. This paper builds on his earlier works including the October 1998 strategy paper on "A new foreign economic relations strategy for Turkey towards 2010", published by TUSIAD, and "Turkey 2023 Vision" in Dis Ticarette Durum, September 2002, as well as on a series of discussions with key government and business leaders. He is grateful to Ugur Yuce, Mehmet Aktas, Mujdat Guler, Namik Erpul, Franz Traxler, Zulal Izgin, Rainer Geiger, James Chan-Lee, Bozkurt Aran and Ergun Pelit for sharing their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. The views expressed in this paper are his personal and do not reflect those of any organisation he is associated with.