INFLUENCING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE
ON ETHNIC VERSUS NATIONAL INTERESTS
Tabib HUSEYNOV
Central European University
International Relations and European Studies Department
Ethnicity is an influential element in contemporary American
domestic politics, and, one would argue, in foreign politics
as well. Some powerful ethnic interest groups - Jewish, Greek,
Armenian etc. - have gained a lot of influence in American domestic
affairs and increasingly tried to exert more and more influence
on the foreign policies, which deal with their country or place
of origin.
The issue of ethnic interest groups' influence incorporates
broad range of topics on the domestic determinants of the policymaking,
including the nature of the domestic political system and state-society
relations, the role of the public opinion and societal groups,
and even the importance of ideas and perceptions in policymaking
process. What are the policy impacts of public opinion and societal
groups? How do domestic structures provide grounds for the activities
of various interest groups? How and by which mechanisms do various
interest groups and public opinion influence the policymaking
process? What is the relationship between elites and public
in U.S. political system and who follows whom? All these larger
questions constitute the research agenda of this article.
The purpose of the present article is to evaluate the role
of the domestic ethnic interest groups on foreign policy-making,
based on the example of the role of the Armenian lobby in the
formulation of the U.S. foreign policy towards Azerbaijan from
early 1990s till present. To achieve this end, to what extent
and by which mechanisms and strategies the ethnic lobbies, the
Armenian interest groups in this case, have influenced the U.S.
foreign policies will be identified. This article suggests that
although ethnic groups may exert significant influence on foreign
policy, ethnic lobbying does not determine policy decisions
and outcomes and can easily be sacrificed when broader national
interests are at stake. Likewise, it will be showed that the
activity of the Armenian interest groups has had a significant
influence on U.S. policies, but the Armenian ethnic lobby was
not the determining factor in U.S. policies toward Azerbaijan
and its influence was limited by the existence of obvious national
interests.
To prove this thesis, first, the particularities of the U.S.
political system and how it provides grounds for the activities
of various interest groups will be analyzed. Then the mechanisms
and strategies by which ethnic interests exert pressure on and
influence the American policymaking process will be discussed.
Finally, a case study will be presented and the major developments
in the history of the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations will be outlined,
which have relevance to the subject matter of the present article,
i.e. to the activity of the ethnic Armenian interest groups
in America.
The Extent of Ethnic Groups' Influence: The U.S. Domestic
Political Structure and State-Society Relations
This section is aimed to show that "the American political
system not only permits, rather it actively promotes ethnic
group activism" (1). Therefore, in order to understand
the role ethnic interest groups in general, and Armenian interest
groups in particular, play in American domestic and foreign
politics, it is necessary to analyze the U.S. domestic structure.
From its beginning, U.S. society has been a multicultural society
of people with different origins and backgrounds. Therefore,
it is natural that in a number of cases these ethnic groups
sought to influence American policies toward their country or
place of origin. However, as Smith writes, "it is not only
the social character of America as a nation of immigrants that
makes for the prominent role ethnic actors play in foreign policy
deliberations; it is also the structure of American democracy
that allows ethnic communities, and much wider range of civic
interest groups in general, access to policymaking."(2)
As it will be seen below, the factors that allow various interest
groups, including ethnic ones, to influence the U.S. policymaking
lie namely on the nature of the wider state-society relations
and the country's political and party organization.
It is generally accepted that the U.S. has a largely decentralized
policy-making structure. The U.S. founding fathers have built
the U.S. political system based on the principle of 'checks
and balances'. This democratic principle provided separate branches
of government with powers to oversee the actions of the other,
thus preventing any one from becoming too powerful. This principle
of 'checks and balances' enshrined in the U.S. Constitution
provides large freedom of action for the activity of various
interest groups. Watanabe illustrates the sources of untidiness
in U.S. foreign policy making process in the following lines:
"While unquestionably lodging the political authority
for the governance of foreign affairs in the president and Congress,
acting either apart or together, the actual demarcation of many
responsibilities is left unclear. ...In the effort to resolve
imprecision and irregularity in the division of foreign affairs
powers, the courts, especially the Supreme Court, have been
noticeably silent. ...The courts' reluctance to act has thrown
these disputes into political rather than judicial arena. In
this context, the activities of organized interests, such as
ethnic groups...may be as decisive in defining the distribution
of foreign policymaking responsibilities as would be a large
body of court judgements."(3)
Another factor that greatly enforces the role of social forces
in American foreign policymaking is the specific system of political
party organization. As Smith indicates, "[b]ecause the
Congress and the President can be of the same mind or the same
party, it is conceivable that the institutional struggle built
into politics by the Constitution might not occur and thus,
the government would enjoy relative autonomy in the face of
social pressures."(4) Therefore, the party system has been
built, in which the public officials are not named by the party
but nominated through primaries, whose results are decided by
local electorates. "The consequence of such party discipline,
- Smith writes, - is that in practice public officials may well
be as responsive to their constituents as to their party leadership"(5).
Moreover, Smith notes that given that the Congress is also a
decentralized entity, even civic interests operating on a small
social base may find their concerns being reflected in legislation
(6). Thus, the U.S. is usually characterized as a typical "weak
state" because of its federalist structure, the system
of checks and balances between Congress and administration,
and the extensive network of group representation (7).
