This article includes two parts. In the first part,
four different strategy models have been developed
in order that Turkey could maximize her foreign
policy goals in regard to the Central Asian region
and the Central Asian republics. In the second part,
certain positive and negative scenarios that Turkey
would possibly face following the application of
the mentioned strategy models have been analyzed.
However, after consulting the responsibles of Stradigma,
we decided to publish this rather long article in
two parts in order to respect for the scholars and
other specialists whose papers take place in Stradigma
e-journal. So, in this volume of the journal, "Strategy
Models", which is the first part of the article
and in the next volume, "Future Scenarios",
the second part of the article, will be published.
I hope, the readers will enjoy the article, which
is completely based on little mind games.
Introduction
In the first part of the article, in order to maximize
Turkey's policies in the Central Asian region, we
propose four different "cooperation strategy
models"; Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S., Strategy
Model II: Turkey - U.S. - Israel; Strategy Model
III: Turkey - U.S. - Iran, and Strategy Model IV:
Turkey - Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAECO).
The strategy models are numbered from the most probable
to the least probable. In other words, in the study
taking the fact into consideration that cooperating
with these five states will not present equal political
and economic advantages for Turkey, we include the
U.S. in Strategy Model I assuming that cooperating
with U.S. would present more political and economic
advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region
than Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan, and that
the realization of Strategy Model I seems the most
probable; we include Israel in Strategy Model II
assuming that cooperating with Israel would present
less political and economic advantages for Turkey
in the Central Asian region than U.S. but more than
Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the realization
of Strategy Model II is less probable than the realization
of Strategy Model I but more probable than Strategy
Model III and Strategy Model IV; we include Iran
in Strategy Model III assuming that cooperating
with Iran would present less political and economic
advantages for Turkey in the Central Asian region
than U.S. and Israel but more than India and Pakistan,
and that the realization of Strategy Model III is
less probable than the realization of Strategy Model
I and Strategy Model II but more probable than Strategy
Model IV; we include India, Pakistan and Iran in
Strategy Model IV assuming that these three states
would present the least political and economic advantages
for Turkey in the Central Asian region, and that
the realization of Strategy Model IV is the least
probable. Furthermore, we distribute the U.S., Israel,
Iran, India and Pakistan into strategy models according
to the intensification of their political and economic
interests in the Central Asia region. Depending
on this reason, we include the U.S. in Strategy
Model I taking its diversified political and economic
interests in this region; Israel in Strategy Model
II taking its relatively less political and economic
interests in the region; Iran in Strategy Model
III taking its small scale security and economic
doubts in regard to the region; and India and Pakistan
in Strategy Model IV taking their only one-sided
(economic) interests in the region into consideration.
So, depending on these explanations, the detailed
answers to be given to the questions "Depending
on which criteria we determine/prefer the states
for the strategy models?" and "Why we
propose only cooperation strategy model but not
any other strategy type?" will also explain
the basic aim of the first part of this article.
"Depending on Which Criteria We Determine/Prefer
the States for the Strategy Models?"
Our determination in regard to including the U.S.,
Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan in strategy models
is based on two criteria: Firstly, their economic
or political or cultural capabilities and possibilities
which can directly facilitate and maximize Turkey's
policies in the Central Asian region in case Turkey
cooperates with them and secondly, their direct
or indirect interests and benefits in the Central
Asian region since national interests of the states
bear vital importance in international relations.
For example, in Strategy Model I we choose U.S.
considering the "political and economic advantages"
she might present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also the U.S.' political interests in
the Central Asian region. We include the U.S. in
all Strategy Models assuming that U.S can support
Turkey financially through allocating money necessary
for the realization of Turkey's oil politics and
some other investments in the Central Asian region,
U.S. can support Turkey politically in international
platforms in regard to Turkey's attempts to realize
its economic, political and cultural interests in
the region; and also taking the U.S.' "political
interests" through Turkey-U.S. cooperation
in the Central Asian region into consideration such
as breaking the influence of Iran, providing the
transportation of oil to world markets via a secure
state like Turkey, integrating the Central Asian
states into the world community.
In Strategy Model II we choose Israel considering
the "political and economic advantages"
she might present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also Israel's aim to gain U.S. back in
regard to its political interests in the Middle
East region. We include Israel in Strategy Model
II assuming that Israel can support Turkey's policies
in regard to the Central Asian region, provide necessary
fund which would help Turkey realize some investments
in the region; and also taking Israel's "political
interests" through Turkey - U.S. -Israel Cooperation
in the Central Asian region into consideration such
as providing U.S back in her Middle East policies,
intensifying bilateral relations with Turkey in
order to reinforce its position in the Middle East
region.
In Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering
the "political advantages" she might present
to Turkey through this strategy model; and also
Iran's "political and economic interests"
in its own region, in the Central Asian region and
in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model
III and Strategy Model IV assuming that Iran might
look for the ways of developing good-neighborly
relations with Turkey, behave more carefully in
regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist activities
on its own territory against Turkey and also taking
Iran's "political and economic interests"
through Turkey - U.S.- Iran cooperation in the Central
Asian region into consideration such as getting
rid of international isolationism prevailing since
Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War, improving
relations with the U.S. through this strategy model,
having a share in oil transportation from the Central
Asian region, reinforcing its political and economic
position in the Middle East region.
In Strategy Model IV we choose India and Pakistan
considering the "political and economic advantages"
they might present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also their "political and economic
interests" in Southern Asian region, in the
Central Asian region and in world politics. We include
India and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV assuming
that through this Strategy Model Turkey might eliminate
various probable economic and political attempts
of these two states (in regard to Central Asia)
which might endanger Turkey's economic and political
interests in the Central Asian region and also taking
India's and Pakistan's "economic and security
interests" through Strategy Model IV into consideration
such as eliminating nuclear threat against each
other in Southern Asian region, benefiting from
economic wealth in the Central Asian region and
gaining power in world politics through this Strategy
Model.
"Why We Propose Only "Cooperation
Strategy Model" But Not Any Other Strategy
Type?"
There have been several reasons, which direct us
to propose and concentrate on only "cooperation
strategy model" in the first part of this article.
First of all, in terms of economic possibilities
Turkey is not capable of realizing its goals in
the region by itself. When we take the importance
of "win-win strategy" (the strategy developed
by the American strategists is based on the idea
that the states should realize economic, political
and military investments or attempts in any region
or any state and should not refrain from any expense
if this region or state is able to present some
more advantages to the state who propose cooperation
in any field) it can be said that the Central Asian
states who are strongly in need of economic support
which would facilitate their transition to market
economy will improve relations as long as Turkey
continues to have share in rehabilitating their
economy. Depending on the reasons above, we find
it necessary for Turkey that it should cooperate
with an economically powerful state, such as the
U.S., to realize its economic goals in the Central
Asian region.
Secondly, it seems obvious that Russia would resist
any intimate political, economic and cultural initiatives
in the Central Asian region taking its political
and economic interests in the same region into consideration.
Parallel to this determination, it can be said that
Turkey would have difficulties in realizing its
political, economic and cultural goals in the region
by itself. For this reason, in our study we propose
the Turkish decision-makers that in order to realize
its political, economic and cultural targets in
Central Asia, Turkey should cooperate with the state/s,
such as the U.S., which are economically and politically
strong enough to overcome Russian resistance.
Thirdly, as mentioned before several states have
appeared to gain political or economic, or both,
or some other advantages in the Central Asian region
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, India and global powers such as
China, Japan and U.S can be included in this power
rivalry in the region. When we take various advantages
they can present to the Central Asian states into
account, it can be said that neither the Central
Asian states, who regard political or economic capabilities
of some regional or global powers as vital for their
political and economic development, nor the regional
or global powers, who take place in the power rivalry
in the region for their political and economic advantages,
would not leave Turkey to realize its goals independently.
Regarding the probable obstacles to be put by some
regional or global powers before Turkey, in our
study instead of excluding some important regional
and global powers we choose some, such as the U.S.
and Israel, and integrate them in our cooperation
strategy model.
