This article includes two parts. In
the first part, four different strategy
models have been developed in order
that Turkey could maximize her foreign
policy goals in regard to the Central
Asian region and the Central Asian republics.
In the second part, certain positive
and negative scenarios that Turkey would
possibly face following the application
of the mentioned strategy models have
been analyzed. However, after consulting
the responsibles of Stradigma, we decided
to publish this rather long article
in two parts in order to respect for
the scholars and other specialists whose
papers take place in Stradigma e-journal.
So, in this volume of the journal, "Strategy
Models", which is the first part
of the article and in the next volume,
"Future Scenarios", the second
part of the article, will be published.
I hope, the readers will enjoy the article,
which is completely based on little
mind games.
Introduction
In the first part of the article, in
order to maximize Turkey's policies
in the Central Asian region, we propose
four different "cooperation strategy
models"; Strategy Model I: Turkey
- U.S., Strategy Model II: Turkey -
U.S. - Israel; Strategy Model III: Turkey
- U.S. - Iran, and Strategy Model IV:
Turkey - Central Asian Economic Cooperation
(CAECO). The strategy models are numbered
from the most probable to the least
probable. In other words, in the study
taking the fact into consideration that
cooperating with these five states will
not present equal political and economic
advantages for Turkey, we include the
U.S. in Strategy Model I assuming that
cooperating with U.S. would present
more political and economic advantages
for Turkey in the Central Asian region
than Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan,
and that the realization of Strategy
Model I seems the most probable; we
include Israel in Strategy Model II
assuming that cooperating with Israel
would present less political and economic
advantages for Turkey in the Central
Asian region than U.S. but more than
Iran, India and Pakistan, and that the
realization of Strategy Model II is
less probable than the realization of
Strategy Model I but more probable than
Strategy Model III and Strategy Model
IV; we include Iran in Strategy Model
III assuming that cooperating with Iran
would present less political and economic
advantages for Turkey in the Central
Asian region than U.S. and Israel but
more than India and Pakistan, and that
the realization of Strategy Model III
is less probable than the realization
of Strategy Model I and Strategy Model
II but more probable than Strategy Model
IV; we include India, Pakistan and Iran
in Strategy Model IV assuming that these
three states would present the least
political and economic advantages for
Turkey in the Central Asian region,
and that the realization of Strategy
Model IV is the least probable. Furthermore,
we distribute the U.S., Israel, Iran,
India and Pakistan into strategy models
according to the intensification of
their political and economic interests
in the Central Asia region. Depending
on this reason, we include the U.S.
in Strategy Model I taking its diversified
political and economic interests in
this region; Israel in Strategy Model
II taking its relatively less political
and economic interests in the region;
Iran in Strategy Model III taking its
small scale security and economic doubts
in regard to the region; and India and
Pakistan in Strategy Model IV taking
their only one-sided (economic) interests
in the region into consideration.
So, depending on these explanations,
the detailed answers to be given to
the questions "Depending on which
criteria we determine/prefer the states
for the strategy models?" and "Why
we propose only cooperation strategy
model but not any other strategy type?"
will also explain the basic aim of the
first part of this article.
"Depending on Which Criteria
We Determine/Prefer the States for the
Strategy Models?"
Our determination in regard to including
the U.S., Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan
in strategy models is based on two criteria:
Firstly, their economic or political
or cultural capabilities and possibilities
which can directly facilitate and maximize
Turkey's policies in the Central Asian
region in case Turkey cooperates with
them and secondly, their direct or indirect
interests and benefits in the Central
Asian region since national interests
of the states bear vital importance
in international relations.
For example, in Strategy Model I we
choose U.S. considering the "political
and economic advantages" she might
present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also the U.S.' political
interests in the Central Asian region.
We include the U.S. in all Strategy
Models assuming that U.S can support
Turkey financially through allocating
money necessary for the realization
of Turkey's oil politics and some other
investments in the Central Asian region,
U.S. can support Turkey politically
in international platforms in regard
to Turkey's attempts to realize its
economic, political and cultural interests
in the region; and also taking the U.S.'
"political interests" through
Turkey-U.S. cooperation in the Central
Asian region into consideration such
as breaking the influence of Iran, providing
the transportation of oil to world markets
via a secure state like Turkey, integrating
the Central Asian states into the world
community.
In Strategy Model II we choose Israel
considering the "political and
economic advantages" she might
present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also Israel's aim to gain
U.S. back in regard to its political
interests in the Middle East region.
We include Israel in Strategy Model
II assuming that Israel can support
Turkey's policies in regard to the Central
Asian region, provide necessary fund
which would help Turkey realize some
investments in the region; and also
taking Israel's "political interests"
through Turkey - U.S. -Israel Cooperation
in the Central Asian region into consideration
such as providing U.S back in her Middle
East policies, intensifying bilateral
relations with Turkey in order to reinforce
its position in the Middle East region.
