The role and place of the army in social-political
life of modern Iraq and its functions
in the frame of Iraqi society have been
closely connected with history of formation
of the national statehood in the country.
As in most of the Arab countries, officership
in Iraq had played one of the dominant
roles in the formation of independent
Iraqi state that predetermined the position
of the army in its social-political
life in many respects since the 20th
century.
The turning point in the history of
modern Iraq and its armed services was
the July Coup D'etat, 1968 as a result
of which the Ba'th Party had come to
power in the country. During their 35-year
tenure of office, the leaders of this
party attended a special emphasis on
the army and constantly aspired to strengthen
their own positions in armed services,
establish a strong system of party control
over all army structures in the country.
The slogan "Army for war and construction",
advanced as far back as the 7th Regional
Congress of the Ba'th Party (November,
1968) directed party bodies to hasten
"Baathization" in the army
and widely purge the managerial staff
of armed services. At the same time,
the activities of other parties had
been banned (1).
The Ba'th Party leadership from the
very outset had added to their arsenal
the idea of the founder and party ideologist,
M. Aflaq that military personnel should
not politicize, and gradually could
reduce the representation of the military
in the bodies of political authority.
At the same time, for strengthening
of their regime, Iraqi authorities consolidated
the army on the inside - in the 1980s
all the commissioned and non-commissioned
staff in the armed services, as well
as in the security services had already
become members of the Ba'th Party (2).
This provision was legalized in official
documents, decisions of regional congresses
of the ruling party, in which it was
underlined that "from the very
beginning, there had been earnestly
two problems before the party … consolidation
of party leadership in the army; propagation
of the party principles in the ranks
of the army, and its purification from
all suspected and adventurist elements"
(3).
Under the military doctrine of the
party and national leadership of Iraq,
it considered the armed services as
protection from external enemies, and
also as a guarantee of internal security
and stability of the regime. It being
noted that repressive internal functions
of the armed services in most cases
were becoming more dominant. Suffice
it to remember that the use of the army
in the suppression of the Kurdish actions,
Shi'i population, etc., of the country.
External functions of the army were
aimed at the security of "center-force"
ambitions of the ruling regime on the
change of Iraq into a leading power
not only in the Arab world, but also
in the whole Middle East region. On
the path to the achievement of this
aim, Baghdad regime regarded acceptable
to use all means, including political
and military ones.
In order to secure long-range ambitions
and aims, there had been envisaged an
intensification of military potential
of the country, for which long before
Iran-Iraq War intensive development
and realization of whole system for
special military programs on equipping
of the army with modern weapons and
defense technology, on its modernization
on the basis of creation of highly-mechanized
branches had been under way. A special
emphasis was focused on the development
of proper nuclear programs and creation
of conditions for changing of Iraq into
a nuclear power. Iraqi leadership started
carrying out the policy of diversification
of armaments sources and military expenses
for military considerably increased.
The character of political aspect of
Iraq's military doctrine was proven
by the incursion of its army into Iran
in 1980 that started the eight-year
Iran-Iraq War and Kuwait occupation
in August 1990. The Kuwait adventure
cost Iraq dear, it undermined not only
the military and political positions
of the country in the region, but also
led to further decrease of its military
potentiality, limitation of military
programs, and establishment of control
over them. UN Security Council introduced
a strict system of sanctions against
Iraq that deprived it from the opportunity
to reconstruct destroyed, defensive
industry, and also import of ammunitions.
Resolution N 661 (August 6, 1990) and
following resolutions envisaged an embargo
on the sale or delivery of arms and
military materials of all kinds including
conventional weapons and means for their
production, as well as their spare parts,
military technology etc.
A strict barrier was aimed at Baghdad's
intentions to establish the production
of weapons of mass destruction. UN Security
Council's Resolution N 687 (April 3,
1991) resolved that Iraq must unconditionally
consent to distract, eliminate or render
harmless all chemical and biological
weapons under international control,
eliminate all ballistic missiles with
the range above 150 km. besides, Iraq
had to agree not to purchase or develop
nuclear weapons (4).
After the suppression of Shi'i uprising
in the south of Iraq and Kurdish anti-governmental
actions in the North, the main task
of the regime became a fight for its
own survival gradually getting previous
things put in order in the country.