Fourthly, culture and history also necessitates
adopting cooperation strategy model by Turkish decision-makers
for the Central Asian region. Though Turkish decision-makers
insist on common features, which Turkish and Central
Asian peoples share, in fact these common features
diversify immensely. While Anatolian Turks acquired
an Islamic-Imperial identity, Central Asian Turks
developed differently bearing tribal and mongoloid
features. Persian had been the language of the cultural
centers of Bukhara and Samarkand, and Turkestani
elites were generally equally at ease in Chagatay
Turk and Persian. Along with Russian dominance cultural
and historical difference grew more and after the
Bolshevik Revolution, Central Asian peoples had
to follow a different path culturally and the elites
of Central Asia had been Russified. In today's southern
Central Asia, the cultural world bears imprint of
centuries of Iranian influence. In northern Central
Asia, shamanistic rituals are still strong, and
Islam is far weaker than in Turkey. Furthermore,
the region's local languages are more distant from
Turkish. Lastly, almost half of the residents of
the region are Slavs or Persians who are away from
Turkish origin. (Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.198)
Depending on the explanations above it can be argued
that historical and cultural ties are motivative
factors which lead Central Asian peoples to regard
Turkey as one of the most important cooperation
partners in the region and which help Turkey realize
its policies in Central Asia. Parallel to this,
we find it quite reasonable for Turkish decision-makers
to cooperate with the state/s, such as Iran, which
is still quite influential culturally and religiously
over the Central Asian states.
Lastly, geography restricts Turkey to realize its
political, economic and cultural goals in regard
to the Central Asian region independently since
there is no continuity between Central Asia and
Turkey. In the newly-emerged geography Iran represents
one of the most important routes for the Central
Asian states to reach global markets. So, it can
be said that regarding the transportation possibilities
Iran plays vital role for the Central Asian states
and Turkey - Iran cooperation would be a development
in favor of Turkey.
The following part includes the explanation of
four different strategy models, developed for the
betterment of relations with the Central Asian republics.
1. Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S. Strategy
Model
In Strategy Model I, we propose Turkish-American
cooperation in the Central Asian region since we
believe that this Model would give the most advantageous
results for Turkey's Central Asian policies depending
on several reasons.
First of all, through cooperating with the only
superpower in the world, Turkey will be able to
find necessary political and economic support to
realize its policies in the Central Asian region.
Secondly, Turkish-American cooperation for the Central
Asian region will not be the first example of these
two states' cooperation in history. Particularly
after the World War II, these two states cooperated
with each other several times in order to realize
their goals, and both of them became content about
these cooperations. Thirdly, it is clear that there
is no obstacle before U.S. to refuse this kind of
cooperation for the Central Asian region since America
has specific political and economic interests in
regard to this region. Fourthly, we believe that
U.S. will fully back Turkey economically and politically
during cooperation process. Fifthly, since the U.S.
government has some other expectations from Turkey
in regard to realizing its goals related with other
regions, in which she has vital interests, we can
assume that U.S. would do its best to satisfy Turkey's
needs in the mentioned cooperation process. Sixthly,
we support the idea that since the U.S. will have
the chance of influencing the states (Iran, India
and Pakistan which she has deep-rooted political
problems) included in Strategy Model III and Strategy
Model IV through involving herself in the mentioned
strategy models, she will be quite willing to cooperate
with Turkey for the Central Asian region.
We should also mention that taking U.S. and Turkey's
expectations from each other in this cooperation
process into consideration, Strategy Model I is
largely based on economic and political concerns
of both states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model I
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for
Turkey
First of all, Turkish government through
cooperating with the only super power like U.S.
might automatically enlarge its sphere of action
(performance) in the Central Asian region; secondly,
with the U.S. back, Turkish government might realize
its promises given to the Central Asian republics
particularly at the very beginning of their independence.
When we remember the economic assistance given to
Turkey by the U.S. government after 1945 through
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in order to break
the USSR's possible penetration into the Middle
East region, we can easily understand the importance
of the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey; thirdly,
Turkish government, lack of enough economic and
political power in international platforms, might
reinforce the U.S. economic and political support
necessary for the construction and realization of
Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline project through
this cooperation. Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline
project is one of the oil and gas transportation
routes project based on transporting oil and gas
reserves in the Caspian region to the world markets
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the
largest energy reserves in the Caspian region. Currently,
the proven oil reserve in the region accounts for
15-31 billion barrels. However, exploitation and
transportation of oil in this region is rather difficult
since the Caspian Sea Basin is landlocked. Since
the Caspian region has no outlet to the seas, the
region is regarded as one of the most difficult
and dangerous regions for the exploitation and transportation
of hydrocarbon. During 20 years before the year
1914, Caspian region was one of the largest and
one of the most developed oil production areas.
However, following the 70-year of Soviet rule, Caspian
states were left behind oil exploitation technologies.
Currently, there have been only two installations
in the region, one in Primorsk city in Azerbaijan,
and other in Astrakhan city in Russia, which can
construct or repair oil wells. Furthermore, it costs
rather high to bring modern oil exploitation equipment
abroad. Oil exploitation is not the only problem
in the Caspian region, the political problems in
regard to the construction of new pipelines, and
also the high cost of the construction of these
new pipelines consist other side of the issue. It
is possible to carry Kazakhstan oil over Russia
to the port of Novorossisk. However, Russia might
use this pipeline in order to increase its control
over Kazakhstan. The pipeline from Azerbaijan over
Daghistan and Chechenia to Novorossisk is confronted
by increasing stability in these states. As for
the exportation of Azerbaijan's oil, there are two
alternatives: The pipeline over Turkey and the pipeline
over Iran. Although the transportation of Azerbaijan's
oil over Iran would cost cheaper than the transportation
of this oil over Turkey, U.S. government opposes
the oil pipeline project over Iran since she sees
Iran as a terrorist state. U.S. backs Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline, which would also carry Turkmenistan's
natural gas and Kazakhstan's oil to the western
markets without constructing an additional pipeline,
depending on geopolitical reasons. She regards Turkey
as her and Israel's vital ally, and she wants to
increase Ankara's prestige in the Caucasus and Central
Asia against Iran and Russia. However, the oil companies
of the states (except for the U.S. oil companies),
which are involved with the transportation of oil
and gas in the Caspian region to the western markets,
regard the pipeline project over Iran as less risky
than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, which would
pass through three problematic regions. According
to them, although the war between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nogorno-Karabakh ended in 1994, it
still has the potential or reemergence. Furthermore,
PKK factor in Turkey is another problem. And Georgia
has also problems with Abkhasia, she could not establish
its authority over South Osetia, Cakavetia and (see
IISS Strategic Comments in Milliyet, 23 June 1999;
Blank, 1994; Forsythe, 1996)
Cumhur Ersümer, the then Turkish Minister of Energy
and Natural Resources, summarized the probable advantages
Turkey might gain when the Baku-Ceyhan project is
materialized as follows: "When the project
reaches the full capacity, 50 million tons of oil
will be transported from Baku to Ceyhan annually!
We should emphasize that oil consumption in Turkey
is 30 million tons in a year, this consumption will
be 45 million tons in the year 2010! We should also
point out that Turkey will purchase 16 billion m3
natural gas and we will be able to sell the same
amount of natural gas to Europe. In addition to
these it should also be kept in mind that the construction
of 2.4. billion dollars pipeline will have an important
positive impact on Turkish economy..." (Milliyet,
18 November 1999)
When we take Iranian and Russian governments' proposals
related with alternative transportation routes into
consideration, it could be assumed that the U.S.
economic and political back might be the most important
instrument for the realization of the mentioned
oil and gas transportation route.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for the
U.S.