In Strategy Model III we choose Iran
considering the "political advantages"
she might present to Turkey through
this strategy model; and also Iran's
"political and economic interests"
in its own region, in the Central Asian
region and in world politics. We include
Iran in Strategy Model III and Strategy
Model IV assuming that Iran might look
for the ways of developing good-neighborly
relations with Turkey, behave more carefully
in regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist
activities on its own territory against
Turkey and also taking Iran's "political
and economic interests" through
Turkey - U.S.- Iran cooperation in the
Central Asian region into consideration
such as getting rid of international
isolationism prevailing since Islamic
revolution and Iran-Iraq War, improving
relations with the U.S. through this
strategy model, having a share in oil
transportation from the Central Asian
region, reinforcing its political and
economic position in the Middle East
region.
In Strategy Model IV we choose India
and Pakistan considering the "political
and economic advantages" they might
present to Turkey through this strategy
model; and also their "political
and economic interests" in Southern
Asian region, in the Central Asian region
and in world politics. We include India
and Pakistan in Strategy Model IV assuming
that through this Strategy Model Turkey
might eliminate various probable economic
and political attempts of these two
states (in regard to Central Asia) which
might endanger Turkey's economic and
political interests in the Central Asian
region and also taking India's and Pakistan's
"economic and security interests"
through Strategy Model IV into consideration
such as eliminating nuclear threat against
each other in Southern Asian region,
benefiting from economic wealth in the
Central Asian region and gaining power
in world politics through this Strategy
Model.
"Why We Propose Only "Cooperation
Strategy Model" But Not Any Other
Strategy Type?"
There have been several reasons, which
direct us to propose and concentrate
on only "cooperation strategy model"
in the first part of this article. First
of all, in terms of economic possibilities
Turkey is not capable of realizing its
goals in the region by itself. When
we take the importance of "win-win
strategy" (the strategy developed
by the American strategists is based
on the idea that the states should realize
economic, political and military investments
or attempts in any region or any state
and should not refrain from any expense
if this region or state is able to present
some more advantages to the state who
propose cooperation in any field) it
can be said that the Central Asian states
who are strongly in need of economic
support which would facilitate their
transition to market economy will improve
relations as long as Turkey continues
to have share in rehabilitating their
economy. Depending on the reasons above,
we find it necessary for Turkey that
it should cooperate with an economically
powerful state, such as the U.S., to
realize its economic goals in the Central
Asian region.
Secondly, it seems obvious that Russia
would resist any intimate political,
economic and cultural initiatives in
the Central Asian region taking its
political and economic interests in
the same region into consideration.
Parallel to this determination, it can
be said that Turkey would have difficulties
in realizing its political, economic
and cultural goals in the region by
itself. For this reason, in our study
we propose the Turkish decision-makers
that in order to realize its political,
economic and cultural targets in Central
Asia, Turkey should cooperate with the
state/s, such as the U.S., which are
economically and politically strong
enough to overcome Russian resistance.
Thirdly, as mentioned before several
states have appeared to gain political
or economic, or both, or some other
advantages in the Central Asian region
following the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. Regional powers such as
Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, India and global powers such
as China, Japan and U.S can be included
in this power rivalry in the region.
When we take various advantages they
can present to the Central Asian states
into account, it can be said that neither
the Central Asian states, who regard
political or economic capabilities of
some regional or global powers as vital
for their political and economic development,
nor the regional or global powers, who
take place in the power rivalry in the
region for their political and economic
advantages, would not leave Turkey to
realize its goals independently. Regarding
the probable obstacles to be put by
some regional or global powers before
Turkey, in our study instead of excluding
some important regional and global powers
we choose some, such as the U.S. and
Israel, and integrate them in our cooperation
strategy model.
Fourthly, culture and history also
necessitates adopting cooperation strategy
model by Turkish decision-makers for
the Central Asian region. Though Turkish
decision-makers insist on common features,
which Turkish and Central Asian peoples
share, in fact these common features
diversify immensely. While Anatolian
Turks acquired an Islamic-Imperial identity,
Central Asian Turks developed differently
bearing tribal and mongoloid features.
Persian had been the language of the
cultural centers of Bukhara and Samarkand,
and Turkestani elites were generally
equally at ease in Chagatay Turk and
Persian. Along with Russian dominance
cultural and historical difference grew
more and after the Bolshevik Revolution,
Central Asian peoples had to follow
a different path culturally and the
elites of Central Asia had been Russified.
In today's southern Central Asia, the
cultural world bears imprint of centuries
of Iranian influence. In northern Central
Asia, shamanistic rituals are still
strong, and Islam is far weaker than
in Turkey. Furthermore, the region's
local languages are more distant from
Turkish. Lastly, almost half of the
residents of the region are Slavs or
Persians who are away from Turkish origin.
(Odom and Dujarric, 1995, p.198) Depending
on the explanations above it can be
argued that historical and cultural
ties are motivative factors which lead
Central Asian peoples to regard Turkey
as one of the most important cooperation
partners in the region and which help
Turkey realize its policies in Central
Asia. Parallel to this, we find it quite
reasonable for Turkish decision-makers
to cooperate with the state/s, such
as Iran, which is still quite influential
culturally and religiously over the
Central Asian states.