For this purpose, the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) - superior authorities
in the country accepted strategy "preservation
of forces and non-participation in conflicts".
It meant the maintenance of military
capacity on such a level that could
be enough for protection of Iraq's internal
and external security within the forthcoming
period. Gradually, military threat from
the outside was becoming less sufficient
in comparison with possible anti-regime
actions in the very country.
In this connection, a rapt attention
of the regime was focused on the army.
In particular, it was taken into consideration
that regular armed services actually
compromised themselves during anti-governmental
actions in the spring of 1991, without
offering proper resistance to rebels.
Increased purges and the atmosphere
of non-confidence and jealousy created
in the ranks of the army resulted in
that, many officers decided to flee
from the country, mainly through Kurdish
regions. Part of these officers remained
there and took part in the activities
against the regime.
1991 to 1997, a number of plots was
disclosed with the participation of
the high-ranking military, mainly those,
who intended to remove the Tikrit clan
from power. In summer of 1996, Iraqi
special services revealed anti-regime
conspiracy with the participation of
army officers, in the result of which
over 100 persons had been taken into
custody or executed.
Because of non-confidence to the "traditional"
armed services, at the same time, new
military and militarized units had been
organized thus creating multistage structure
of force machinery. So, on the initiative
and under the leadership of Saddam Hussein's
elder son, fighting squads so-called
"Saddam's Fidains" and "Saddamiyun"
were organized in 1994. Moreover, within
the "Fidains" a separate "gold
battalion ", in a sense, Iraqi
special purpose service, and later,
under the aegis of the "Fidains",
also, similar militia for teen-agers-
"Ashbal Saddam" had been organized.
Saddam Hussein's jealousy mainly applied
to the armed forces. The next "fit"
of jealousy had caused an apical crisis,
defeating the regime as a result of
escape of President's sons-in-law -
Hussein Kamal and Saddam Kamal, also
some others from the circle close to
them (August, 1995) (5). In fact, of
officers and employees of special services,
Hussein Kamal's multiple entourages
had been disgraced or reduced to the
ranks or transferred to the army, backcountry
districts of the country. During the
"purges" in spring-summer,
1996, that had a very deep resonance,
there were many originating from the
ruling Tikrit clan in the army, security
services, and the Republic Guard. At
that, Saddam Hussein focused the preventive
measures on the groupings ("center
of influence"), created around
his close relatives (6).
A special attention was given to the
purge and renewal of "security
zone" around Saddam Hussein. Apart
from the President, this question was
in progress by the Special Security
Service (Jihaz al-Amn al-Hass), headed
by Saddam Hussein's younger son Kusay
(7).
In the middle of 1990s, Iraqi armed
services numbered app. 400, 000 persons.
Along with its standing army, the military
organization of the country also included
irregular troops- People's Army. It
was organized as far back as 1970 and
represented units of territorial type,
functioning under direct control of
the ruling Ba'th Party.
The scale of priority inside the armed
services was as follows:
- Special Republic Guards;
- Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense;
- Naval Fleet and Coastal Patrolling;
- Conventional army units (8).
They had in service about 2,600 tanks,
over 2000 guns of field artillery, 5,000
fighting machine infantries, about 300
combat planes, 80 small- and medium-range
anti-craft rocket complexes. Armaments
belonging to units and divisions mainly
included foreign made weapons of outmoded
types. Because of the established regime
of sanctions, the flow of new machinery
and spare parts had been cut off.
In order to maintain combat readiness
of ground forces at a proper level,
Iraqi General Headquarters of the armed
services took a resolution to carry
out cuts in them in 1995 (including
the Republic Guards).
The influence of international sanctions
seemed to be much more tangible in respect
of techno-capacious types of military
services- Air Force, Anti-Craft Defense,
Naval Forces. Out of some 300 combat
planes in service, 130 (mainly old Soviet
MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-20, SU-22) had virtually
generated flying resources, over 100
of them seemed to have been in faulty
condition. As a result, only 70-90 planes
(MiG-25, MiG-29, Su-25) and some 100
helicopters capable of solving problems
put by at a proper level could be maintained
in battle-worthy condition within Iraqi
Air Force (9).
