TURKEY'S EU AND CYPRUS POLICY AFTER THE ATHENS
SUMMIT
Dr. Emel OSMANÇAVUŞOĞLU OKTAY
Hacettepe University
International Relations Department
On Turkey's Cyprus policy two trends were clarified along with
the dispute reflected to the press for over a year. When the
solution on the Cyprus issue was cited just two months ago,
one could remember the need to sign the United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan's Cyprus plan (proposal for the comprehensive settlement
of the Cyprus problem) that was submitted to the Turkish and
Greek Cypriot parts on November 11, 2002 and was revised for
two times and that the parties had discussed or little discussed
the plan, by April 16, when the Greek Cyprus signed the treaty
on its accession to the European Union. On the other hand, some
other people thought that the continuation of the status quo
was not an unpleasant outcome as there was peace in the Island
since 1974. However the rallies held in the Turkish Republic
of the Northern Cyprus (TRNC) demonstrated that mere peace is
not adequate and the people have to share the rights Greek Cypriots
already have.
What was really showed to the Turkish public regarding the
Greek people casting vote for the Presidential elections and
electing the hardline nationalist Tassos Papadopoulos, candidate
from the centre-right Democratic Party (DIKO), at first tour,
that the Greek Cypriot side was ready and eager to sign the
Annan plan.
However, things did not develop in the expected way and when
Papadopoulos, who seemed to stand against the Annan plan and
was mostly upheld by AKEL (Communist Party) during the election
campaign, and had a harsh stance, took his place in the politics
scene and the domestic and foreign press gave up showing the
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash as the only responsible
for the failure of reaching an agreement on Cyprus problem.
When the press initiated to point out the content of the plan
and eavesdrop (especially the domestic press) on what the other
side was saying, the Turkish side thought that the solution
would not be profitable as expected. In relation to the decision-making
in the international relations (as the people both taking part
in the theory and the decision stage of the issue know well)
the first thing that comes to mind is the other sides' thoughts
and what would their reaction be in case of a certain determination.
However, before thinking their possible ideas and reactions
on the Annan Plan, the Turkish media had mostly focused on the
fight of the solutionists/supporters of the status quo.
Today it's well understood that just as the former Greek Cypriot
leader Glafkos Clerides had accepted, the parties had failed
to negotiate the Annan Plan as a whole "due to the technical
impossibilities and especially the lack of time." In other
words, although the plan includes certain issues, there are
still vital points that the parties could not discuss (or couldn't
adequately discuss.) Actually Clerides himself had also told
that the negotiations could not be finalized by February 28.
However, both the pressure of Annan, acting as if he is the
Secretary-General of the EU rather than the UN, and the demonstrations
held in the TRNC had brought the "deadline" and the
"ultimatums" within a two-three-day period. Notwithstanding
that much of these ultimatums look as if they take both sides'
interests into consideration, the Turkish side was the only
one to be made ineffective since the Greek side's EU membership
was certain; whether or not it signs the agreement or agrees
to hold a referendum.
As the revised Annan plan was discussed at The Hague held on
March 10 (following February 28, deadline for a last-ditch effort
to secure a deal between parties), the TRNC officials, thinking
the plan would bring immense problems rather than peace to the
island, decided to oppose it. Actually, although both the Turkish
and the Greek sides had notified at the summit that they would
not accept the plan with its current condition, only the Turkish
side was shown as the opposing party. However, it's obvious
that the solution attained at The Hague had also caused the
Greek side, which believed that the corruption of the single
voice at the Turkish side would show the light at the end of
the tunnel, to loose patience. Especially when February 28 was
approached, the message Athens, which currently holds the EU
term-presidency, was giving that the Turkish government was
discussing the issue absolutely on different grounds. In addition,
TRNC was expected to accept the conditions recommended to them.
The policies established by Prime Minister Costas Simitis and
Foreign Minister Yorgo Papandreu since 1996 were based on this
enthusiasm. The interpretations as "Turkey is a stable
country and wants peace and Turkey as a EU member country serves
Greece's interests" were made for a long time, but prior
to this policy pronunciation, Greece had carried the Cyprus
and the Aegean issues it could not solve with Turkey to the
EU platform and started to follow a policy that is not troublesome,
but would provide an extreme success in terms of its results
by taking use of Turkey's enthusiasm to be a EU member. It had
even successfully dealt with the Turkish relations that were
about to be cut due to the Öcalan and S-300 crises, through
the earthquake diplomacy and had created the conditions for
a new pressure. Today's conditions were like the continuation
of this situation. And the Greek politicians told this aspect
to the Greek and Greek Cypriot public as defeating Turkey through
the existence of a stronger partner and as a compromising policy
abroad.
Greeks attach the Turkish policy's success on having a single
voice and its foreign policy not being an instrument of the
political parties' rivalries. Turkey's political outlook was
like this until the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came
to power. The Greeks could not imagine arise of different opinions
between the government and the Presidency and army on an issue
like Cyprus, which is seen as a "national case", and
the exaggerated reflection of these differences to the press.