First of all, although the U.S. government
is extremely interested in the Central Asian region
due to the mentioned economic and political reasons,
geographical realities restrict the mentioned U.S.
desire to become real. Because geographically U.S.
is so far from Central Asia that even if she intends
to play an active role in the region, she can not
do this. For this reason, it can be said that similar
to the policy she adopted for the Balkans and Middle
East region during the Cold War period; in the new
world order, she favors a foreign policy pattern
which is based on supporting one of her faithful
allies to become actively involved in the regions
in which she has vital interests, and by doing so,
she has word on these regions. So, through Turkey-U.S.
cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might
realize its policies in regard to this region; secondly,
as mentioned before U.S. has been observing Iranian
interest and attempts in the Central Asian region
closely since the states in the region gained their
independence, and she intends to break the influence
of Iran in this region since she believes that any
probable Iranian political or economic active involvement
in the region will evoke Islamic sentiments, which
were suppressed under Soviet regime during 70 years,
and parallel to this development Central Asian republics
and the Central Asian region will be closed to Western
interests. So, it can be assumed that through this
cooperation, U.S. might decrease the influence of
Iran in this region, and by backing Turkey, she
might present laic, secular and democratic model
against radical Islamic model before the Central
Asian republics; thirdly, through this cooperation,
U.S. government might restrict any possible Iranian-Russian
coalition aimed at gaining full control over Central
Asian republics. When we remember the negative results
of Iranian-Russian close relationship in the Middle
East region in the period after Shah Reza Pehlevi,
the possible negative results of the emergence of
Iranian-Russian coalition in the Central Asian region
will become clearer; fourthly, through this
cooperation, U.S. might reinforce its position in
the Middle East region, in which she has vital interests,
too; and last, the U.S. government might
reinforce Turkish-Israeli relationship/cooperation
in the Middle East region. When we take these two
states' presence and roles in Middle East in terms
of U.S. into consideration, we can assume that Turkish-U.S.
cooperation in the Central Asian region might be
quite advantageous for the future projections of
the U.S. in some other regions such as Middle East.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model I for
the Central Asian Republics
First of all, it is quite clear that the
independent republics of Central Asia have been
attempting to transform the established institutions
and rules into western-type democratic institutions
and rules. They strongly believe that in order to
realize the mentioned transformations they need
western political support. At that point we can
assume that through the active involvement of the
U.S. as the result of Turkish-American cooperation
in their region, these republics might obtain the
support of a super power, and this kind of development
will accelerate the intended transition period;
secondly, Central Asian republics are also
aimed at transforming their economies into liberal
economy. However, largely due to economic reasons
they have not succeeded to realize this until now.
So, it can be assumed that by the help of U.S. active
involvement in their region, they might provide
economic assistance from the U.S necessary for the
rehabilitation of their economies and transition
to liberal economy; last, although the Central
Asian republics recognized the fact that the CIS
membership would increase the Russian control and
authority over their governments, they joined the
CIS, set up by Russian Federation, Belorussia and
Ukraine, firstly regarding their security and economic
concerns and secondly since they did not have any
other alternative except for this. For the time
being, Russian political approaches toward these
republics and Central Asia proved this assumption
to be true and Russian Federation began to be regarded
as the ideological, social and cultural successor
of the Soviet Union by these republics. It can be
said that currently, these republics are aware of
the fact that Russian officials do have some economic
and political plans related with them and for this
reason they still face Russian threat. So, it can
be assumed that through Turkish active involvement
in the Central Asian region, they might gain power
before the Russian Federation. When we take common
features such as historical, cultural, religious
and linguistic ties between the independent republics
in Central Asia and Turkey in the past into consideration,
the importance of Turkey's presence in the Central
Asian region for these republics will be understood
better.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model I
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian
Federation Before Strategy I
It should be kept in mind that any serious attempt
by any external power in regard to the Central Asian
region would face Russian objection. So, it can
be argued that the cooperation strategy models to
be developed by Turkish officials for the Central
Asian region would face Russian objection, too.
However, it should be mentioned that the content
of contra-policies to be developed by the Russian
officials against each of the four cooperation strategy
models will be completely different. For example,
while the content of contra-policies to be developed
by the Russian officials against Turkey-U.S. Cooperation
Strategy Model might be more Iran, Armenia and Central
Asian- orientated; the content of contra-policies
to be developed by the Russian officials against
Turkey-Israel-U.S., Turkey-Iran-U.S, and Turkey-CAECO
Cooperation Strategy Models might be more diversified.
So, it can be said that the most probable contra-policies
to be developed by the Russian officials against
Turkish-American cooperation for the Central Asian
region might be as follows:
Firstly, in order to prevent Turkish-American
cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russia
might seek the ways for reinforcing the established
bi-lateral economic and political relations with
Iran for the Central Asian region. Alvin Z. Rubinstein,
Professor of political science at Pennsylvania,
and senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, in his article "Moscow and Tehran
The Wary Accommodation" explains the reasons
which bring Russian Federation and Iran closer in
the Central Asian region. According to Rubinstein
the causes which lead them to behave commonly in
Central Asia are based on shared political, economic
and security concerns. The reasons, explained by
Rubinstein, can be summarized as follows: - Along
with the changes emerged in the geopolitics of Central
Asia and Caucasus, both Moscow and Tehran feel insecure
before these radical changes; - In the Cold War
period both Russia (following the bi-polarization)
and Iran (following the Iran Islamic Revolution)
observed the U.S. policies closely and adopted common
contra-policies against the U.S. increasing influence
in the Middle East region; - In order to maintain
the balance of power in the Middle East region,
Iran backed Russia's military and political attempts
in this region in the Cold War period; - Both the
Russian Federation and Iran find the establishment
and continuity of stability in Central Asia and
Caucasus regarding their economic and security concerns;
- Russia does not see Iran as in economically and
politically powerful condition which can endanger
her projections in regard to Central Asia and Caucasus;
- Russian Federation, in order not to lose her influence,
and Iran, in order to prevent the emergence of any
attempt which might endanger her national security,
are in favor of the continuation of status quo in
Central Asia and Caucasus; - Both the Russian Federation
and Iran support the idea that the U.S. must have
a limited influence particularly in the Central
Asian region; - In the new world order both the
Russian and Iranian governments are in favor of
developing good relations with the West particularly
with the U.S. (see Rubinstein, 1995, pp.26-57)
Furthermore, İhsan Çolak, Research Assistant at
Fatih University in İstanbul, explains the developing
relationship between Russia and Iran from a different
perspective and tells that "Although Russian
- Iran relations have lost its former intimate phase
as the result of the dismantlement of Soviet mentality
and the Russian attempts to develop relations with
the West, both of these two states' similar stand
before the West forces them to behave commonly in
regional relations. One of the most important reasons
which leads Russia to develop relations with Iran
is that the West, particularly the U.S., is in favor
of being with Turkey in the attempts in regard to
the region (former Soviet geopolitical area)".
(Çolak, 1999, p.211) Disregarding the fear related
with the awakening of Islamic sentiments in the
Central Asian region, Russian officials might back
Iran to play an active role in this region. This
might lead the uprise of radical Islam in Central
Asia, which in turn would result in the rejection
of laic and secular Turkey's Central Asian-orientated
political and economic attempts by the Central Asian
republics; secondly, Russian officials might
also attempt to benefit from political contradictions
and fragility prevailing between Iran and Turkey,
and they might use the policy of "double containment".
Double containment is a kind of policy, which is
used (particularly by the U.S.) to weaken political,
economic and military potentials of any two states,
which have problems in several fields by suggesting
the use of contradictions between them. U.S. government
succeeded to gain advantages from this policy through
using the contradictions between Iran and Iraq.
The most important aspect of this policy is that
the state, which uses the "double containment",
is never actively involved in the process of the
mentioned policy. D. Baluev, in his article "Moderation
in the National Idea", published in International
Affairs (Moscow), regards the use of double containment
policy between Iran and Turkey as a means of weakening
Turkey's role in the Caucasus. (Baluev, 1996, p.107)
In order to materialize this policy, Russian officials
might develop some strategies. Firstly, they might
provoke Iran to violate the rights of Azeris and
Turkmens, which consist large proportion of Iran
population. Secondly, in order to create obstacles
before the U.S. backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project,
they might give support to Iran to construct an
alternative pipeline, which would carry Azerbaijan's
oil to the world markets. Thirdly, they might also
increase its support to the activities of illegal
groups such as PKK and Hezbollah through backing
Iranian policies related with these two groups.