As seen from the discussion above, the U.S. is a society-dominated
domestic structure in which public opinion and the societal
groups play an important role in formulation of domestic and
foreign policies. Muller and Risse-Kappen illustrate the importance
of public opinion in society-dominated domestic structures in
the following lines:
"...public opinion becomes a resource which competing
elite factions try to mobilize for their purposes. Public opinion
defines broader or more limited boundaries on the range of options
available to the political system, depending on the degree and
the specificity of the public consensus."(8)
However, this high degree of responsiveness to the public aspirations
among U.S. policymakers does not exclude the possibility of
elite manipulation of public opinion. We cannot forget that
elite, especially the ruling elite has large material resources
in its disposal and access to media, which is one of the most
powerful instruments in shaping the public opinion. Moreover,
in a number of cases low level of knowledge about certain issues
among public make it easier for the elites to manipulate with
the public opinion. Therefore, the question of interaction between
public opinion and elites is case and situation specific. However,
the false dilemma of which one is more important, elites or
public and whether it is public that follows elite or vice versa
can be easily resolved if we abstain from erroneous approach
of conceiving of both elites and public as distinct unitary
actors. Domestic elites, as a rule, consist of opposing groups
struggling for power and use the public and its aspirations
to achieve their goals. Likewise, the public while may hold
similar stance in fundamental policy issues, is, in many cases,
divided on specific issues.
But what is more important is that viewing elites and public
as relatively distinct and unitary actors lead to ignoring an
important causal role that interest groups play in influencing
and even shaping both elite and public opinion. This has long
been a point ignored by scholars. As Skidmore and Hudson write:
"Previous efforts to build domestic-centered theories of
foreign policy behavior have...suffered from inattention to
the significant causal role of societal groups"(9). Everts
also observes that "[e]specially in the American case,
the study of public opinion as mass opinion has tended to overlook
the role of parties and interest groups in shaping and mediating
the connection between mass opinion and foreign policy."(10)
Risse-Kappen suggests distinguishing at least between (a) mass
public opinion, (b) the attentive public, which has a general
interest in politics, and (c) issue publics, which are particularly
attentive to specific questions (11). In this case, the ethnic
(including Armenian) interest groups in the third category as
groups particularly interested in the foreign policies, conducted
toward their kith and kin can be placed.
The similar approach can be applied not only to the public
but also to the elites, viewing them as non-unitary actors,
which, certainly, may manipulate the public opinion, but which,
at the same time, may be influenced and even manipulated by
various interests, including ethnic groups. As Smith rightly
notes, "American politics is typically the politics of
organized interests - not only of the "power elite"
(12). However, in most of the cases, the interest groups and
elites both use each other's support and resources for their
own, and at the same time, mutual benefits. In this regard Congress'
high responsiveness towards the demands of its local constituents,
including ethnic interest groups, makes it especially attractive
to various interest groups. As Watanabe writes:
"Ethnic organizations rely upon the responsiveness and
legitimate policymaking authority of Congress to promote specific
policy propositions. Congress, to a great extent, relies upon
the mobilization of nongovernmental opinion, such as that which
emanates from informed ethnic activists, in order to perform
effectively and to promote its enhanced foreign policymaking
role."(13)
Watanabe also characterizes public opinion as "a notoriously
slippery concept, which is largely a manifestation of the selective
determinations of policymakers as to what is indeed representative"(14).
This evaluation is correct, but only in part, since it implies
that policymakers are free to decide what constitutes a public
opinion, which is not the case in many instances. Moreover,
as seen from the discussion above, interest groups play not
lesser and, in certain instances, greater role in shaping public
opinion than do policymakers, which themselves operate within
the constraints of limited alternatives conditioned by this
public opinion.
The Mechanisms and Strategies of Ethnic Group Influence:
Appeal to Mutual Interests
Having discussed the wider political structures, which provide
the framework for the policymaking and ethnic groups interaction
we can turn now to the examination of various strategies that
allow certain ethnic lobbies be more effective than others operating
within the same domestic political structures. As Watanabe writes,
"the ultimate measure of ethnic influence is the extent
to which ethnic groups are successful in persuading officials
to take authoritative actions supportive of their positions"(15).
There can be discerned a lot of factors, which make the ethnic
interest groups efficient and promote their ability to influence
the policymakers' decisions. In this article, the ones that
are considered the most important will be referred.
Smith distinguishes three general ways in which interest (including
ethnic) groups bring pressure to bear on the political establishment:
(a) through the vote, (b) by campaign finance contributions,
and (c) by an organizational body (16). In the U.S., similarly
to many other democratic societies, small number of votes may
make a big difference. If to consider that ethnic groups, if
well organized, are usually very vocal about their problems,
especially during the election period, as well as given the
fact that their participation level in elections, as a rule,
is much higher than the average, then it becomes clear how even
a small ethnic community can gain a critical influence in U.S.
policymaking (17). Through contributing money to the campaigns
of candidates for the presidency and the Congress, ethnic activists
have another valuable source of access to decision-makers (18).
As Watanabe notes, "[o]rganizational requirements and the
demands of the advocacy process place a premium on information
processing and communication skills that require substantial
outlays of money"(19).