Out of the rest of anti-craft missiles
(mainly "zemlya-vozdukh" type
Soviet rocket systems - SAM-2, SAM-3,
SAM-6, SAM-8, SAM-13, and European "Roland-2"
and anti-craft guns "ZSU 23-4")
and radio aids were of little use for
carrying out combat missions after the
bombings in January-March, 1991 (10).
The staff of the Air Force and Anti-Craft
Defense was subject to reduction-from
25% to 40%. In May-August 1995, the
regime under private control of Saddam
Hussein made an attempt to restore part
of the machinery by the forces of national
specialists in the network of "Nida
al-Kaid" company (leader's war-cry).
In order to finance it, along with the
allocation of funds from National Treasury,
the authorities had organized to collect
donations earmarked for a special purpose
from the population.
As a result of bombardments in the
course of the so-called operation "Desert
storm", Iraqi Naval Forces had
suffered irreplaceable losses and Naval
Fleet practically had been missing.
Within it, there were basically light
patrol boats made in Iraq, which carried
out a task on patrolling of waters,
directly bordering to the Iraqi coast
of the Persian Gulf, water areas of
the Iraq ports and the Shat-el-Arab
River in that part, across which extends
the border between Iran and Iraq.
Apart from the technique of the armed
services, the regime was also engaged
in the decision-making connected with
the strengthening of moral - political
spirit in the army, maintenance of its
implicit loyalty and allegiance to the
leadership. For this purpose, staff
transfer of the officers in the armed
services, touching practically all parts
had been widely undertaken. The principle
of recruitment of the senior officers
at all levels was conducted on the basis
of deep loyalty to the Ba'th regime
and personal fidelity to Saddam Hussein.
Special emphasis was laid on the appropriate
appointments of those who originated
from the ruling "at-Tikriti"
or other clans from the province of
Salaheddin.
Over the past years, the General Headquarters
and most part of its divisions had been
practically renewed, Air Force, Naval
Force Commanders, and Commander-in-Chief
of the Frontier troops had been replaced
on their posts, a new organizational-regular
structure had been introduced in the
troops of the Republic Guards, according
to which numerous staff changes had
been made (11).
According to the data provided by the
International Institute of Strategic
Researches, in 1998-1999, defense spending
of Iraq amounted to $ 1, 43 and 1, 5
billion respectively, that was much
for such a blockaded country (12)
Under conditions of the sanctions,
the armed services had gradually conceded
the role of the powerful defender of
the regime to various security bodies.
The most powerful structure among Iraq's
special services was the Special Security
Service (SSS) (Jihaz al-Amn al-Hass)
headed by Saddam Hussein's younger son
Kusay and who had the power to deal
with the coordination of activity of
all Iraqi special services on safeguarding
of the President and superior leaders
of the country and the party. The Special
Security Service was formed in the middle
of the 1980's, following one of the
serious attempts on Saddam Hussein as
the security services had failed to
coordinate actions. Employees were recruited
basically from the "at-Tikriti"
clan and the tribe so-called "ad-Duleym".
Number of the employees grew from 1,000
persons in 1990 up to more 5, 000 persons.
Primary function of the SSS was to protect
President Saddam Hussein from attempts
of the army officers. For this purpose,
the SSS not only watched all presidential
establishments, but also kept a look-out,
conducted reconnaissance in the environment
of other special services and army.
The SSS battalions closely cooperated
with the Special Republic Guard that
was liable to provide the service with
heavy armament in case of serious attempt
of revolution.
The second place due to importance
was held by Iraqi Intelligence Service
(IIS) (Dairat al-Muhabarat al-Amma),
engaged in vigorous activities, both
inside Iraq, and abroad. Twenty-eight
divisions of the IIS included all traditional
guidelines for action of intelligence
and counterespionage (work with the
local population, protection of public
and party organization men, safety of
delegations arriving in Iraq, watching
of foreigners located in the country,
external intelligence, spread of the
agents into the lines of opposition
and liquidation of its leaders, secret
export-import transactions).