Lastly, geography restricts Turkey
to realize its political, economic and
cultural goals in regard to the Central
Asian region independently since there
is no continuity between Central Asia
and Turkey. In the newly-emerged geography
Iran represents one of the most important
routes for the Central Asian states
to reach global markets. So, it can
be said that regarding the transportation
possibilities Iran plays vital role
for the Central Asian states and Turkey
- Iran cooperation would be a development
in favor of Turkey.
The following part includes the explanation
of four different strategy models, developed
for the betterment of relations with
the Central Asian republics.
1. Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S.
Strategy Model
In Strategy Model I, we propose Turkish-American
cooperation in the Central Asian region
since we believe that this Model would
give the most advantageous results for
Turkey's Central Asian policies depending
on several reasons.
First of all, through cooperating with
the only superpower in the world, Turkey
will be able to find necessary political
and economic support to realize its
policies in the Central Asian region.
Secondly, Turkish-American cooperation
for the Central Asian region will not
be the first example of these two states'
cooperation in history. Particularly
after the World War II, these two states
cooperated with each other several times
in order to realize their goals, and
both of them became content about these
cooperations. Thirdly, it is clear that
there is no obstacle before U.S. to
refuse this kind of cooperation for
the Central Asian region since America
has specific political and economic
interests in regard to this region.
Fourthly, we believe that U.S. will
fully back Turkey economically and politically
during cooperation process. Fifthly,
since the U.S. government has some other
expectations from Turkey in regard to
realizing its goals related with other
regions, in which she has vital interests,
we can assume that U.S. would do its
best to satisfy Turkey's needs in the
mentioned cooperation process. Sixthly,
we support the idea that since the U.S.
will have the chance of influencing
the states (Iran, India and Pakistan
which she has deep-rooted political
problems) included in Strategy Model
III and Strategy Model IV through involving
herself in the mentioned strategy models,
she will be quite willing to cooperate
with Turkey for the Central Asian region.
We should also mention that taking
U.S. and Turkey's expectations from
each other in this cooperation process
into consideration, Strategy Model I
is largely based on economic and political
concerns of both states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model
I
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model I for Turkey
First of all, Turkish government
through cooperating with the only super
power like U.S. might automatically
enlarge its sphere of action (performance)
in the Central Asian region; secondly,
with the U.S. back, Turkish government
might realize its promises given to
the Central Asian republics particularly
at the very beginning of their independence.
When we remember the economic assistance
given to Turkey by the U.S. government
after 1945 through Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan in order to break the
USSR's possible penetration into the
Middle East region, we can easily understand
the importance of the U.S. economic
assistance to Turkey; thirdly,
Turkish government, lack of enough economic
and political power in international
platforms, might reinforce the U.S.
economic and political support necessary
for the construction and realization
of Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipeline
project through this cooperation. Baku-Ceyhan
oil and gas pipeline project is one
of the oil and gas transportation routes
project based on transporting oil and
gas reserves in the Caspian region to
the world markets following the disintegration
of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan have the largest energy
reserves in the Caspian region. Currently,
the proven oil reserve in the region
accounts for 15-31 billion barrels.
However, exploitation and transportation
of oil in this region is rather difficult
since the Caspian Sea Basin is landlocked.
Since the Caspian region has no outlet
to the seas, the region is regarded
as one of the most difficult and dangerous
regions for the exploitation and transportation
of hydrocarbon. During 20 years before
the year 1914, Caspian region was one
of the largest and one of the most developed
oil production areas. However, following
the 70-year of Soviet rule, Caspian
states were left behind oil exploitation
technologies. Currently, there have
been only two installations in the region,
one in Primorsk city in Azerbaijan,
and other in Astrakhan city in Russia,
which can construct or repair oil wells.
Furthermore, it costs rather high to
bring modern oil exploitation equipment
abroad. Oil exploitation is not the
only problem in the Caspian region,
the political problems in regard to
the construction of new pipelines, and
also the high cost of the construction
of these new pipelines consist other
side of the issue. It is possible to
carry Kazakhstan oil over Russia to
the port of Novorossisk. However, Russia
might use this pipeline in order to
increase its control over Kazakhstan.
The pipeline from Azerbaijan over Daghistan
and Chechenia to Novorossisk is confronted
by increasing stability in these states.
As for the exportation of Azerbaijan's
oil, there are two alternatives: The
pipeline over Turkey and the pipeline
over Iran. Although the transportation
of Azerbaijan's oil over Iran would
cost cheaper than the transportation
of this oil over Turkey, U.S. government
opposes the oil pipeline project over
Iran since she sees Iran as a terrorist
state. U.S. backs Baku-Ceyhan pipeline,
which would also carry Turkmenistan's
natural gas and Kazakhstan's oil to
the western markets without constructing
an additional pipeline, depending on
geopolitical reasons. She regards Turkey
as her and Israel's vital ally, and
she wants to increase Ankara's prestige
in the Caucasus and Central Asia against
Iran and Russia. However, the oil companies
of the states (except for the U.S. oil
companies), which are involved with
the transportation of oil and gas in
the Caspian region to the western markets,
regard the pipeline project over Iran
as less risky than the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
project, which would pass through three
problematic regions. According to them,
although the war between Azerbaijan
and Armenia over Nogorno-Karabakh ended
in 1994, it still has the potential
or reemergence. Furthermore, PKK factor
in Turkey is another problem. And Georgia
has also problems with Abkhasia, she
could not establish its authority over
South Osetia, Cakavetia and (see IISS
Strategic Comments in Milliyet, 23 June
1999; Blank, 1994; Forsythe, 1996)
Cumhur Ersümer, the then Turkish Minister
of Energy and Natural Resources, summarized
the probable advantages Turkey might
gain when the Baku-Ceyhan project is
materialized as follows: "When
the project reaches the full capacity,
50 million tons of oil will be transported
from Baku to Ceyhan annually! We should
emphasize that oil consumption in Turkey
is 30 million tons in a year, this consumption
will be 45 million tons in the year
2010! We should also point out that
Turkey will purchase 16 billion m3 natural
gas and we will be able to sell the
same amount of natural gas to Europe.