However, money and votes can be effective if ethnic interests
posses a well-established organizational body, which channels
these popular forms of influence in specific directions targeted
at specific issue areas. As Smith indicates, ethnic organizations
1) ensure the organizational unity of the ethnic community,
2) form and supervise alliances with other social forces and
3) advocate policy propositions and monitor the behavior of
the government officials responsible for formulating and implementing
policy (20). Policymakers often view ethnic interest groups
and organizations as representatives of the larger ethnic communities
and, therefore, prefer to cooperate with them in order to get
ethnic community's support during elections. Thus, as Watanabe
points, "[I]n addition to serving as the primary conduits
for interaction with the policymaking structure, organizations
are the primary contact points for policymakers seeking advise,
information, or a reading of ethnic community attitudes"(21).
Congress as the most responsive branch of government, which,
as discussed above, is due to its decentralized nature, the
absence of strong party discipline, and most importantly, the
role of primaries in congressional elections is "a more
likely source of access to decision making for ethnic lobbies"(22).
Ethnic activists understand that it is far more difficult to
gain access to the President and effectively influence his policies
than it is to lobby members of Congress, where the threshold
of entry is far lower and a much closer working relationship
can be established (23). In this regard it is worthwhile to
mention the congressional caucuses, which are the "entit[ies]
composed of interested members of congress who work together
to further causes related to a special interest group"
(24). The congressional caucuses, which represent ethnic interests,
work closely with these ethnic groups in promoting ethnic interests.
It is interesting to note that the Congressional Caucus on Armenian
Issues created back in 1995 consists of 126 members as of January
2003 (25) and is presently the largest caucus in the U.S. Congress
(26), followed by the Hellenic Caucus counting 117 members (27)
with which it has close cooperative relationships.
Another significant function performed by the ethnic interest
groups and organizations, as we saw above, is advocating policy
propositions and monitoring. Ethnic organizations perform the
roles of surveillance and keeping their membership and the larger
ethnic community abreast of developments in the government and
throughout those areas of the world deemed critical (28). At
the same time ethnic interest groups and organizations engage
in what Watanabe terms an "educative role" by providing
ideas and usable data to policymakers. In fact, "the actual
wording of many resolutions and legislative proposals directly
bears the mark of some ethnic organizations"(29). And here
we come to the importance of information providing in influencing
policymaking process. Information is communicated by ethnic
groups and individuals in a variety of ways: through letters,
telegrams, speeches, reports and documents, newsletters, hearing
testimony, telephone calls, meetings, demonstrations, and other
formal and informal devices (30).
Recently, with rise of Internet, web-based campaigns, such
as launching "action alerts", which inform ethnic
community members about certain issues and urge to act either
by sending Web-faxes or e-mails, have become very popular. A
recent interesting example for the effectiveness of such web-based
campaigns was the American government decision to exclude the
Armenian nationals residing in the U.S. from a list of men required
under the new anti-terrorism program to undergo special registration
at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In November
2002 the INS and Justice Department designated a list of 18,
mostly the Middle Eastern countries that are considered high
risks for terrorism, whose male nationals over 16 residing in
U.S. had to undergo special registration under the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEES). A month later
on December 13 the INS added Armenia, along with Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia, to the NSEES list, a notice was published in a
Federal Register on December 16, 2002. This move provoked a
"furious round of lobbying" (31) by the government
of Armenia, which was the only post-Soviet country in the list,
but most importantly, by the Armenian interest groups. Within
the first 24 hours of issues the action alert launched by the
Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), -one of the largest
Armenian interest group in the U.S., - over 10,000 web faxes
were sent to the President Bush expressing the Armenian American
community's profound opposition to this action. "The ANCA,
along with a broad-based coalition of Armenian American groups,
worked to resolve this issue with senior Administration officials,
Armenian Americans with close ties to the White House, the Congressional
Armenian Caucus, and key foreign policy figures"(32). These
high-level contacts and grassroots level campaign made the U.S.
government to change its decision and to drop Armenia from the
INS list in a matter of two days. The notice from the Justice
Department published on December 18 said that it is "only
adding Pakistan and Saudi Arabia" and it had "incorrectly
listed Armenia as a designated country"(33). It is worthwhile
to quote the chairwoman of ANCA's Fresno (California) chapter
Hygo Ohannessian who said "You don't know how glad I am
that the Armenian community responded quickly on this because
now the Bush administration knows Armenians will react to anything
negative being said or done towards Armenia"(34).
As we saw above, well-established organization and financial
and information resources are essential elements of efficient
ethnic group lobbying. However, these factors, although necessary,
are not enough. Rogers, who refers to Martin Weil, gives a similar
to that of Smith's three criteria necessary for an ethnic interest
to influence U.S. foreign policy: (1) an electoral threat, (2)
a lobbying apparatus, and (3) a successful appeal to the symbols
of American nationhood (35). The first two criteria basically
correspond to Smith's first and third measures, respectively,
which we discussed above.