Common Security Service (CSS) (al-Amn
al-Amm), notwithstanding all data available,
basically supervised questions concerning
internal security, was sometimes involved
in realization of small-scale operations
outside of Iraq. The CSS was formed
as far back as the royal regime and
was then part of police forces in the
system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The CSS's term of reference provided
for economic and political crimes. Before
revolution of 1968, the CSS staff included
professional policemen and army officers.
In 1980, the post of the CSS leader
was held by Saddam Hussein's cousin
A.H. al-Majid who carried out "ba'thization"
of the service and strengthened it with
the party staff. Because of the confusion
of S.Ibrahim with Saddam Hussein's stepbrother
and arrest of a number of CSS personnel
in 1996 on suspicion in the attempt
on the President, its ascendancy strongly
decreased.
For the information gathering and processing
on the air and with the use of special
electronic means, Electronic Intelligence
Service (EIS) was organized in Iraq.
During Iranian- Iraqi war, for it, special
modern equipment from abroad (basically
from France and Japan) was sent. According
to some data, the EIS totaled about
800 employees and had at least five
large overland stations of electronic
intelligence in different parts of Iraq.
Apart from national special services
in Iraq, also special party bodies had
been organized - Security Service of
the Ba'th Party and Military Bureau
of the Ba'th Party. The previous had
foxholes in all party organizations
and was engaged in maintenance of the
control of sentiments and loyalty of
the party members. The latter carried
out the role of political and educational
body in the army, kept up party discipline
and loyalty of the officers. Nominally,
Saddam Hussein directly headed the Ba'th
Party Military Bureau, in practice it
was supervised by his deputy. In 2001,
Kusay Saddam Hussein was elected deputy
head of the Military Bureau.
With the purpose of supervision over
the state of sentiments in the clan-
tribe environment, Iraqi leadership
formed the Sheikhs Bureau of Tribes
(Maktab of Sheikhs) following the war
in the Persian Gulf, called for consolidating
the activity of tribe ruling bosses
that were loyal to regime, on the suppression
of opposition views, revealing and handing
of dissidents out of the tribes on relevant
authorities. The sheikhs of the Bureau
regularly received money rewards and
were often involved in contraband trade.
For creation of top elite army divisions
from the elite of the Republic Guards,
Saddam Hussein generated a Special Republic
Guard (SRG) - the most reliable squad
of defense of Baghdad and its strategic
establishments, the last line of army
defense of the Ba'th regime. The SRG
included three brigades located in town
along southern, northern and western
highways, leading to Baghdad.
As used here, it is necessary to note,
that the major role of the army in the
life of Iraq's modern society was also
recognized by Americans. Moreover, despite
of numerous conversations about new
democratic Iraq, Washington could give
preference to establishment of an analogous
military regime, only this time under
US control. Some informed sources asserted
that "the place of Saddam Hussein
could be occupied by a general originated
from Arabian Sunnite clan (13)".
Thus, the representatives from circles
close to Saddam Hussein no longer took
into account. Another scenario, according
to some experts on Iraq, had few prospects
of success (14).
However, the opinion of the well-known
Iraq military official T.al-Yasiri presents
certain interest here which asserted
that despite of seeming consolidation
of Iraqi force structures in the hands
of the leadership of the country, in
practice they represented three large
competing groupings or, as he said,
" three armies". "First
- Special Security Bodies - SSB, Emergency
Forces (Kuvvat at-Tavaria), Special
Guard (al-Himayat al-Hassa), second
- Republic Guards, third - conventional
military forces". "Numbering"
was given in accordance with "the
degree of attention of leadership, trust
of effectiveness" (15).
An apparent threat of US-led large-scale
operation against Iraq for the purpose
of removal of the regime made authorities
of the country establish a contingent
of reservers' and volunteers' army,
capable of rendering assistance to combat
units and helping maintain internal
order. The retired military at all levels
were conditionally divided into "near
reserve" (al-ihtiyat-al-qarib)
and "far reserve" (al-ihtiyat-al-baid).
There was modernization of the structure
and directives of the office of special
day (Dairat yaum an-Nahva), to which
party personnel, employees of special
services and officers involved in military
training of "People's squads"
had been imputed (16).