In addition to these it should also
be kept in mind that the construction
of 2.4. billion dollars pipeline will
have an important positive impact on
Turkish economy..." (Milliyet,
18 November 1999)
When we take Iranian and Russian governments'
proposals related with alternative transportation
routes into consideration, it could
be assumed that the U.S. economic and
political back might be the most important
instrument for the realization of the
mentioned oil and gas transportation
route.
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model
I for the U.S.
First of all, although the U.S.
government is extremely interested in
the Central Asian region due to the
mentioned economic and political reasons,
geographical realities restrict the
mentioned U.S. desire to become real.
Because geographically U.S. is so far
from Central Asia that even if she intends
to play an active role in the region,
she can not do this. For this reason,
it can be said that similar to the policy
she adopted for the Balkans and Middle
East region during the Cold War period;
in the new world order, she favors a
foreign policy pattern which is based
on supporting one of her faithful allies
to become actively involved in the regions
in which she has vital interests, and
by doing so, she has word on these regions.
So, through Turkey-U.S. cooperation
in the Central Asian region, U.S. might
realize its policies in regard to this
region; secondly, as mentioned
before U.S. has been observing Iranian
interest and attempts in the Central
Asian region closely since the states
in the region gained their independence,
and she intends to break the influence
of Iran in this region since she believes
that any probable Iranian political
or economic active involvement in the
region will evoke Islamic sentiments,
which were suppressed under Soviet regime
during 70 years, and parallel to this
development Central Asian republics
and the Central Asian region will be
closed to Western interests. So, it
can be assumed that through this cooperation,
U.S. might decrease the influence of
Iran in this region, and by backing
Turkey, she might present laic, secular
and democratic model against radical
Islamic model before the Central Asian
republics; thirdly, through this
cooperation, U.S. government might restrict
any possible Iranian-Russian coalition
aimed at gaining full control over Central
Asian republics. When we remember the
negative results of Iranian-Russian
close relationship in the Middle East
region in the period after Shah Reza
Pehlevi, the possible negative results
of the emergence of Iranian-Russian
coalition in the Central Asian region
will become clearer; fourthly, through
this cooperation, U.S. might reinforce
its position in the Middle East region,
in which she has vital interests, too;
and last, the U.S. government
might reinforce Turkish-Israeli relationship/cooperation
in the Middle East region. When we take
these two states' presence and roles
in Middle East in terms of U.S. into
consideration, we can assume that Turkish-U.S.
cooperation in the Central Asian region
might be quite advantageous for the
future projections of the U.S. in some
other regions such as Middle East.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model I for the Central Asian Republics
First of all, it is quite clear
that the independent republics of Central
Asia have been attempting to transform
the established institutions and rules
into western-type democratic institutions
and rules. They strongly believe that
in order to realize the mentioned transformations
they need western political support.
At that point we can assume that through
the active involvement of the U.S. as
the result of Turkish-American cooperation
in their region, these republics might
obtain the support of a super power,
and this kind of development will accelerate
the intended transition period; secondly,
Central Asian republics are also aimed
at transforming their economies into
liberal economy. However, largely due
to economic reasons they have not succeeded
to realize this until now. So, it can
be assumed that by the help of U.S.
active involvement in their region,
they might provide economic assistance
from the U.S necessary for the rehabilitation
of their economies and transition to
liberal economy; last, although
the Central Asian republics recognized
the fact that the CIS membership would
increase the Russian control and authority
over their governments, they joined
the CIS, set up by Russian Federation,
Belorussia and Ukraine, firstly regarding
their security and economic concerns
and secondly since they did not have
any other alternative except for this.
For the time being, Russian political
approaches toward these republics and
Central Asia proved this assumption
to be true and Russian Federation began
to be regarded as the ideological, social
and cultural successor of the Soviet
Union by these republics. It can be
said that currently, these republics
are aware of the fact that Russian officials
do have some economic and political
plans related with them and for this
reason they still face Russian threat.