The third criterion is also an interesting one deserving separate
attention. It implies that the ethnic groups, in order to influence
favorably the policymakers' perceptions and make them receptive
and sensitive to their ethnic concerns, must formulate (if not
to adapt) their demands and policies in terms of the broader
national interests and according to the existing public and
elite preferences. Watanabe recognizes the importance of this
factor when he writes that "ethnic groups must consciously
formulate their communications and build their cases in such
a way as to stress the compatibility between their positions
and the overall public interest". (36) Examples of ethnic
interest groups' using of the existing public and elite discourses
are abundant. Thus, one recent example is the "action alert"
launched by the ANCA urging Armenian community members to ask
the U.S. postal service to issue a stamp commemorating the so-called
alleged Armenian genocide (37). The first sentence of the sample
letter provided by ANCA in its web-site says: "As an American
who values the vital role of our nation in advancing justice
and human rights around the world, I am writing to urge the
creation of a postage stamp on the American response to the
Armenian Genocide."(38) Here, the attempt to link the values
of the American society and the historical events of which U.S.
postal service officials know little about is obvious. Another
sample letter for the protest campaign against the above-mentioned
Armenia's inclusion to the NSEES list appealed to the national
interests: "Armenia...continues its staunch support for
U.S. led efforts [against terrorism]... As an Armenian American,
I urge you to continue your cooperation with Armenia in the
war against terrorism and remove that country from any list
falsely linking its citizens to crimes against our nation."
(39)
Thus, a necessary element for the successful ethnic lobby influence
to the policymaking process, along with strong organization
and rich resources, is the ability of the ethnic interest groups
to formulate their demands and policies in terms of broader
public and national interests. Here the perceptions of the policymakers
play a crucial role determining the policymakers' responsiveness
and sensitivity to the ethnic interests. This responsiveness
and sensitivity of the policymakers towards ethnic interests
is conditioned by the degree these interests are considered
to be compatible with the broader national and public interests.
Therefore, ethnic interests are likely to influence the policymaking
process if they overlap with, or at least, are not viewed as
contrary to the national interests.
A Case Study: The Impact of the Armenian Lobby on the U.S.
Policy Formulation towards Azerbaijan
Initially the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations were largely asymmetrical
with Azerbaijan aspiring towards more cooperation with the U.S.
in both political and economic fields and the U.S. being somewhat
incoherent towards enhancing its relations with Azerbaijan.
There can be discerned two most important factors that had the
strongest impact on the U.S. foreign policy towards Azerbaijan
during the initial years, i.e. in 1991-1994:
1) The U.S. initially lacked consistent foreign policy towards
Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus region as a whole due to the low
level of awareness about the region and its problems;
2) The absence of clearly formulated policies and interests
coupled with low level of awareness about the region both among
policymakers and broad public made the U.S. foreign policy towards
Azerbaijan highly vulnerable to the pressures of the ethnic,
primarily Armenian, interest groups, especially during the initial
years.
Apart from broad support for democracy in the successor states
of the former Soviet Union and peaceful resolution of conflicts,
the United States did not seem to have a specific policy for
the Caucasus. (40) The oil companies were much more interested
in Azerbaijan than the U.S. government, which tended to see
the Newly Independent States as a Russian sphere of influence.
(41)
On the other hand, Azerbaijan's foreign policy was from the
very beginning strongly oriented towards the U.S. This foreign
policy orientation was adopted based on two basic considerations:
1) Azerbaijan saw the U.S. as a balancing power against Russia,
which was seen, especially during the first years of independence,
as a potential threat to the security, political independence
and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, mainly, given Russia's
active support for the Armenian government and the separatists
during the Karabakh conflict.
2) Azerbaijan also viewed the U.S. as an important business
partner and sought to attract the American investments to the
exploitation of its oil resources in the Caspian Sea.
During the first years of independence Azerbaijan, similarly
to other former Soviet republics, have undergone severe economic
regression caused by the disruption of Soviet-time economic
links. However, the situation was further exacerbated by existence
of ethnic and territorial conflict with neighboring Armenia
over Mountainous (Nagorno) Karabakh, a province of Azerbaijan
with Armenian majority (42). The United States has been actively
engaged in international efforts to find a peaceful solution
to the Mountainous Karabakh conflict. It has played one of the
leading roles in the Minsk Group, which was created in 1992
by the Organization (then called Conference) for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to encourage a peaceful, negotiated
resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In
early 1997, the U.S. heightened its role by becoming a co-chair,
along with Russia and France, of the Minsk Group.
Conflict with Armenia has had a deep impact on the U.S.-Azerbaijan
relations and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the
whole history of the bilateral relations between the two countries
has been obfuscated by the activity of the ethnic Armenian lobby
in the USA, which became an influential force in U.S. domestic
politics by 1990s. As Smith indicates, "the end of the
Cold War has allowed other [previously inactive or less active]
ethnic communities a new role in American foreign policy. Thus
Armenian Americans gained critical influence on U.S. policy
in the Caucasus by virtue of the creation in 1991 for the first
time of an Armenian Republic"(43).
Armenian interest groups especially succeeded in influencing
the decisions on the U.S. foreign aid allocation to Azerbaijan
and Armenia. In the fall of 1992 the U.S. Congress passed the
Freedom Support Act (FSA) to facilitate economic and humanitarian
aid to the former republics of the Soviet Union, aimed at helping
democratization processes and fostering economic growth. However,
a month after its adoption, on October 24, 1992 the Congress
pushed by the Armenian lobby introduced a highly controversial
amendment to the FSA, most commonly referred as Section 907,
which banned direct American government assistance to the government
of Azerbaijan. Given the untidiness of the U.S. policy towards
Azerbaijan, low level of awareness about the country and in
the absence of other interest groups, which could oppose Armenian
lobby, the Congress responded in a highly sensitive way to the
ethnic Armenian demands. As John J. Maresca, the first U.S.
mediator for the Mountainous Karabakh conflict writes:
"there was very limited effort to influence Congressional
thinking, or to indicate that the U.S government was actively
seeking an impartial role in the solution to this conflict.