Within the frame of permanent maintenance
of troops, in particular, RG (divisions
"Navukhdonosor", "Khammurapi",
"al-Madina al-Munavvara",
"Kuvvat Allahu Akbar"), on
war footing from time to time there
used to be held relocation of divisions,
local military maneuvers in the zones
adjoining to the territory of Jordan,
Syria and Kurdish provinces (17).
The success of consolidation of the
army and special services in the hands
of his family became introduction of
Kusey Hussein into the regional leadership
of the Ba'th Party with a next appointment,
promoted as Vice-Chairman of the Military
Bureau (naib amin sirr al-maktab al
askariy li hizb al Ba'th) (18). In fact,
also taking into consideration all other
posts and entrusted sites of Kusay,
it meant that he was becoming the second
person in the top Command of Armed forces,
head of all party structures in the
army, head of presidential and government
guards, the main coordinator for the
activity of special services, top leader
of the Republic Guards.
On the eve of the beginning of the
military operations, many prognoses
were given for removal of Saddam Hussein's
regime by US-headed coalition in respect
of military and political aspects, results
of the war in Iraq. To our opinion,
in the context of considering the role
and place of the army in modern Iraqi
society, military aspect of the problem
and participation of the armed forces
in operations are of apparent interest.
As far as military operations and their
main objective - removal of Saddam Hussein
from power are considered to be final,
then we can already absolutely state
that the prognosis related to the successful
conducting of the military operation
led by US and British armed services
due to their absolute military-technological
superiority have been completely proven.
The proposition often repeated in favor
of superiority of Iraqi army, was either
high moral spirit of its personnel,
brought up in the spirit of national
Ba'th ideology and ideas, or allegiance
to the "chief leader" Saddam
Hussein. However, after the military
operations have stopped we can say that
the army in total seemed to have not
been ready for conducting military operations
during steady and massive involvement
of aviation and other modern means of
defeat. The level of training of officer
corps failed to meet standards, but
constant and multiple purges and repression
contributed not to the formulation and
mastering of pure military skills and
habits, but it resulted in its physical
fright and maybe, in that condition
thought of its survival.
What concerns strong and positive features
of Iraqi army, experts had mentioned
their skills to mask and disperse military
and other establishments of great importance.
But the first strike on Baghdad in the
morning on March 20, when at the order
of military and political leadership
of Iraq all the systems of management
and communication, anti-craft defense
radar went over to military time, they
were immediately discovered by US intelligence
services and fully eliminated. It was
a serious miscalculation of Iraqi Military
Command that had perceived the first,
rather limited strike of US Air Force
as the beginning of large-scale air
operations.
It was proposed that much more resolute
resistance could be offered to English-American
troops by Units of the Republic Guards
(seven divisions) and units of task
force (26,000 persons). Upon completion
of military operations, many people
wouldn't keep from asking this question:
"Where have the Republic Guards
gone?" Of course, such an important
military force could not have disappeared,
even more so, the losses had been insignificant.
At present, we can say that it was crushed
as an organized military force, the
manpower of which either had left for
their homes, or gone into irregular
units. Maybe, in order to maintain army,
especially, its elite subdivisions,
Iraqi military and political command
preferred to order the commanding officers
to abandon all resistance. To us, only
for this purpose Baghdad's defense had
not been organized and severe street
fighting of which all experts spoke
and which frightened to some extent
coalition forces, had failed.
It can be assumed that after a lapse
of time, as soon as the picture of Iraq's
future reconstruction is clarified,
a great deal of special formations and
those that have preserved the backbone
of military forces will be rehabilitated
as an army of new Iraq in any or another
form. A lot will depend weather American-English
coalition has set forth an aim to finally
break Iraqi military machinery or not.
But, at this stage, the forces were
unable to act as a mighty force trained
according to modern methods to conduct
combat operations, and that which is
capable of offering resistance to American-English
coalition forces although it had great
strength and there were enough, but
old armaments.
In contrast to the army, special services,
in our opinion, managed to discharge
their professional liabilities and duties
imposed on them. To date they could
ensure security of superior party and
state leadership of Iraq. Numerous rumors
about the death of Saddam Hussein and
his sons, and his close relatives have
not been confirmed yet. Apart from catch
and voluntary surrender, no massive
discovery and rendering of former Iraqi
party and national officials has not
happened, and judging all this, it is
not expected in the nearest future.