Moreover, the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots could not attribute
any meaning to it and interpreted the condition as, "Ankara
is trying to mislead and surprise us through various statements
and unexpected attitude." At that period, agitated by the
words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was seen as Prime Minister
at the EU countries and especially in the Athens though he was
yet the leader of the ruling JDP, as "Turkey has been following
wrong policies for nearly 40 years," Greeks had started
to think how to put the Aegean problem on the table by 2004.
Unfortunately the policies and expectations established on
the assumption concerning the traditional Turkish policies became
part of history were hit at The Hague on March 10. Although
Erdoğan was not yet appointed as Prime Minister but had started
to give impressive messages on foreign politics, his fixations
were right. He had said, "Annan has deceived us."
As a matter of fact, he had returned from the Greek side, which
he knew that had no effect on Annan on the issues like the "map,
sovereignty and immigration", with worse conditions and
had said, "I looked over." In short, it became clear
that the solution lies in the "compensation of the Turkish
side only."
Although Greek Cyprus signed the EU accession treaty on April
16 in the name of both sides, it took the last step towards
the EU membership alone. The treaty signed between the Greek
Cypriot side and the EU said, "Cyprus has become the EU
member as a whole but in the absence of a settlement, the application
of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended,
until the political problems are solved and the Council decides
unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission."
Turkey's approach was to provide synergy on equal basis in
order to arrange permanent peace and for the sake of the Turkish
Cypriots not to be crushed by the Greeks' political and economic
pressure. However, the Annan plan was far from assuring this
confidence to the Turkish side asked to sign under this plan.
The plan, which had to be read carefully as a whole, gives the
impression at first that it meets "management" expectations
of the Turkish side in respect to the "founding partnership"
and the "political equality." However, when the plan
is attentively read, it is seen that it includes articles that
would, in long term, endanger the Turkish Cypriots' existence
in the island. The founding partnership and sovereignty means
the right to demolish this partnership on condition of removing
the factors those of which make sure the ongoing of the common
state that is established by the sovereign factors through their
own will. On the other hand, the Annan plan (including the final
version) does not comprise any article on this issue and (1)
the guarantorship given to the guarantor countries would in
a sense guarantee the statue of Cyprus, which is to be EU's
part. Likewise, the "political equality", which means
the right to have a word in the decisions and the laws without
considering the population of the parties, could only be provided
through the right to veto. (2)
On the other hand, however much the decision reached on Turkey's
EU membership at the Copenhagen Summit is shown as a "victory"
on condition of "if", it prevented any will to sign
Annan plan "by assuming all risks." Today it's seen
that the estimations as, "although a disadvantageous agreement
has to be signed in Cyprus for Turkey's EU membership, we should
accept that the EU accession will not make any differences,"
are wrong. The Aegean problem, which is to come on agenda with
or after solving the Cyprus issue, has to be solved in the same
logic. The Greek Cypriots' and Greek's tactics become obviously
right at this point. The tactic the Greek Cypriot side implemented
for 15 years reached its goals at the Copenhagen summit held
on December 12-13. As a result of this systematic policy and
the efforts spent on this path, Simitis, who said, "We
have opened a new page for Greece and Hellenism," on the
other hand stated that Greece want Turkey's integration to the
EU. After the Greek Cyprus's EU accession became definite at
the Copenhagen Summit without any opposition by the ruling JDP,
Papandreu brought the Aegean problem on the agenda. Greek Defense
Minister Yannos Papandoniu claimed, "The violations in
the Aegean Sea are increasingly continuing." He said, "Turkey's
approach on this issue does not fit with its efforts on the
EU path."
While the island is to be officially accepted to the EU within
less than a year (May 2004), EU's political pressure on Turkey
and the TRNC has increased. (3) The uneasy condition that appeared
at the signing ceremony arranged for the acceding 10 countries
at the Athens Summit held on April 16-17 forms the beginning
of the problems Turkey would counter in Turkish-EU relations.
The Turkish Ambassador to Athens has also participated to the
signing ceremony of the Greek Cypriot state, which Turkey does
not recognize, in position of the member country and signed
the document. Hence, the political and legal arguments Turkey
has supported until now had been pushed away.
Recent Developments in the Island: Opening of the Gate Doors
Following the accession treaty on April 16, TRNC Parliament
opened the border gates on April 23 in order to accept one-day
visitors from the South. When the Turkish and Greek Cypriots
showed great interest to the opening of the gates, the Turkish
side extended the entries and exits up to three days and so
the Greek side had to present certain facilities to the Turkish
side. Meanwhile, the Greek Cyprus announced the good intention
package; however it did not produce effect as much as the opening
of the border gates. The Greek Cyprus National Council wants
to gather the Turkish Cypriots under its structure and give
the opportunity to have the right to participate to the European
Parliament elections through a decision as long as the Northern
Cypriots submit the documents regarding the right to work, education
possibilities and the document showing that they are the citizens
of the Cyprus Republic. While only the Turkish side was expected
to show interest to the opening of the border gates, the Greek
Cyprus was disturbed about its citizens to seal their passports
on condition of entering the Turkish side.