Fourthly, they might suggest Iranian government
setting up alliances with the states with which
Turkish government has deep-rooted political, diplomatic
and historical problems. Iran -Syria alliance in
the Middle East, or (or both) Iran - Syria - Greek
Government of South Cyprus - Armenia - Greece alliance
both in the Middle East and Central Asia might be
quite well-established alliances determined to restrict
Turkey's influence in the Central Asian region indirectly;
thirdly, Russian Federation might restrict
economic relations with the Central Asian republics
in order to prevent them from joining Turkish-American
cooperation in Central Asia. When we take the fact
into consideration that Russia has the largest share
in Central Asian republics' foreign trade (these
republics realize 80% of their foreign trade with
the Russian Federation), the mentioned probable
attempt of Russia might affect the political stand
of these republics toward Turkish-American cooperation
in their region badly; fourthly, Russia might
cause conflict in Central Asian region deliberately,
as she did in the Caucasus region, and following
the internal chaos emerged in these republics she
might play peace-keeping role in this region. By
doing so, she might automatically increase her control
and authority over the states in Central Asia. As
the result of this development it is highly possible
that the republics in Central Asia might be rather
hesitant towards any external initiative which would
endanger their relations with the Russian Federation
in the region; fifthly, in order to prevent
Turkish government from concentrating on Turkish-American
cooperation strategy model in the Central Asian
region, Russia might establish a "Slavic-Orthodox
quasi-coalition" under the aegis of herself.
(1) By doing so, she might motivate the Slavic-Orthodox
origin nations in the Balkans to adopt negative
policies toward the Muslim-origin Turkish population
living in the same region; sixthly, Russia
might cause an Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in the
Caucasus region, which would directly close Turkey's
passing route to the Central Asian region; seventhly,
in order to draw Turkish officials' attention to
other issues, Russia might support Syrian policies
in regard to the PKK. Furthermore, she might
violate Montreux Convention on Straits, which might
in turn deprive Turkish officials of focusing on
Central Asian region and of conducting strategy
models in this region; furthermore, Russia might
do her best to transport Azerbaijan's oil over its
own territory but not over Turkey. In order to exclude
Turkish option (Baku-Ceyhan pipeline) to carry Azerbaijan's
oil to the world markets, she might emphasize that
the mentioned pipeline project, proposed by Turkey
depending on political and economic reasons and
strongly backed by the U.S. due to geostrategic
reasons, is under the risk of Kurdish problem which
is confronted by Turkey particularly in southeastern
Anatolia through which the Azeri oil will flow when
this pipeline project is materialized. Presenting
the mentioned handicap in Turkey, Russian officials
very often put forth the idea that the flow of Azerbaijan's
oil must be through the Russian pipeline. The planned
outlet for the Russian pipeline would be the port
of Novorossisk on the Black Sea. According to this
plan the oil would be carried by tankers through
the Bosphorus Straits. If the Russian pipeline project
is materialized, the population living in Istanbul
would face serious risks due to the probable environmental
problems to be caused by tankers, and the tanker
traffic through the Bosphorus Straits would be on
the maximum limit; and last, Russia might
benefit from Armenian-Kurdish ties in order to provoke
Kurdish population living largely in southeastern
Anatolia of Turkey. Moreover, she can increase her
support to several Moscow-based Kurdish organizations
and Kurdish Council, which was set up in Moscow.
(2) By doing so, she might strengthen Kurdish separatist
movement under the leadership of Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK), which would badly affect Turkey's internal
political order.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Iran
before Strategy I
Before presenting the probable disadvantages to
be caused by Iran before Strategy Model I, it should
be mentioned that Iran would oppose any external
attempt determined to obtain maximum political and
economic benefit from the Central Asian region,
and particularly she will oppose the attempt actually
made by Turkey. However, it should be kept in mind
that Iran will not be able to develop any direct
contra-policies against the attempts in which the
U.S. is actively involved since she has several
political and economic expectations from the U.S.
after Khomeini period. So, it can be said that probable
opposition to be showed by Iranian government against
Turkish-American cooperation in the Central Asian
region will be directed towards Turkey, and Iran
will develop some policies determined to weaken
Turkey's influence in Central Asia. These would
naturally lead the emergence of several disadvantages
before Strategy I. The probable disadvantages to
be caused by Iran before the mentioned Strategy
Model might be as follows:
First of all, although the present Iran
government's political ideology in regard to the
Central Asian region and Central Asian states is
not based on transporting Iranian-type political
model to these republics, Iranian officials might
use Islam factor in this region in order to prevent
these republics from intensifying relations with
Turkey and by doing so, Iran will be able to develop
closer relations with them. This development might
lead two negative outcomes. Firstly, political
order in these states might be destabilized and
this might retard the period necessary to transit
into democratic system. Secondly, Central Asian
republics, provoked by Islamic sentiments, might
refrain from cooperating with a laic and secular
state such as Turkey in their region; secondly,
in order to cause problems before Turkish-American
cooperation for the Central Asian region, Iranian
government might increase its support for PKK and
Hezbollah. (3) This would force Turkish officials
to focus on solving internal problems rather than
developing strategies for the regions in which Turkish
government has political and economic interests;
thirdly, parallel to this policy, she might
reinforce her relations with Syria in the Middle
East; and with Russia and Armenia in the Central
Asian region. It can be argued that Iran might look
for the ways to turn these relations with the mentioned
states into a kind of strategic alliance. In any
case, development of any close relations or establishment
of any strategic alliance among these states might
weaken Turkey politically; and last, Iranian
officials might conduct political pressure over
Turkish population living in Iran.
2. Strategy Model II: Turkey - Israel - U.S.
Strategy Model
In Strategy Model II we propose Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region since we
believe that this Model would give secondarily advantageous
results (compared to the advantages which Turkey
would obtain from Strategy Model I) for Turkey's
Central Asian policies depending on several reasons.
First of all, it sounds quite reasonable to prefer
Israel and America for Strategy Model II since Turkey
and Israel have been close allies in the Middle
East region for years depending on similar political,
economic and security concerns related with Arab
Middle East states; and since both Turkey and Israel
have been inevitable allies of the U.S. in regard
to her policies in the Middle East. Secondly, Turkish-Israel
cooperation in Central Asia would not be the first
example of these two states' cooperation. Particularly
after the demise of the Soviet Union, both of them
have been in favor of developing bi-lateral economic,
political and military relations in order to strengthen
their economic, political and military stand in
their own regions. Thirdly, they are aware of the
fact that the probable positive results to be obtained
from Strategy Model II would have a multi-dimensional
impact on both Israel's and Turkey's stand before
Arab states in the Middle East region. For example,
both Israel and Turkey will be able to foster their
political and economic position before Arab Middle
East states, with which they have deep-rooted conflicts.
In addition to this, via this cooperation, Turkey
will be able to prevent Israel state from supporting
the realization of a Kurdish state project. Furthermore,
Israeli officials, who would have a chance to become
closer to the U.S. officials via Strategy Model
II, will be able to obtain the U.S. political support
more in regard to Arab-Israel conflict, prevailing
in the Middle East region for years. As for the
U.S., via the mentioned cooperation in the Central
Asian region, U.S. will be able to reinforce relations
with Turkey and Israel, which represent vital importance
in regard to her stand in the Middle East. It can
be assumed that parallel to this cooperation, while
Turkey will consist military leg of the U.S. in
the Middle East region, Israel will consist political
leg of her in the same region. Besides the probable
advantages that the U.S. government will obtain
from this cooperation in regard to her Middle East
policies, she will be able to obtain political back
of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which
plays an important role in the determination of
the U.S. foreign policy.
So, taking the mentioned reciprocal political,
economic and security expectations of Turkey-Israel
and the U.S. from each other, it can be assumed
that these three states' cooperation in the Central
Asian region will become quite effective, and Turkey
will be able to maximize her policies in the mentioned
region through setting up Strategy Model II. This
Model is based on political, economic and security
concerns of the participating states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model II
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for
Turkey
First of all, via Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region, Turkey's
political stand before the U.S. might raise gradually.