So, it can be assumed that through Turkish
active involvement in the Central Asian
region, they might gain power before
the Russian Federation. When we take
common features such as historical,
cultural, religious and linguistic ties
between the independent republics in
Central Asia and Turkey in the past
into consideration, the importance of
Turkey's presence in the Central Asian
region for these republics will be understood
better.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy
Model I
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by the Russian Federation Before Strategy
I
It should be kept in mind that any
serious attempt by any external power
in regard to the Central Asian region
would face Russian objection. So, it
can be argued that the cooperation strategy
models to be developed by Turkish officials
for the Central Asian region would face
Russian objection, too. However, it
should be mentioned that the content
of contra-policies to be developed by
the Russian officials against each of
the four cooperation strategy models
will be completely different. For example,
while the content of contra-policies
to be developed by the Russian officials
against Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Strategy
Model might be more Iran, Armenia and
Central Asian- orientated; the content
of contra-policies to be developed by
the Russian officials against Turkey-Israel-U.S.,
Turkey-Iran-U.S, and Turkey-CAECO Cooperation
Strategy Models might be more diversified.
So, it can be said that the most probable
contra-policies to be developed by the
Russian officials against Turkish-American
cooperation for the Central Asian region
might be as follows:
Firstly, in order to prevent
Turkish-American cooperation in the
Central Asian region, Russia might seek
the ways for reinforcing the established
bi-lateral economic and political relations
with Iran for the Central Asian region.
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Professor of political
science at Pennsylvania, and senior
fellow of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, in his article "Moscow
and Tehran The Wary Accommodation"
explains the reasons which bring Russian
Federation and Iran closer in the Central
Asian region. According to Rubinstein
the causes which lead them to behave
commonly in Central Asia are based on
shared political, economic and security
concerns. The reasons, explained by
Rubinstein, can be summarized as follows:
- Along with the changes emerged in
the geopolitics of Central Asia and
Caucasus, both Moscow and Tehran feel
insecure before these radical changes;
- In the Cold War period both Russia
(following the bi-polarization) and
Iran (following the Iran Islamic Revolution)
observed the U.S. policies closely and
adopted common contra-policies against
the U.S. increasing influence in the
Middle East region; - In order to maintain
the balance of power in the Middle East
region, Iran backed Russia's military
and political attempts in this region
in the Cold War period; - Both the Russian
Federation and Iran find the establishment
and continuity of stability in Central
Asia and Caucasus regarding their economic
and security concerns; - Russia does
not see Iran as in economically and
politically powerful condition which
can endanger her projections in regard
to Central Asia and Caucasus; - Russian
Federation, in order not to lose her
influence, and Iran, in order to prevent
the emergence of any attempt which might
endanger her national security, are
in favor of the continuation of status
quo in Central Asia and Caucasus; -
Both the Russian Federation and Iran
support the idea that the U.S. must
have a limited influence particularly
in the Central Asian region; - In the
new world order both the Russian and
Iranian governments are in favor of
developing good relations with the West
particularly with the U.S. (see Rubinstein,
1995, pp.26-57)
Furthermore, İhsan Çolak, Research
Assistant at Fatih University in İstanbul,
explains the developing relationship
between Russia and Iran from a different
perspective and tells that "Although
Russian - Iran relations have lost its
former intimate phase as the result
of the dismantlement of Soviet mentality
and the Russian attempts to develop
relations with the West, both of these
two states' similar stand before the
West forces them to behave commonly
in regional relations. One of the most
important reasons which leads Russia
to develop relations with Iran is that
the West, particularly the U.S., is
in favor of being with Turkey in the
attempts in regard to the region (former
Soviet geopolitical area)". (Çolak,
1999, p.211) Disregarding the fear related
with the awakening of Islamic sentiments
in the Central Asian region, Russian
officials might back Iran to play an
active role in this region. This might
lead the uprise of radical Islam in
Central Asia, which in turn would result
in the rejection of laic and secular
Turkey's Central Asian-orientated political
and economic attempts by the Central
Asian republics; secondly, Russian
officials might also attempt to benefit
from political contradictions and fragility
prevailing between Iran and Turkey,
and they might use the policy of "double
containment". Double containment
is a kind of policy, which is used (particularly
by the U.S.) to weaken political, economic
and military potentials of any two states,
which have problems in several fields
by suggesting the use of contradictions
between them. U.S. government succeeded
to gain advantages from this policy
through using the contradictions between
Iran and Iraq. The most important aspect
of this policy is that the state, which
uses the "double containment",
is never actively involved in the process
of the mentioned policy. D. Baluev,
in his article "Moderation in the
National Idea", published in International
Affairs (Moscow), regards the use of
double containment policy between Iran
and Turkey as a means of weakening Turkey's
role in the Caucasus. (Baluev, 1996,
p.107) In order to materialize this
policy, Russian officials might develop
some strategies. Firstly, they might
provoke Iran to violate the rights of
Azeris and Turkmens, which consist large
proportion of Iran population. Secondly,
in order to create obstacles before
the U.S. backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
project, they might give support to
Iran to construct an alternative pipeline,
which would carry Azerbaijan's oil to
the world markets. Thirdly, they might
also increase its support to the activities
of illegal groups such as PKK and Hezbollah
through backing Iranian policies related
with these two groups. Fourthly, they
might suggest Iranian government setting
up alliances with the states with which
Turkish government has deep-rooted political,
diplomatic and historical problems.