A question comes to mind at this point: If this attempt was
expected to give such positive results why the TRNC officials
did not open the gates before? The answer to this question lies
in the EU accession treaty. The border gates were opened immediately
after the Greek Cypriots had signed the EU accession treaty.
As TRNC deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Tourism Serdar
Denktash said, "If the border gates were opened before
the signing ceremony, the Greek Cyprus could prevent the act
in various ways but the administration that entered the EU,
where the free movement was nearly sacred, could not act like
this." On the other hand, since no distress emerged on
the island after the entries and exits between the two societies
were allowed, many people said "Denktash was claiming that
the two societies cannot live together, but the recent developments
show the opposite," however, the situation would be different
under the current conditions if the Greek Cypriots, after a
regulation like the Annan plan, which did not foresee any homes
to some 120,000 dislocated Turkish Cypriots, had come to the
places where the Turkish Cypriots were living.
Under the current circumstances the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots
are politically equal. In this respect, Greek International
Law Professor at the Athens Pandino University, Aleksis Iraklidis's
affirmation published on the Ta Nea daily paper on May 22 is
important. At the end of his article titled "Denktash's
sternness hid Papadopoulos," Iraklidis mentions that the
antipathy and despising feelings against the Turkish Cypriots
dominate the Greek society and this antipathy and despise in
real terms were the source of the Cyprus problem since 1948.
As a matter of fact, reacting to the intensity of the Greek
Cypriots entering TRNC, the Greek administration and the Greek
Cyprus Orthodoxy Church made several statements and tried to
dissuade the public from these entries and exits. Having no
meaning in practice, these efforts also show the unjust situation
in burdening all responsibility on Denktash in the failure of
the agreement between the parties.
The Turkish Cypriots were frightened of facing a similar massacre,
which they had countered in the 1960s, and 70s, and this fear
has been the source of the current drawbacks. This can be understood.
A logical person should be able to say, "It's not possible
to confront with massacres in a unipolar and global world."
In addition, just eight years ago in July 1995, in front of
the United Nations Peace Keeping Soldiers from Holland, some
8.000 Bosnians were massacred (4) in Srebrenica, which was announced
as the "secure paradise" by the UN soldiers. This
incident can take its place it deserves in the Balkan history
books. From a very positive and liberal point of view, the real
problem can be appraised as the Turkish Cypriots' entering into
an assimilation process on their land.
What kind of changes would any solution under the Annan plan
make in an ordinary TRNC citizen's live? With no doubt, all
the expectations are established on the basis of the estimations
that after signing the plan the parties would be capable of
living together. In terms of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU and
the UN, both trying to gather the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots,
who have different religion, language and nationality and were
separated due to the ethnical skirmish, had envisaged and realized
with the Dayton Agreement to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina, recognized
by the UN as well, saying, "These societies cannot live
together anyway," just because the strong Serbian army
aided the Bosnian Serbs to dismiss the Bosnian Muslims from
their homes and also establishing a Serbian Republic ethnically
cleaned, however this cannot be objectively evaluated.
Meanwhile, (verifying the pessimists) if Turkey cannot become
an EU member in the nearby future, and even falls apart of the
EU tactically due to the inevitable developments in the world,
then Cyprus will be a missed "partner" for Turkey,
having no chance to leave on its own geography. Likewise, Turkey,
excluded from the EU, will have no position as a guarantor country
for the Turkish Cypriots, who would probably loose their homes
and jobs, with the most optimistic estimation and would not
meet their expectation within the borders of the "United
Cyprus Republic" due to the Annan plan.
As a result, what has to be done from now on is that Turkey,
which is insistent on being guarantor between the Cypriot parties,
must be associated with the EU membership during the EU accession
process.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The last paragraph of the second part of the Comprehensive
Settlement Agreement's third version, which is submitted by
the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Turkish and Greek
Cypriot sides on February 26, read as follows: "The status
and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its common state government,
and its component states, is modeled on the status and relationship
of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons. Accordingly:
Cyprus is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble
partnership, with a common state government and two equal component
states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.
Basis for A Comprehensive Settlement of Cyprus Problem,Turkish
Republic of Foreign Affairs Ministry web site: http://mfa.gov.tr
2. For detailed information: A. Kuloğlu, E. Osmançavuşoğlu Oktay,
Ayşe Özkan, "Kıbrıs İçin Çözümün Neresinde?: BM Kapsamlı
Çözüm Belgesinin Değerlendirilmesi, Stratejik Analiz, April
2003, Vol: 3 No: 36, p. 26-28.
3. In line with this, the fiscal aid package for the TRNC also
shows the implementation of the carrot policy skillfully.
4. For detailed information: Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both,
Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, Penuin, London, 1996.