When we remember the strategic importance of Turkey
through being one of the most trustable allies of
the U.S. related with her counter-policies against
the Soviet Union during the Cold War years in terms
of America, it can be assumed that Turkey, through
cooperating with the U.S. and her historical friend,
Israel, in Central Asia, in the region which American
and Israeli governments have direct or indirect
interests, might obtain the U.S. support more, and
this might help Turkish officials be more powerful
before the states with which Turkish government
has had economic and political problems, and in
international platforms; secondly, Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region might help
Turkish government gain political power before Iran
and Syria strategic grouping in the Middle East
region. Although this kind of cooperation seems
unable to remove these states' foreign policy attempts,
intended to weaken Turkey politically and economically,
this might prevent the mentioned three states from
developing future projections, which would endanger
national security of Turkey; thirdly, parallel
to the realization of Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
in the Central Asian region, the policies of fundamentalist
Arab Middle East states against Turkey might become
less severe; and last; through this cooperation,
Turkish government might stop the attempts of the
U.S., Israel and the Jewish lobby in U.S. congress
in regard to the realization of Kurdish state project.
(4)
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for
the U.S.
Firstly; via this cooperation, the U.S.
government might raise the political and economic
support of the Jewish lobby in the Congress; secondly,
Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in the Central
Asian region might strengthen the U.S. policies
on Middle East. When the prevailing conflict between
Iran-U.S., Iraq-U.S. and Syria-U.S. in the Middle
East region, and also Russia's political expectations
in the Middle East are taken into consideration,
it can be assumed that via this cooperation the
U.S. might foster its stand in the Middle East before
the states mentioned above by the help of Turkey
and Israel. Along with developing relations with
these two states in the Central Asian region, while
Turkey might consist military leg of the U.S. in
the Middle East region, Israel might consist political
leg of the U.S. in the same region; and last,
Turkish-American-Israel cooperation might also have
a positive influence on American policies on Central
Asian republics. It is obvious that U.S. government
strictly backs the continuity of current political
systems in these states. By doing so, she believes
that Russian policies and probable Iranian fundamentalist
attempts in Central Asia will be kept aloof. So,
it can be assumed that along with Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region, an extensive
Israeli economic penetration into this region might
present a Western, rather than Islamic, orientation
for the political systems of the Central Asian states.
(Ehteshami, 1994, pp.96-97)
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for
Israel
Firstly, Israel, such as Turkey, has lost
its strategic importance before the West relatively
following the end of the Cold War. However, despite
the mentioned downgrade in its strategic position
before the West, U.S. is still Israel's one of the
most important allies. So, it can be assumed that
by actively involving herself in the Central Asian
region, in which the U.S. government has vital interests,
and by adopting policies similar to the policies
of the U.S. in this region, and by helping the U.S.
officials enlarge American sphere of influence in
Central Asia, Israeli government might compensate
the mentioned loss before the West, and particularly
U.S.; secondly, through taking place in Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region, Israel
will be able to develop its relations with the U.S.
government. Parallel to the developing relations
with the U.S., Israel might realize its policies
in the Middle East region more independently. At
least, Israeli government might foster its political
stand in Arab-Israeli peace process through gaining
U.S. support more; thirdly, if Bernard Lewis'
assumption "The emergence of Turkish states
world, such as the emergence of Arab world appeared
following the disintegration of British and French
empires, will be viewed quite important in the following
years, and this Turkish states world will have fairly
important influence on Middle East." (Göka,
1999, p.181) becomes real, it can be assumed that
Israel, which will have a word in Central Asian
policies through participating in this kind of cooperation
in the Central Asian region, might gain political
power before Arab Middle East states. Parallel to
this development, anti-Israel policies of the Middle
East Arab states will become less effective on Israel's
political stand in the Middle East, so, the mentioned
political burden before Israeli government in the
Middle East region might decrease gradually; fourthly,
along with Israel-Central Asian states cooperation
in the Central Asian region, Islamic world, particularly
Muslim-origin peoples in the Middle East region
might think that Israeli government will soften
her political discourse and political attempts in
regard to the Arab Middle East states and particularly
to the Palestine conflict. This development might
help Israel remove political oppression in its own
region gradually; and last, Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region might also
be advantageous for Israel in regard to solving
its problems with Iranian government. The main problem
between Iran and Israel is not "Islamic fundamentalism".
Simply, in terms of Israel, the problem is that
Iran insistently opposes to the peace process, and
to the Israeli government's enlargement through
Jerusalem, and struggles with Israel for this enlargement
issue. (Aras, 1999, p.205) So, parallel to developing
relations with Turkey, Israel might benefit from
Turkey's potential mediating role in solving the
mentioned problem with Iran. Although this possibility
seems rather weak, still, it should be kept in mind.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model II for
the Central Asian Republics
Since we explained probable advantages which U.S.
and Turkey might present for the Central Asian republics
in Strategy Model I, we will only explain probable
advantages which Israeli government might present
for the Central Asian republics along with Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region in Strategy
Model II.
Firstly, along with Israel's active involvement
in the Central Asian region, Central Asian republics
might benefit from Israel's close relations with
the West, and particularly with the U.S. These republics
might regard Israel as a gateway to the West, and
particularly to the U.S.; secondly, Israel's
economic assistance given to the Central Asian states
since they gained their independence has been welcomed
by them since these states are in need of any economic
assistance by any state. So, along with Israel's
developing relations parallel to Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region, the states
in Central Asia might obtain more economic assistance
from Israel, which would in turn help these states
rehabilitate their economies; thirdly, it
is obvious that the mutual fear shared by Israel
and the Central Asian states related with the expansion
of Islamic fundamentalism and with the increasing
influence of Iran in the region has been one of
the most important factors which leads these two
sides to develop closer relations.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model II
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by some
in the Middle East region Before Strategy Model
II
First of all, it seems obvious that Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region will have
a negative impact on Turkey's economic and particularly
political relations with the Arab countries in the
Middle East region because most of these countries
have had deep-rooted political problems with Israel
since the establishment of this state. So, it can
be said that Turkish state's cooperation attempt
with Israel will cause discontent among the Arab
Middle East states, and these states will adopt
a negative stand against Turkey. Parallel to this
development, Turkey might be deprived of these states'
political and economic support which is necessary
for the political stability and economic well-being
of Turkey in the Middle East region; secondly,
along with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation in
the Central Asian region, Iran might show its reaction
in two ways. Firstly, Iran might raise its political
opposition against Israeli state's enlargement policy
through Jerusalem, and the mentioned political attempt
of Iran might cause problems in Arab-Israeli peace
process. Secondly, Iran, in order to create obstacles
before Turkish-Israel cooperation attempt in the
Central Asian region, might raise its political
support for PKK and Hezbollah, which might prevent
Turkish officials from concentrating on the mentioned
cooperation process; thirdly, such as Iran,
Syria might show its reaction against Turkish-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region in two ways,
too. Firstly, Syria, in order to break the probable
influence of Turkey in the Middle East region as
the result of her attempts in the Central Asian
region, might foster its political support for PKK.
Secondly, Syria might reinforce its relations with
Iran, and Greek Government of South Cyprus, and
even she might be willingly involved in establishment
of Syria-Iran-Armenia-Greece probable quadripartite
strategic alliance against Turkish-American-Israel
tripartite alliance.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian
Federation Before Strategy Model II
First of all, Russian Federation, in order
to endanger Turkish-Israel cooperation in the Central
Asian region, might search the ways for backing
Arab states' anti-Israel policies. By doing so,
she might create problems before Arab-Israeli peace
process, and this might result in the downgrade
in Israel's concentration on the mentioned cooperation
process; secondly, Russian Federation might
convince Arab states that Turkish-Israel alliance
in the Central Asian region will in turn help Turkish
and Israeli states become politically and economically
more powerful in the Middle East region before other
states in the same region. Arab Middle East states,
provoked by Russia, might foster their anti-Turkish
and anti-Israeli policies; thirdly, she might
develop her relations with the states such as Iran
and Syria in the Middle East region, Armenia in
the Caucasus, Greece in the Balkans, and Greek Government
of South Cyprus, with which Turkish state has had
rather fragile political relations for years, and
she might suggest these states set up a kind of
strategic alliance against Turkish-Israel alliance
in the Central Asian region; and last, Russian
Federation might continue to house PKK terrorists
in order to weaken Turkey politically and economically.