Large segment of rank-and file members
from wide and developed network of Iraqi
special services, to us, have already
been dispersed among the population,
and to discover them will be real difficult.
Though we have tried to analyze the
role and place of the army in modern
Iraq in this article, we would like
to say a few words about the Ba'th Party,
ruling Iraq since July 1968 (in February-November
1963 it also ruled the country for a
short period of time). The last 35-year
old history of modern Iraq is fully
and completely connected with the activity
of this party, and only it individually
and exclusively defined the country's
social-economic and political development,
as well as home and foreign policy.
The present collapse of one -party
dictatorship Ba'th Party regime, which
closely merged with the system of administrative
and industrial management, has brought
to substantial vacuum of power in the
country. But solidly confirmed ideas
and ideological doctrine, accurately
developed and organized structure, and
difficult political way and "stages
of splits, mistakes and defeat"
(19), through which the Ba'th Party
has passed enables to forecast in part
that after a certain period of "silence",
this party will be able to restore its
lost positions. The similar prognosis
can also be met in the Turkish researcher
G.Bachik, who had likened the Ba'th
Party to the former communist parties
in Eastern Europe (20). We do base our
statement on the fact, that none of
the political forces from wide spectrum
of opposition parties or groups or organizations
today has such clearly defined ideological
and organizational bases, vast experience
in political struggle either underground
or under legal conditions. Anyhow, in
case of formation of a multi-party system
in Iraq, the Ba'th Party (the essence
would not change because of that) will
be able to be involved in political
life of the country. But, to date no
attempt to break up Iraq's party and
political system is observed and even
in this case deeply conspiratorial party
structures will be able to establish
their activities and ties with new leadership
of the party after a short period of
disorganization.
So, the war is over and Saddam Hussein's
regime is on the decline, but events
in Iraq and around it have not come
to a logical end yet. Today one thing
is clear - Iraq's future will not look
like its past, and the present-day situation
is a temporary occurrence and a march
to another new Iraq. If the USA is able
to realize all the problems put by in
corpore, then Iraq will become one of
the key pro-American elements of a new
strategic architecture of the Middle
Eastern region.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The Political Statement of the
7-th Regional Conference of the Socialist
Arab Ba'th Party. Baghdad, 1969, p.16.
2. Batatu H. The Old Social Classes
and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq.
Princeton. New-Jersey, 1978, p.1085.
3. The Arab Nation is indivisible and
it mission immortal. Socialist Arab
Ba'th Party. Iraqi Region. January,
1974. Helsinki , 1975, p.112.
4. S/RES/687(1991), 3 April 1991-The
United National and the Iraq-Kuwait
Conflict, p. 193-198.
5. Two of Saddam Hussein's sons-in-law
- H. Kamal, the minister of industry
and mineral resources and his brother
H. K. Hasan, chief of his body-guard
service fled from Iraq to Jordan on
August 8, 1996 and they were obliged
to return on February 19, 1996 and executed
three days later.
6. Ash -Sharq al-Ausat , 02.08.1998.
7. Middle East Economic Digest. Vol.39,
No.33, August 18, 1995; The Middle East.
February 1997, p.9.
8. The Middle East. January 1998, p.
7.
9. Newsweek, 23.09.1996.
10. Al-Hayat, 10.01.1999
11. Al-Hayat, 09.06.2001
12. Middle East Economic Digest. Vol.
39, ? 30, July 28, 1995.
13. Jordan Times, 16.02.2001.
14. Al-Majalla, ? 925, 2-8.11.1997,
?. 44
15. The Middle East. January 1998, p.
6-7
16. Ash-Sharq al-Ausat, 2.08.1998.
17. Al-Hayat, 6.01.2000.
18. Al-Hayat, 16.10.2000.
19. Farakh I. Tatavvur al-idiyulujiya
al-arabiya as-sauriya. Beirut, 1973,
p.231.
20. Bacik G. Irakın Geleceği Üzerine
Tartışmalar.- Avrasya Dosyası, C: 6,
N 1, 2000, s. 75.