Congress was left to the influence of lobbyists and as a result
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning direct aid to
the Azerbaijan government, was passed. Congress was simply ignorant
of the issue at the time and of the implications of their actions.
This early failure to inform and influence Congressional thinking
imposes a responsibility on the present Administration to rectify
and correct the results of that failure". (44)
Adoption of the Section 907 was undoubtedly one of the most
significant victories of the Armenian interest groups in the
U.S. The Azerbaijanian government, which could get 50-60 million
of aid annually, was deprived from this assistance and Azerbaijan
was the only former Soviet Union country to be sanctioned in
such a way. In contrast, the U.S. foreign aid to Armenia gradually
increased and reached 95 million dollars in 1997 making Armenia
the second largest recipient of the U.S. foreign aid after Israel
calculated on per capita basis (45). Since then the Armenian
lobby has managed to keep this high level of U.S. government
aid. In January 2003 the U.S. Senate approved an Omnibus Appropriations
Bill for fiscal year 2003, which provided 90 million dollars
in assistance for Armenia and an additional 5 million dollars
"to address ongoing humanitarian needs in Nagorno Karabakh."(46)
However, for Azerbaijan the moral side of Section 907, its
distorted logic and wording were much more important than its
financial side. The Azerbaijanian officials repeatedly complained
that Azerbaijan being a victim of aggression was identified
by Section 907 as an aggressor. Section 907 read: "United
States assistance under this or any other Act may not be provided
to the Government of Azerbaijan until the [U.S.] President determines,
and so reports to the Congress that the Government of Azerbaijan
is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other
offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh."(47)
By Section 907 the Armenian lobby managed not only to restrict
significantly the American government aid to Azerbaijan, but
also effectively succeeded to create a negative image of Azerbaijan
by assuming that it has played an offensive role in the conflict
over Mountainous Karabakh. Furthermore, another strategic victory
of the Armenian lobby was the way the Section 907 referred to
Mountainous Karabakh region as an entity apart from Azerbaijan
saying that Azerbaijan was using "offensive uses of force
against…Nagorno-Karabakh", i.e. a territory internationally
recognized (including by the U.S.) as part of Azerbaijan. The
irony of the Section 907 was that "Armenian American lobbyists
managed to exclude Azerbaijan from receiving aid intended to
support newly independent former Soviet states, despite the
fact that the Armenian government was highly authoritarian,
that it was an aggressor state, and that it was friendly with
Iran and Russia, the two rivals of the United States in the
region."(48)
The Azerbaijanian officials, as well as many independent American
observers, have repeatedly criticized the U.S. government, and
especially the Congress, for relinquishing its policies in the
Caucasus to the hands of the ethnic Armenian interest groups.
Azerbaijanian government dismissed the Armenian claims on blockade,
arguing that it simply has exercised its legitimate right to
defense by ceasing all economic relations and refusing to cooperate
in joint projects with the nation with which it considered itself
in a state of war. Also, Azerbaijanian officials noted that
Azerbaijan is not the only country with which Armenia borders
with, and therefore, it cannot actually blockade Armenia. Section
907 was vehemently criticized by a number of U.S. high-ranking
officials too. Thus, in words of John J. Maresca, the first
U.S. mediator for the Mountainous Karabakh conflict:
"Section 907 assumes that Azerbaijan has played an offensive
role in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The wording of the
restrictive clause refers to what it calls Azerbaijan's "offensive
uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." But
clearly Azerbaijan is not conducting offensive uses of force
against anyone. On the contrary, it is Azerbaijan, whose territories
have been occupied, resulting in the suffering of hundreds of
thousands of internal refugees. Azerbaijan has been on the defensive
now for at least six years. Section 907 is, therefore, deeply
unjustified and unfair and based entirely on faulty assumptions."(49)
Thus, at the beginning there emerged an unbalanced relationship
between Azerbaijan and the United States with the former aspiring
greater cooperation and the latter being undecided and largely
influenced by domestic ethnic interest groups. As Smith writes,
"beholden to the Armenian American lobby, U.S. policy in
the Caucasus was long rigid and shortsighted."(50)
However, the analysis of the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations suggests
that the role of the Armenian lobby has been gradually decreasing
as American elite and public awareness about Azerbaijan increased
and as the American business and security interests have been
increasingly tied to Azerbaijan. The U.S. strategic and business
interests in Azerbaijan and in the Caucasus region as a whole
significantly increased with the signing in 1994 of a contract
between the Azerbaijanian government and the leading American
and other Western oil companies on the exploitation of the Azeri
oil fields in the Caspian Sea. Also beginning from 1994, after
cease-fire was achieved between Azerbaijan and Armenia, there
was a concern that the sanctions would impede political and
economic cooperation as well as delivery of humanitarian aid.