Probable Disadvantage to be Caused by Islamist
and Nationalist Circles in Turkey Before Strategy
Model II
When we take rather fanatic political discourses
developed, and rather severe political stand adopted
by Islamist and nationalist circles in Turkey just
after the former Soviet republics in Central Asia
had declared their independence in the beginning
of 1990s into consideration, it can be assumed that
these circles will oppose Turkish officials' attempt
to cooperate with Jewish-populated Israel state.
So, the ones who follow either Islamist or nationalist
ideologies in Turkey might prevent the emergence
of a fully agreed political consensus in Turkey,
and this might cause the emergence of some problems
in domestic policy, which might in turn lead lack
of concentration on Central Asian region and Central
Asian republics.
3. Strategy Model III: Turkey - Iran - U.S.
Strategy Model
In Strategy Model III we choose Iran considering
the "political advantages" she might present
to Turkey through this strategy model; and also
Iran's "political and economic interests"
in its own region, in the Central Asian region and
in world politics. We include Iran in Strategy Model
III assuming that Iran might look for the ways of
developing good-neighborly relations with Turkey,
behave more carefully in regard to PKK and Hezbollah
terrorist activities on its own territory against
Turkey and also taking Iran's "political and
economic interests" through Turkey - U.S.-
Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region into
consideration such as getting rid of international
isolationism prevailing since Islamic revolution
and Iran-Iraq War, improving relations with the
U.S. through this strategy model, having a share
in oil transportation from the Central Asian region,
reinforcing its political and economic position
in the Middle East region.
Despite the handicaps before Strategy Model III
we believe that along with the realization of Strategy
Model III; political, economic and security differences
and expectations of these states related with the
Central Asian region will become less disturbing,
and the mentioned political, economic and military
conflicts among them will be taken under control
although these conflicts will not be completely
removed because the eventual goal of Strategy Model
III is to minimize political, economic and security
differences and expectations of the states included
in this kind of cooperation, and to remove any political,
economic or military conflicts among them in the
Central Asian region. So, along with the realization
of Strategy Model III, Turkish government will be
able to realize its goals in Central Asia and foster
her economic and social progress at home easier.
It should be also mentioned that Strategy Model
III is mainly based on political and security concerns
of the participating states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model III
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for
Turkey
First of all, along with Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region, Russian-Iran
relations might downgrade gradually. As the result
of this development Russia might be deprived of
one of its power centers in the Middle East region.
Moreover, Russian-Iran close relationship in Central
Asia will leave the floor to Turkish-American-Iran
partnership; secondly, Iran, accepted to
cooperate with Turkey in the Central Asian region,
might give up backing PKK and Hezbollah. Parallel
to this, Turkey might eliminate one of the states
which houses and gives political support to the
mentioned illegal groups; thirdly, probability
of the emergence of Russia-Iran-Armenia tripartite
strategic partnership in the Central Asian region,
which is uttered very often recently by the Russian
officials in order to break the influence of Turkey
in this region, might be removed parallel to Turkish-American-Iran
partnership in Central Asia. As for the probability
of the emergence of Russian-Armenian strategic partnership
in the Central Asian region, it can be claimed that
these two sides' partnership will not be as effective
as Russia-Iran-Armenia strategic partnership since
both Russian Federation and Armenia have been busy
with internal political and economic problems; fourthly,
along with the realization of Strategy Model III,
Iran might refrain from taking place in Iran-Syria-Armenia-Greece-Greek
Government of South Cyprus strategic alliance; fifthly,
as mentioned before, Turkey and Central Asian republics
are not geographically contiguous. Access to these
republics is rather problematic. Overland routes,
which connect Turkey with Central Asia, traverse
Iran, or pass through the Transcaucasus and Russia,
or run via Transcaucasus and the Caspian Sea. (Winrow,
1996, p.129) So, it can be said that along with
Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central
Asian region, Turkey might safeguard its transportation
route which traverses Iran; and last, Iranian
government expecting to obtain various political
and economic advantages from the U.S. as the result
of Turkish-American-Iran cooperation might no longer
oppose Baku-Ceyhan route which is supported by Turkey
and America.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for
the U.S.
Firstly, it seems possible that U.S. foreign
policy on Central Asia, which is mainly based on
isolating Iran from the Central Asian region, will
lead the mentioned state to cooperate economically
and politically with the Russian Federation, and
in the end to become politically marginalized. So,
the U.S. government through accepting to cooperate
with Iran might prevent this state from developing
close relations with Russia, and so, Iran might
no longer remain as a political threat against the
U.S. in the Middle East and Central Asian regions;
secondly, by the help of Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region, U.S. might
eliminate one of the most important negative factors
such as Iran in the Middle East region. Taking the
importance of economic and political advantages
to be obtained through U.S.-Iran cooperation into
consideration, Iran might soften its anti-American
policies, and adopt more cooperative political stand
in its own region. This development might bring
two different practical ends. First of all, U.S.
political maneuvers in the Middle East region might
face less Iranian opposition. Secondly, Iran might
support the Middle East peace process through obeying
the rules of law, refraining from backing the activities
of illegal groups, removing its negative political
stand against Arab-Israel peace process. These both
might lead the U.S. government to enlarge its sphere
of influence in the Middle East; and thirdly,
through Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the
Central Asian region, U.S. will have a chance to
become involved in Central Asia with these two Muslim
countries, which have deep-rooted cultural, historical
and social ties with the Central Asian republics.
By doing so, U.S. might realize its Central Asian
policies more easily.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model III for
Iran
Firstly, Iran, through taking place in Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region might have
a chance to remove political conflicts with the
U.S. As the result of this promising development
Iran might convince the U.S. government to cancel
the prevailing embargo, get rid of isolation through
reintegrating itself into the world community, and
rehabilitate its economy. So, it can be assumed
that the probable advantages that Iran will obtain
from Turkish-American-Iran cooperation might be
larger than the probable advantages that the same
state will obtain from Iran-Russian strategic alliance
in the Central Asian region; secondly, because
of the immense power of Russia which extends to
the north, historically Iran has always sought to
balance off Russia with other potentially balancing
powers. France (under Napoleon), Germany, America,
and even Japan and China have functioned as these
potentially balancing powers in some ways in more
recent periods. (Fuller, 1991, p.182) So, through
cooperating with the only superpower of the world,
Iran might also have the chance of ensuring that
she will not be entirely at the mercy of a state
such as Russian Federation, which the political
and economic future is unforeseen; thirdly, as mentioned
before, Iranian Azeris living in northwest of Iran
consist 20% or 30% of Iran population, and Iran
has always had some concerns about this Azeri population.
This concern is based on Iranian assumption that
Azeris living in Iran might attempt to unite with
the Azeris living in Azerbaijan, or visa versa.
So, through developing relations with Turkey for
the Central Asian region, Iran might benefit from
close relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and
remove this threat; and last; although Iran has
deep-rooted historical ties with the peoples of
Central Asian republics, there are still some limits
which prevent Iran from enlarging its ideological,
cultural influence through the Central Asian republics
fully. Firstly, Iranians are Shiites while the peoples
of Central Asian states are Sunnis, secondly, Iranians
strictly follow Islamic traditions while the peoples
of Central Asian states prefer more 'Asiatic' traditions,
thirdly, historically the states which existed
in the Central Asian region never belonged to the
sphere of influence of Persia. (Zagorski, Zlobin,
Solodovnik, Khrustalev, 1992, p.8) When compared
to Iran, Turkey has more detailed ties with the
Central Asian peoples in terms of religion and tradition.