Iran -Syria alliance in the Middle East,
or (or both) Iran - Syria - Greek Government
of South Cyprus - Armenia - Greece alliance
both in the Middle East and Central
Asia might be quite well-established
alliances determined to restrict Turkey's
influence in the Central Asian region
indirectly; thirdly, Russian
Federation might restrict economic relations
with the Central Asian republics in
order to prevent them from joining Turkish-American
cooperation in Central Asia. When we
take the fact into consideration that
Russia has the largest share in Central
Asian republics' foreign trade (these
republics realize 80% of their foreign
trade with the Russian Federation),
the mentioned probable attempt of Russia
might affect the political stand of
these republics toward Turkish-American
cooperation in their region badly; fourthly,
Russia might cause conflict in Central
Asian region deliberately, as she did
in the Caucasus region, and following
the internal chaos emerged in these
republics she might play peace-keeping
role in this region. By doing so, she
might automatically increase her control
and authority over the states in Central
Asia. As the result of this development
it is highly possible that the republics
in Central Asia might be rather hesitant
towards any external initiative which
would endanger their relations with
the Russian Federation in the region;
fifthly, in order to prevent
Turkish government from concentrating
on Turkish-American cooperation strategy
model in the Central Asian region, Russia
might establish a "Slavic-Orthodox
quasi-coalition" under the aegis
of herself. (1) By doing so, she might
motivate the Slavic-Orthodox origin
nations in the Balkans to adopt negative
policies toward the Muslim-origin Turkish
population living in the same region;
sixthly, Russia might cause an
Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in the Caucasus
region, which would directly close Turkey's
passing route to the Central Asian region;
seventhly, in order to draw Turkish
officials' attention to other issues,
Russia might support Syrian policies
in regard to the PKK. Furthermore,
she might violate Montreux Convention
on Straits, which might in turn deprive
Turkish officials of focusing on Central
Asian region and of conducting strategy
models in this region; furthermore,
Russia might do her best to transport
Azerbaijan's oil over its own territory
but not over Turkey. In order to exclude
Turkish option (Baku-Ceyhan pipeline)
to carry Azerbaijan's oil to the world
markets, she might emphasize that the
mentioned pipeline project, proposed
by Turkey depending on political and
economic reasons and strongly backed
by the U.S. due to geostrategic reasons,
is under the risk of Kurdish problem
which is confronted by Turkey particularly
in southeastern Anatolia through which
the Azeri oil will flow when this pipeline
project is materialized. Presenting
the mentioned handicap in Turkey, Russian
officials very often put forth the idea
that the flow of Azerbaijan's oil must
be through the Russian pipeline. The
planned outlet for the Russian pipeline
would be the port of Novorossisk on
the Black Sea. According to this plan
the oil would be carried by tankers
through the Bosphorus Straits. If the
Russian pipeline project is materialized,
the population living in Istanbul would
face serious risks due to the probable
environmental problems to be caused
by tankers, and the tanker traffic through
the Bosphorus Straits would be on the
maximum limit; and last, Russia
might benefit from Armenian-Kurdish
ties in order to provoke Kurdish population
living largely in southeastern Anatolia
of Turkey. Moreover, she can increase
her support to several Moscow-based
Kurdish organizations and Kurdish Council,
which was set up in Moscow. (2) By doing
so, she might strengthen Kurdish separatist
movement under the leadership of Kurdish
Workers Party (PKK), which would badly
affect Turkey's internal political order.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by Iran before Strategy I
Before presenting the probable disadvantages
to be caused by Iran before Strategy
Model I, it should be mentioned that
Iran would oppose any external attempt
determined to obtain maximum political
and economic benefit from the Central
Asian region, and particularly she will
oppose the attempt actually made by
Turkey. However, it should be kept in
mind that Iran will not be able to develop
any direct contra-policies against the
attempts in which the U.S. is actively
involved since she has several political
and economic expectations from the U.S.
after Khomeini period. So, it can be
said that probable opposition to be
showed by Iranian government against
Turkish-American cooperation in the
Central Asian region will be directed
towards Turkey, and Iran will develop
some policies determined to weaken Turkey's
influence in Central Asia. These would
naturally lead the emergence of several
disadvantages before Strategy I. The
probable disadvantages to be caused
by Iran before the mentioned Strategy
Model might be as follows:
First of all, although the present
Iran government's political ideology
in regard to the Central Asian region
and Central Asian states is not based
on transporting Iranian-type political
model to these republics, Iranian officials
might use Islam factor in this region
in order to prevent these republics
from intensifying relations with Turkey
and by doing so, Iran will be able to
develop closer relations with them.