The erosion of Section 907 prohibitions has been more serious
since 1997, partly because many did not want the United States
to appear to be biased in favor of Armenia while playing a role
in the Minsk Group that oversees the peace talks, and, perhaps
more importantly, because U.S. economic interests in Azerbaijan
have grown with the exploitation of oil resources by U.S. firms
(51). Both the Bush (father) and the Clinton administrations
have repeatedly criticized the Congress for its sanctions against
Azerbaijan, arguing that these sanctions ran contrary to the
U.S. strategic interests in the region. Thus, in words of John
Herbst, the State Department's deputy coordinator for the former
Soviet states under Clinton administration, congressional efforts
to reward Armenia and punish Azerbaijan were foiling U.S. foreign
policy efforts in the region (52). However, in the absence of
urgency, the president administration did not want to antagonize
the Armenian American community by exercising its legitimate
power and waiving the provision by the executive decision. Instead
the White House tried to repeal Section 907 from within the
Congress, but with little success because of intense opposition
from the Armenian lobby. Smith gives an example of one of these
efforts in the following sentence:
"In a press release of September 18, 1998 the Armenian
National Committee of America saluted its victory the day before
in the House (by a vote of 231 to 182) over efforts to repeal
Section 907, a measure backed not only by the Clinton administration
(in the person of Madeleine Albright, who launched a vigorous
critique of the Armenian lobby), but also by fourteen oil companies
with interests in Caspian Sea (and so in Azerbaijan), an impressive
assembly of Jewish organizations (concerned to solidify Israel's
relations with Turkey), and a segment of Republican leadership
in the House including the head of the Appropriations Committee."(53)
Nevertheless, under the pressure from the White House and efforts
of the pro-Azeri disposed Turkish and Jewish lobbying, as well
as oil companies' efforts, the Congress gradually allowed for
a few exemptions to Section 907. Subsequent legislation has
allowed U.S. assistance in key areas, including programs that
support democracy, humanitarian assistance, education and confidence-building
measures between countries of south Caucasus.
September 11 attacks and subsequent war on terrorism have created
new prospects for enhancing U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. In view
of Azerbaijan's important geostrategic location at the gates
of Europe to the Middle East and to the Central Asia and given
Azerbaijan's support of the U.S. in war against terrorism (e.g.
by allowing U.S. jets flying to Central Asia to use its airspace
and ground facilities), calls for lifting the U.S. ban on aid
to Azerbaijan became more vocal both on part of the Azerbaijanian
government and the Bush Administration. On December 19 the House
of Representatives and on December 20 the Senate by the majority
of votes approved the bill authorizing the President to "waive
the restriction of assistance for Azerbaijan if the President
determines that it is in the national security interest of the
United States to do so."(54) President Bush used this authorization
on January 25, 2002 by effectively waiving the Section 907.
It is no doubt that new realities after September 11 terrorist
attacks have played a significant role in presidential waiver
of the Section 907. However, these new realities after 9/11
were more triggers rather than underlying factors for waiving
discriminatory sanctions against Azerbaijan. It would be more
correct to view the presidential waiver of the Section 907 as
a continuation of the previous White House policies. In this
sense, it is more probable that after 9/11, given the increased
geostrategic importance of Azerbaijan and already strong American
business interests in the country, the Bush administration simply
used favorable moment to get rid of long-lasting impediment
in the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. By this time Azerbaijan managed
to tie the American business interests closely to the country,
established good contacts with other interest groups in the
U.S. (e.g. the Jewish and Turkish lobbies in the Congress),
the public and elite awareness about Azerbaijan and about the
situation in the Caucasus region has greatly improved in comparison
to early 1990s and, consequently, the American political establishment
came to better realize the national interests associated with
Azerbaijan. Ethnic Armenian interests became increasingly viewed
as a serious impediment for enhancing the U.S. strategic interests
in Azerbaijan and in the Caucasus region. "We have long
wanted to do things in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations that Section
907 effectively prevents… - the U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan
Ross Wilson commented after the waiver of the U.S. ban on aid
to Azerbaijan - The cost to the United States of our inability
to do some of those things is now somewhat higher than the cost
was before, because of September 11."(55)
Another significant change in U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan
after September 11 terrorist attacks was that the official Washington
became more vocal in demonstratively supporting Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity. It has to be noted that the United States
have officially recognized Azerbaijan's territorial integrity
when establishing bilateral diplomatic relations, when voting
for the four UN Security Council resolutions adopted with regard
to the Karabakh conflict back in 1993, which reaffirmed territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan (56), and also in a number of bilateral
and multilateral official meetings. However, the official Washington
was always somewhat hesitant, especially before September 11
attacks, in the formulation of its support for Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity. The most interesting example of this
is the abstention of the United States from voting on Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity on December 15, 1999 at the UN's 54th
General Assembly session. During discussions of the UN resolution
on cooperation between UN and OSCE at the 54th General Assembly
session, a provision on Mountainous Karabakh was introduced
to the section on conflicts, which, in its turn, brought about
the issue of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The provision
on recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was
approved by the majority of votes. However, many Western countries,
including the United States, abstained from voting implying
that the question of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was
still a matter of consideration for them (57). Due to the increased
importance given to Azerbaijan after September 11 attacks, the
official Washington have made a number of statements supporting
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The official position that
the "United States supports territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
and holds that the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter
of negotiation between the parties in the Minsk Process"(58)
was increasingly voiced by a number of high-ranking officials
in a more explicit and unambiguous terms than before. The U.S.
Ambassador to Ross Wilson was quoted to saying on January 14,
2002 that the "goal of the U.S. government is to restore
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and stability in the region"(59).