So, depending on these explanations it can be assumed
that through Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central
Asian region, Iran might be more influential on
the republics in this region.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model III
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Russian
Federation Before Strategy Model III
First of all, as mentioned before although
Russian officials do not declare openly that Russia
houses and gives political and economic support
to PKK, they do this in a hidden way. So, it seems
highly probable that Russian Federation, in order
to weaken Turkey politically and economically, and
in order to break the influence of Turkish state
on Central Asian republics, might begin to house
and give political and economic support to PKK supporters,
who might probably be isolated from Iran following
Turkish-Iran cooperation in the Central Asian region;
secondly, Russian Federation; which might
think that Turkish-American cooperation in the Central
Asian region might revive Islamic sentiments in
the region, and that this development might endanger
Russian political stand before these republics;
might upgrade its influence on them, and force the
Central Asian states to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran
actual involvement in the region; thirdly,
Russian Federation, which will lose one of her most
important partners in the Middle East region, might
concentrate on developing closer relations with
other Middle East states, such as Syria, with which
Turkey has harsh problems, and might help these
state develop anti-Turkish policies.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by Israel
Before Strategy Model III
Firstly, Israel, surprised before the U.S.'
involvement in a cooperation process in the Central
Asian region with Iran, might show its reaction
against the U.S. government through affecting the
Jewish lobby in the U.S. congress; secondly,
parallel to Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in
the Central Asian region, Israel might also criticize
Turkish political preference, based on including
Iran in such a cooperation process. And she might
not favor the development of multi-lateral relations
with Turkey, and suspend these relations.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused by the Central
Asian Republics Before Strategy Model III
Firstly, as mentioned before Central Asian
republics have some concerns about Islamic penetration
into the region, and see some Islamic states, such
as Iran, as potential states which favors to increase
their sphere of political and economic influence
in Central Asia through using Islamic sentiments.
So, it can be said that the fear that these republics
do have in regard to this issue might lead them
to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in
their own region; secondly, before Russian
Federation's highly probable negative stand against
Turkish-American-Iran cooperation in the Central
Asian region, Central Asian republics might refrain
from giving support to this cooperation.
4. Strategy Model IV: Turkey - Central Asian
Economic Cooperation Organization (CAECO)
The Strategy Model IV is inspired by the ECO (Economic
Cooperation Organization, established in 1985 by
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and became a ten-member
organization after the demise of the Soviet Union.
The ECO is determined to develop multi-lateral regional
cooperation with a view to creating the conditions
necessary for regular social and economic development,
and to raise the standard of living of the peoples
of the member states through obtaining maximum benefit
from the social and economic potential of the region)
and the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
was established in 1992 by the states neighboring
the area around the Black Sea. The BSEC is determined
to create an economic cooperation region in which
the free movement of goods and capital would be
realized. The eleven members of the BSEC were brought
together by the common realization that extended
multi-lateral cooperation among them is likely to
contribute to speeding up those processes and fostering
the economic and social progress of everyone of
them)
The CAECO, suggested in Strategy Model IV to maximize
Turkey's foreign policy goals in regard to the Central
Asian region, is intended to include Turkey, Iran,
India, and Pakistan under the leadership of the
U.S. This Organization is determined to gather the
mentioned states, which have different economic
and political expectations from the Central Asian
region, around the common goal, which is targeted
at obtaining maximum benefit from the economic potential
of Central Asia.
At the first glance, the realization of the CAECO
might sound rather unrealistic due to several reasons.
First of all, some of the participating states have
had rather severe economic, political and security
problems with each other in various fields. For
example, between Indian and Pakistani governments
Kashmir conflict consists the primary concern for
years. In addition to this, Indian government feels
insecure before Pakistani governments Islamic initiatives
in the Central Asian region and she fears that Pakistan
might use largely Muslim-populated Central Asian
states against her through emphasizing Islam. Furthermore,
Iran has been rather discontent about the Pakistani
policies since Pakistani government backed Pashtun
Sunnis in Afghanistan conflict while Iran backed
Shi'ites and Persian speaking groups in the same
conflict. Iranian government is also discontent
about Pakistani officials' attempt to develop close
relations with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the U.S.
government disapproves the nuclear attempts of India
and Pakistan against each other since she believes
that this would endanger the political stability
of south Asia. In addition to this, the U.S. embargo
on Iran still lasts since she still regards Iran
as a terrorist state. As for Turkey, Turkey has
still complaints about Iran in regard to Iranian
governments' supports to illegal groups, such as
Hezbollah and PKK.
Secondly, the states included in CAECO have rather
different political, economic and security expectations
from the Central Asian region, and from the mentioned
Organization. For example, while Iran might prefer
to be a member of the CAECO in order to benefit
from the economic potential of Central Asia, to
rehabilitate her relations with the U.S., and to
break the support given by Pakistan government for
Taliban movement; India might prefer to be a member
of the CAECO in order to break probable Pakistani
influence (through Islamic initiatives) in Central
Asia, to find new powerful allies after she had
lost the Soviet Union, which had been one of the
most important economic, political and military
supporter of her during the Cold War period, and
to rehabilitate her political, economic and social
stand through developing multi-lateral relations
with the U.S. via this Organization. Pakistan might
prefer to be a member of the CAECO in order to regain
the U.S.' economic and military assistance, to develop
some new security arrangements to gain power before
India, and to reestablish relations with Iran. U.S.
might prefer to be the motivating power of this
Organization in order to control the nuclear attempts
of India and Pakistan in south Asia, and to control
the Central Asian region. As for Turkey, Turkish
officials might attempt to set up this kind of Organization
in order to eliminate probable single attempts of
Iran, India, and Pakistan in the Central Asian region,
to set up a probable Muslim Security Belt via this
Organization in the long run against Russia and
Slavic-Orthodox Balkan states, and to break Pakistan's
Islamic influence on Central Asian states.
Despite the mentioned handicaps before Strategy
Model IV we believe that along with the realization
of Strategy Model IV, the mentioned political, economic
and security differences and expectations of these
states will become less disturbing, and the mentioned
political, economic and military conflicts among
them will be taken under control although these
conflicts will not be completely removed because
the eventual goal of these kind of Organizations
is to minimize political, economic and security
differences and expectations of the member states,
and to remove any political, economic or military
conflicts among the member states. So, along with
the realization of Strategy Model IV, Turkish government
will be able to realize its goals in Central Asia
and foster her economic and social progress at home
easier.
It should be also mentioned that Strategy Model
IV is partly based on economic concern, and partly
political and security concerns of the participating
states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model IV
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for
Turkey
Firstly, along with Strategy Model IV, Turkey
might prevent the states, such as India, Pakistan
and Iran, which have different economic and political
goals in the Central Asian region, from realizing
their policies in regard to this region independently,
and by doing so, she might remove different power
centers in Central Asia; secondly, along
with this Strategy Model, Turkish government might
establish a "Muslim Security Belt" (although
this will remain only in theory in the short-run)
against any probable Russian threat, or any Slavic-Orthodox
upheaval in the Balkans, or any probable negative
Greek policies, intended to weaken Turkey economically
and politically; and last, through including
Pakistan in Strategy Model IV, Turkish government
might prevent the realization of fundamentalist
policies of Pakistan in the Central Asian region.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for
the U.S.
First of all, since the U.S. will be the
motivating power of Central Asian Economic Cooperation
Organization, she might safeguard Central Asian
region's security against Russian Federation via
this Organization. The U.S. might also have the
chance of realizing its foreign policy goals in
Central Asia through placing Turkey at the top of
the mentioned Organization; secondly, U.S.
might control the nuclear attempts in south Asia
since the states, India and Pakistan, which cause
nuclear threat in south Asian region, will be under
the control of the U.S. via this Organization; thirdly,
through this Organization, U.S. might enlarge its
sphere of influence in the Central Asian region,
and even she might establish military bases in this
region in long run. When we recognize the main foreign
policy goal of the U.S. in the establishment of
the U.S.-backed Baghdad Pact by Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Pakistan, in 1955, we can understand the support
to be given by the U.S. to the establishment of
Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization.
The aim of the U.S. in regard to being the supporter
of Baghdad Pact was that through this Pact U.S.
intended to take security of the Middle East region
under control against Soviet Union's probable attempts
in this region through fostering economic and political
stand of the states included in this Pact. In the
following years U.S. not only enlarged its political
influence in the Middle East but also its military
influence in this region; fourthly, through
this organization the U.S. might increase her impact
on Pakistan and this might result in realizing its
Afghanistan policies more easily via Pakistan. So,
depending on this event we can assume that through
being the supporter of Central Asian Economic Cooperation
Organization, U.S. might enlarge its sphere of its
economic influence in the region in the short run,
and political and military influence in the long
run.