This development might lead two negative
outcomes. Firstly, political
order in these states might be destabilized
and this might retard the period necessary
to transit into democratic system. Secondly,
Central Asian republics, provoked by
Islamic sentiments, might refrain from
cooperating with a laic and secular
state such as Turkey in their region;
secondly, in order to cause problems
before Turkish-American cooperation
for the Central Asian region, Iranian
government might increase its support
for PKK and Hezbollah. (3) This would
force Turkish officials to focus on
solving internal problems rather than
developing strategies for the regions
in which Turkish government has political
and economic interests; thirdly,
parallel to this policy, she might reinforce
her relations with Syria in the Middle
East; and with Russia and Armenia in
the Central Asian region. It can be
argued that Iran might look for the
ways to turn these relations with the
mentioned states into a kind of strategic
alliance. In any case, development of
any close relations or establishment
of any strategic alliance among these
states might weaken Turkey politically;
and last, Iranian officials might
conduct political pressure over Turkish
population living in Iran.
2. Strategy Model II: Turkey - Israel
- U.S. Strategy Model
In Strategy Model II we propose Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region
since we believe that this Model would
give secondarily advantageous results
(compared to the advantages which Turkey
would obtain from Strategy Model I)
for Turkey's Central Asian policies
depending on several reasons. First
of all, it sounds quite reasonable to
prefer Israel and America for Strategy
Model II since Turkey and Israel have
been close allies in the Middle East
region for years depending on similar
political, economic and security concerns
related with Arab Middle East states;
and since both Turkey and Israel have
been inevitable allies of the U.S. in
regard to her policies in the Middle
East. Secondly, Turkish-Israel cooperation
in Central Asia would not be the first
example of these two states' cooperation.
Particularly after the demise of the
Soviet Union, both of them have been
in favor of developing bi-lateral economic,
political and military relations in
order to strengthen their economic,
political and military stand in their
own regions. Thirdly, they are aware
of the fact that the probable positive
results to be obtained from Strategy
Model II would have a multi-dimensional
impact on both Israel's and Turkey's
stand before Arab states in the Middle
East region. For example, both Israel
and Turkey will be able to foster their
political and economic position before
Arab Middle East states, with which
they have deep-rooted conflicts. In
addition to this, via this cooperation,
Turkey will be able to prevent Israel
state from supporting the realization
of a Kurdish state project. Furthermore,
Israeli officials, who would have a
chance to become closer to the U.S.
officials via Strategy Model II, will
be able to obtain the U.S. political
support more in regard to Arab-Israel
conflict, prevailing in the Middle East
region for years. As for the U.S., via
the mentioned cooperation in the Central
Asian region, U.S. will be able to reinforce
relations with Turkey and Israel, which
represent vital importance in regard
to her stand in the Middle East. It
can be assumed that parallel to this
cooperation, while Turkey will consist
military leg of the U.S. in the Middle
East region, Israel will consist political
leg of her in the same region. Besides
the probable advantages that the U.S.
government will obtain from this cooperation
in regard to her Middle East policies,
she will be able to obtain political
back of the Jewish lobby in the U.S.
Congress, which plays an important role
in the determination of the U.S. foreign
policy.
So, taking the mentioned reciprocal
political, economic and security expectations
of Turkey-Israel and the U.S. from each
other, it can be assumed that these
three states' cooperation in the Central
Asian region will become quite effective,
and Turkey will be able to maximize
her policies in the mentioned region
through setting up Strategy Model II.
This Model is based on political, economic
and security concerns of the participating
states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model
II
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model II for Turkey
First of all, via Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Turkey's political stand before the
U.S. might raise gradually. When we
remember the strategic importance of
Turkey through being one of the most
trustable allies of the U.S. related
with her counter-policies against the
Soviet Union during the Cold War years
in terms of America, it can be assumed
that Turkey, through cooperating with
the U.S. and her historical friend,
Israel, in Central Asia, in the region
which American and Israeli governments
have direct or indirect interests, might
obtain the U.S. support more, and this
might help Turkish officials be more
powerful before the states with which
Turkish government has had economic
and political problems, and in international
platforms; secondly, Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region
might help Turkish government gain political
power before Iran and Syria strategic
grouping in the Middle East region.
Although this kind of cooperation seems
unable to remove these states' foreign
policy attempts, intended to weaken
Turkey politically and economically,
this might prevent the mentioned three
states from developing future projections,
which would endanger national security
of Turkey; thirdly, parallel
to the realization of Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
the policies of fundamentalist Arab
Middle East states against Turkey might
become less severe; and last;
through this cooperation, Turkish government
might stop the attempts of the U.S.,
Israel and the Jewish lobby in U.S.
congress in regard to the realization
of Kurdish state project. (4)
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model II for the U.S.
Firstly; via this cooperation,
the U.S. government might raise the
political and economic support of the
Jewish lobby in the Congress; secondly,
Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
in the Central Asian region might strengthen
the U.S. policies on Middle East. When
the prevailing conflict between Iran-U.S.,
Iraq-U.S. and Syria-U.S. in the Middle
East region, and also Russia's political
expectations in the Middle East are
taken into consideration, it can be
assumed that via this cooperation the
U.S. might foster its stand in the Middle
East before the states mentioned above
by the help of Turkey and Israel. Along
with developing relations with these
two states in the Central Asian region,
while Turkey might consist military
leg of the U.S. in the Middle East region,
Israel might consist political leg of
the U.S. in the same region; and last,
Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
might also have a positive influence
on American policies on Central Asian
republics. It is obvious that U.S. government
strictly backs the continuity of current
political systems in these states. By
doing so, she believes that Russian
policies and probable Iranian fundamentalist
attempts in Central Asia will be kept
aloof. So, it can be assumed that along
with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
in the Central Asian region, an extensive
Israeli economic penetration into this
region might present a Western, rather
than Islamic, orientation for the political
systems of the Central Asian states.