On June 14, 2002 a State Department spokesman said that Washington
"does not recognize the so-called government... of Nagorno-Karabakh…[The
United States] supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan...
and we believe that a political resolution to the conflict there
must be achieved."(60)
Thus, after September 11 attacks the U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan
became more guided by 'national interests' and less so by ethnic
groups' interests. However, Armenian interest groups continue
to enjoy a significant influence in U.S. policymaking decisions
with regard to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is important to note
that mainly because of Armenian lobbying the Section 907 was
not repealed but simply was suspended by the presidential decision.
In January 2003 President Bush extended the waiver of Section
907 for another year. The text of the presidential determination
on Section 907 signed on January 17, 2003 certified that the
waiver extension was "necessary to support United States
efforts to counter international terrorism", "necessary
to support the operational readiness of United States Armed
Forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism",
and "is important to Azerbaijan's border security (61)
In sum, the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations have gone through a process
of constant improvement, which had a gradual character. Increasing
economic and political ties between the two countries produced
interests, which ran contrary to the Armenian ethnic interests.
Thus, the role of ethnic Armenian interest groups' influence
on U.S. policy formulation towards Azerbaijan has gradually
decreased, in comparison to early 1990s, as the U.S.' broader
national, namely business and security, interests became increasingly
tied to Azerbaijan and as the importance of these interests
came to be realized by the U.S. policymakers.
Conclusion
This article was an attempt to show that although ethnic interest
groups can exert a considerable influence on foreign policy,
especially in such democratic and society-dominated domestic
political systems as that of the United States, the ethnic interests
cannot surpass the national interests, which are obvious and
the importance of which are realized by the policymakers. Even
in such "weak" society-dominated states as the U.S.,
which is highly responsive to the societal pressures, superior
organization and rich financial and information resources are
not sufficient to secure the success of ethnic demands. Since
ethnic groups operate in a multicultural environment with a
variety of interests and given the fact that their successful
activity depends largely on their ability to generate support
and to diminish the opposition from other groups, the ethnic
interest groups always try to appeal to the broader public and
national interests. Likewise, since the ultimate measure of
success of ethnic lobbying rests in influencing the policymaker's
decisions, the ethnic demands and policies must be compatible
with the realities that these policymakers operate, the realities
in which there are contending public and elite preferences,
which together synthesize to a broader policy consensus called
the 'national interest'. Thus, as Watanabe directly points,
"[p]ositions supported by ethnic groups seldom flourish
in the absence of strong and reliable indications that their
views represent reasonable interpretations of the national interest"(62).
In case of the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations the emergence of new
interests, primarily business and security-related in nature,
gradually tied the American 'national interests' to Azerbaijan
and, consequently, diminished the role and importance of the
Armenian lobby in influencing the U.S. policy formulation towards
Azerbaijan. That is not to say that the role of Armenian lobby
will gradually disappear as the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations improve
further. And certainly, it was not only Azerbaijan who improved
its relations with the U.S., the U.S.-Armenian relations during
this period enhanced as well. The point is that with the improvement
of the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations the Armenian interest groups
will not be able to influence the U.S. policy formulation towards
Azerbaijan so easily as they did in early 1990s. The Armenian
interest groups still can, and probably will, have a significant
impact on U.S. policies towards Azerbaijan, but since the issues
associated with the U.S. national interests in its relations
with Azerbaijan have increased, the opportunities for Armenian
lobby influence have correspondingly narrowed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic
Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Harvard University
Press, 2000), 101
2. ibid., 86
3. Paul Y. Watanabe, Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign
Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo, (Greenwood
Press, 1984), 26-27
4. Smith, 88
5. ibid.
6. ibid.
7. Harald Muller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From the Outside
in and from the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic
Politics and Foreign Policy", in The Limits of State Autonomy:
Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, David Skidmore
and Valerie Hudson, eds., (Westview Press, 1993), 34
8. ibid., 41
9. David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, "Establishing
the Limits of State Autonomy: Contending Approaches to the Study
of State-Society Relations and Foreign Policy-Making",
in The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign
Policy Formulation, David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds.,
(Westview Press, 1993), 1
10. Philip P. Everts, "Introduction" in Public Opinion
and the International Use of Force (2001), ed. Philip P. Everts
and Pierangelo Isernia, 8
11. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure,
and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies", World Politics
43, (1991), 482
12. Smith, 94
13. Watanabe, 41
14. ibid., 50
15. ibid. , 48
16. Smith, 94
17. In this regard, Smith provides a good example on how Jewish
New Yorkers, which constitute 9% of the population of New York,
gain significant influence and also notes that they tend to
vote at twice the levels of the state average. See, Smith, 99
18. ibid., 101
19. Watanabe, 68
20. Smith, 109
21. Watanabe, 71
22. Smith, 99
23. Watanabe, 122
24. Web site of the Bangladesh Congressional Caucus, http://bangladeshunited.alochona.org/bangladeshunited/Caucus.html
25. Washington State Democrat James McDermott was the most recent
to join the Armenian Caucus in late January 2003. According
to the PanArmenian news agency, he came to such decision "having
viewed a special ANCA screening of "Ararat" film of
Atom Egoyan at last year-end, narrating about the Armenian Genocide
in Ottoman Turkey".
"Representative James McDermott Joins Congressional Armenian
Caucus", PanArmenian news agency, January 25, 2003.