Probable Advantage of Strategy Model IV for
Iran
Through taking part in Central Asian Economic Cooperation
Organization actually, Pakistan might accelerate
to back the U.S. in regard to Taliban movement about
which both the regional powers and the Central Asian
republics fear. And this might lead Pakistan government
to suspend its foreign policy goal, determined to
carry Turkmenistan's gas to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
As the result of this development, Iran might eliminate
both the probability of the emergence of Pakistan
as an economic rival in Central Asia against her,
and one of the negative factors, which causes threat
for its national security.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for
India
Firstly, along with this Organization, India
might prevent Pakistan from using Islamic sentiments
in Central Asia. This might also eliminate probable
negative policies of Pakistan, intended to gain
power before India with a view to developing multi-lateral
relations with Central Asian republics through using
Islam; secondly, India might compensate the
gap, emerged after she had lost Russian back following
the demise of the Soviet Union, through developing
bi-lateral economic relations and establishing multi-lateral
security arrangements by the help of the mentioned
Organization; and last, it is obvious that
slow economic development, internal conflicts, decreasing
importance in international platforms motivate India
to concentrate on developing foreign relations.
So, it can be assumed that India might partly remove
these handicaps by the help of Central Asian Economic
Cooperation Organization.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model IV for
Pakistan
Firstly, Pakistan might regain the U.S.
political and economic assistance, which is regarded
as quite important by Pakistani officials for the
future of Pakistan state. In addition to this it
can be assumed that Pakistani government might never
face any severe U.S. punishment such as Pressler
Amendment of 1990 (5) in her relations with the
U.S.; secondly, even though Pakistani government
can not succeed to regain the U.S. political and
economic support, she might feel secure against
India via being a member of this kind of economic
organization. Because its is obvious that the eventual
aim of establishing CAECO-type economic organizations
has been to remove political conflicts among the
participating states through raising the economic
potentials of the member states. So, it can be said
that Pakistan might safeguard herself in south Asia
against India through integrating herself in this
kind of economic-security arrangement; thirdly,
through being a CAECO member, Pakistani officials
might remove the prevailing discontent between Pakistani
and Iranian governments, emerged as the result of
Pakistani attempts to develop relations with Saudi
Arabia and as the result of the support given by
Pakistani officials to Pashtun Sunnis during Afghanistan
conflict while Iranian government supported Shi'ites
and Persian-speaking groups in the mentioned conflict.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy Model IV
Probable Disadvantages to be caused by the Russian
Federation before Strategy Model IV
Firstly, Russian Federation might transform
the CIS, established as an economic and political
organization to keep her control over the former
Soviet states after disintegration, into a military
organization following the establishment of Turkish-American
led CAECO. The Central Asian states, which completely
refrain from annoying Russian officials, might adopt
a negative stand before CAECO, and they might prefer
remaining outside this kind of economic (in short
run) and political-military (in long run) grouping;
secondly, Russian officials, in order that
they could put obstacles before the development
of this kind of Organization, might threaten Central
Asian states in the way that they would be deprived
of Russian economic assistance and security guarantee
in case they get actively involved in CAECO.
Probable Disadvantage to be caused by the Central
Asian Republics before Strategy Model IV
Central Asian states, which have been strictly
dependent on Russian economic, political and military
assistance or support, might present indifference
toward taking place in this kind of Economic Organization
in order not to annoy Russian officials.
Probable Disadvantage to be caused by the NATO
before Strategy Model IV
Turkey, which voluntarily accepted to be covered
by common security umbrella through being a NATO
member in the beginning of 1950s, might face with
NATO members' opposition following the establishment
of CAECO, which is intended to raise economic potentials
of the member states in the short run, and to set
up regional political and security arrangements
in the long run.
Following the presentation of four cooperation
strategy models for the Central Asian region in
the first part of this article, we will explain
probable positive and negative impact of these cooperation
strategy models on Turkey's position in regard to
the Middle East region, U.S., Russian Federation,
Greece and EU through developing some positive and
negative future scenarios in the next volume of
Stradigma.
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1. Sergei Kortunov, in his article "Russia
in search of allies", published in International
Affairs (Moscow), regards nations in the Balkans
such as Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians and Greeks
as the peoples of the Balkan countries who may potentially
become allies to Russia depending on long historical
and cultural ties with her. He mentions that "With
the threat of Moslems and Catholics consolidating
in the Balkans, the formation of a Slavic-Orthodox
quasi-coalition under the aegis of Russia is becoming
likely, which, of course, will not be able to be
formed, but is necessary to have in mind when conducting
corresponding diplomatic, military and political
activities". (Kortunov, 1996, p.159)
2. Dr. David Nissman, in his article "Kurds,
Russians, And The Pipeline", published in Eurasian
Studies, Spring 1995, explains the historical ties
between the Russians and Kurds, and between the
Armenians and Kurds since late 18th century. He
also points out the reasons why Russian Federation
and Armenia are deeply involved with Kurdish issue.
In the mentioned article, the issues such as the
support given by Russian and Armenian officials
to both the Kurdish population living in Turkey
and to the activities of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
are also explained. (see Nissman, 1995, pp.30-34)
3. The explanations of Abdulaziz Tunç, archive responsible
of Hezbollah group caught by Turkish security forces
in Diyarbakır city in 1999, is quite satisfactory
in order to emphasize the ties of Iranian government
with Hezbollah group, which is aimed at establishing
an Iranian model Kurdish state in southeastern Anatolia
in Turkey. In his prosecution Tunç said that "In
1988, with Velioğlu (Hüseyin Velioğlu, the leader
of Hezbollah, shot in the operation organized by
Turkish security forces in January 2000, in Istanbul)
and two other friends we arrived in Kelareşe village
in Iran. In this village Iran Revolution Guards
met us. We arrived in Tehran over Urmiye, Salmas
and Tebriz. We settled in a house next to the Turkish
Consulate General. Here Iran Security Guards trained
us. Then the guns and bombs trainings were provided
in the area near Tehran. We came back to Turkey
in 1989..." (Durukan, 18 June 1999, Milliyet)
4. Turkish academic Professor Ümit Özdağ in his
article "İsrail'in Kuzey Irak Politikası"
("Israel's Policy on Northern Iraq") sets
up a correlation between the political stand of
the Israel state in regard to the Kurdish state
project in Northern Iraq and the share of Israel's
political stand in regard to this issue in the determination
of Turkey's relations with Israel. He puts it in
that way: "In terms of Turkey, elimination
of an Israel-backed Kurdish state project in Northern
Iraq and termination of PKK terror consist the primary
importance in the development of relations with
Israel...The main goal of Turkey's policy on Israel
is to help Israel succeed to remove the psychology
shaped by insecurity through proposing strategic
security, and to terminate the Kurdish state project
of both Israel and Jewish lobby in U.S.A..."
(Özdağ, 1999, p.231)
5. The mentioned Act ended all economic and military
assistance to Pakistan since the U.S. Congress believed
that Pakistan government had assembled a nuclear
bomb. The mentioned amendment embargoed delivery
of F-16 and P-3C Orion. However, the Pressler Amendment
did not forbid aid to NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations),
joint military exercises (if no U.S. funds were
used to support Pakistani participation), commercial
arms sales, or any service fully paid for by Pakistan
government with its own national funds. In 1996,
modified the Pressler Amendment through passing
the Brown Amendment. The Brown Amendment permitted
the U.S. government to deliver 368 million dollars
of non-embargoed F-16 equipment, exempted transfer
of military equipment, technology or defense services
other than F-16 aircraft, extended counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotics assistance, authorized some
forms of peacekeeping assistance, facilitated humanitarian
and civic assistance projects, and allowed military-to-military
contact authorized outside of the International
Military Education Training program. (Smith, 1996,
p.27)
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