26. "Armenian Caucus Membership Grows to 125", Website
of the Armenian Assembly of America, http://www.aaainc.org/press/11-01-02.htm;
27. "Congressional Hellenic Caucus", Website of the
American Hellenic Council, http://www.americanhellenic.org/network/modules.php?name=Caucus
28. Watanabe, 72
29. ibid., 62
30. ibid.
31. Alan Cooperman, "Armenians in U.S. Not on INS List",
The Washington Post, December 18, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4407-2002Dec17.html
32. Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) Press Release,
December 16, 2002, http://www.anca.org/anca/pressrel.asp?prID=274
33. Washington File, EUR315 12/18/2002, "INS Revised Notice:
Armenia Not Included in Registration System", http://www.usemb.ee/wf/eur315.htm
34. ANCA Press Release, December 20, 2002, http://www.ancfresno.org/html/press/pr122002.html
35. Elizabeth S. Rogers, "The Conflicting Roles of American
Ethnic and Business Interests in the U.S. Economic Sanctions
Policy: The Case of South Africa", in The Limits of State
Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, David
Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., 191
36. Watanabe, 59
37. The word "alleged" is used here, because the author
believes that it is historians', and not ethnic groups' or politicians'
job to determine the fact of presence or absence of genocide
in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
38. "Help "Stamp" Out Genocide Denial",
ANCA Action Alerts, http://www.anca.org/anca/actionalerts.asp?aaID=12
39."Protest Bush Administration Regulation Requiring Registration
of Armenian citizens" ANCA Action Alerts, http://www.anca.org/anca/actionalerts.asp?aaID=60
40. Manuel Mindreau, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Conflict
Between Armenia and Azerbaijan, p. 9; http://www.docentes.up.edu.pe/Mmindreau/docs/U.S.%20Foreign%20Policy%20-%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan.PDF
41. John J. Maresca "U.S. Ban on Aid to Azerbaijan (Section
907), Azerbaijan International, Winter 1998 (6.4), http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/64_folder/64_articles/64_maresca.html
42. According to the last pre-conflict population census held
in 1989, 75% of the then Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Region
was Armenian and approximately 25% - was Azeri. As a result
of Azerbaijan's de-facto military defeat and the policies of
ethnic cleansing, currently no Azeris live in Mountainous Karabakh
and surrounding regions of Azerbaijan.
Albeit in most of the international documents in English Mountainous
(sometimes also referred as Upland) Karabakh is referred to
as Nagorno-Karabakh, which is the Russian version of the name
for the region, in this paper the conformity of such reference
is sacrificed to a more correct and appropriate English translation
- Mountainous Karabakh.
43. Smith, 69. As a minor detail, it has to be noted that the
Republic of Armenia established in 1991 was not the first Armenian
republic per ce. All South Caucasus countries, Armenia included,
had a brief period of independence in 1918-1920 (Georgia - 1921)
having established their own republics.
44. Maresca, op.cit. http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/64_folder/64_articles/64_maresca.html
45. see: Emil Danielyan, "Armenia's Foreign Policy: Balancing
Between East and West", Prism, Volume 4, Issue 2, January
23, 1998, http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_004_002_003.htm;
Web Site of the Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, http://www.house.gov/pelosi/armenia.htm
46. "U.S. Senate Approved Aid to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh",
PanArmenian news agency, January 27, 2003
47. Freedom Support Act, Section 907 (102nd Congress, 2nd Session,
Public Law 102-511)
48. Smith, 70 referring to Carrol J. Doherty, "Armenia's
Special Relationship with U.S. is Showing ," Congressional
Quarterly, 5/31/97 and Washington Post, 8/1/96
49. Maresca, op. cit. http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/64_folder/64_articles/64_maresca.html
50. Smith, 78
51. Curt Tarnoff, "The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign
Assistance", Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue
Brief for Congress, Order Code IB95077, January 7, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/IB95077.pdf
52. K.P. Foley, "Congress Complicating Caucasus Conflicts,
Official Suggests", RFE/RL, Weekday Magazine, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1996/07/F.RU.96073116315555.html
53. Smith, 14
54. Tim Waal, "Bush Administration Uses Economic Levers
To Encourage Anti-Terrorism Cooperation" Eurasia Insight
10/22/2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102201c.shtml
55. ibid.
56. These UN SC Resolutions are Resolution 822 (30 April 1993),
Resolution 853 (29 July 1993), Resolution 874 (14 October 1993),
Resolution 884 (12 November 1993). For full text of these resolutions
see: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm
57. For details on the territorial integrity question that aroused
at the 54th General Assembly session see, Elkhan Shahinoglu
"West Uncertain Over Azerbaijan's Territorial Integrity",
http://www.geocities.com/fanthom_2000/archives/Archive9.html
58. U.S. Department of State Web site, "The United States
and Nagorno-Karabakh", http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/13502.htm
59. PRIMA News Agency[406-2002-01-15-Azer] "United States
stands for restoration of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan",
http://www.prima-news.ru/eng/news/news/2002/1/15/17551.html
60. "U.S. Aid to Disputed Region", The Washington
Post, June 19, 2002, cited in the web site of the self-proclaimed
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.nkr.am/eng/news/digest.html
(last accessed on January 2, 2003).
61. Text of the Presidential Determination on Section 907, The
White House Office of the Press Secretary January 17, 2003,
Presidential Determination No. 2003-12
Presidential Determination No. 2003-12
62. Watanabe, 60