(Ehteshami, 1994, pp.96-97)
Probable Advantages of Strategy Model
II for Israel
Firstly, Israel, such as Turkey,
has lost its strategic importance before
the West relatively following the end
of the Cold War. However, despite the
mentioned downgrade in its strategic
position before the West, U.S. is still
Israel's one of the most important allies.
So, it can be assumed that by actively
involving herself in the Central Asian
region, in which the U.S. government
has vital interests, and by adopting
policies similar to the policies of
the U.S. in this region, and by helping
the U.S. officials enlarge American
sphere of influence in Central Asia,
Israeli government might compensate
the mentioned loss before the West,
and particularly U.S.; secondly,
through taking place in Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Israel will be able to develop its relations
with the U.S. government. Parallel to
the developing relations with the U.S.,
Israel might realize its policies in
the Middle East region more independently.
At least, Israeli government might foster
its political stand in Arab-Israeli
peace process through gaining U.S. support
more; thirdly, if Bernard Lewis'
assumption "The emergence of Turkish
states world, such as the emergence
of Arab world appeared following the
disintegration of British and French
empires, will be viewed quite important
in the following years, and this Turkish
states world will have fairly important
influence on Middle East." (Göka,
1999, p.181) becomes real, it can be
assumed that Israel, which will have
a word in Central Asian policies through
participating in this kind of cooperation
in the Central Asian region, might gain
political power before Arab Middle East
states. Parallel to this development,
anti-Israel policies of the Middle East
Arab states will become less effective
on Israel's political stand in the Middle
East, so, the mentioned political burden
before Israeli government in the Middle
East region might decrease gradually;
fourthly, along with Israel-Central
Asian states cooperation in the Central
Asian region, Islamic world, particularly
Muslim-origin peoples in the Middle
East region might think that Israeli
government will soften her political
discourse and political attempts in
regard to the Arab Middle East states
and particularly to the Palestine conflict.
This development might help Israel remove
political oppression in its own region
gradually; and last, Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region
might also be advantageous for Israel
in regard to solving its problems with
Iranian government. The main problem
between Iran and Israel is not "Islamic
fundamentalism". Simply, in terms
of Israel, the problem is that Iran
insistently opposes to the peace process,
and to the Israeli government's enlargement
through Jerusalem, and struggles with
Israel for this enlargement issue. (Aras,
1999, p.205) So, parallel to developing
relations with Turkey, Israel might
benefit from Turkey's potential mediating
role in solving the mentioned problem
with Iran. Although this possibility
seems rather weak, still, it should
be kept in mind.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model II for the Central Asian Republics
Since we explained probable advantages
which U.S. and Turkey might present
for the Central Asian republics in Strategy
Model I, we will only explain probable
advantages which Israeli government
might present for the Central Asian
republics along with Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region
in Strategy Model II.
Firstly, along with Israel's
active involvement in the Central Asian
region, Central Asian republics might
benefit from Israel's close relations
with the West, and particularly with
the U.S. These republics might regard
Israel as a gateway to the West, and
particularly to the U.S.; secondly,
Israel's economic assistance given to
the Central Asian states since they
gained their independence has been welcomed
by them since these states are in need
of any economic assistance by any state.
So, along with Israel's developing relations
parallel to Turkish-American-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
the states in Central Asia might obtain
more economic assistance from Israel,
which would in turn help these states
rehabilitate their economies; thirdly,
it is obvious that the mutual fear shared
by Israel and the Central Asian states
related with the expansion of Islamic
fundamentalism and with the increasing
influence of Iran in the region has
been one of the most important factors
which leads these two sides to develop
closer relations.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy
Model II
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by some in the Middle East region Before
Strategy Model II
First of all, it seems obvious
that Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
in the Central Asian region will have
a negative impact on Turkey's economic
and particularly political relations
with the Arab countries in the Middle
East region because most of these countries
have had deep-rooted political problems
with Israel since the establishment
of this state. So, it can be said that
Turkish state's cooperation attempt
with Israel will cause discontent among
the Arab Middle East states, and these
states will adopt a negative stand against
Turkey. Parallel to this development,
Turkey might be deprived of these states'
political and economic support which
is necessary for the political stability
and economic well-being of Turkey in
the Middle East region; secondly,
along with Turkish-American-Israel cooperation
in the Central Asian region, Iran might
show its reaction in two ways. Firstly,
Iran might raise its political opposition
against Israeli state's enlargement
policy through Jerusalem, and the mentioned
political attempt of Iran might cause
problems in Arab-Israeli peace process.
Secondly, Iran, in order to create obstacles
before Turkish-Israel cooperation attempt
in the Central Asian region, might raise
its political support for PKK and Hezbollah,
which might prevent Turkish officials
from concentrating on the mentioned
cooperation process; thirdly,
such as Iran, Syria might show its reaction
against Turkish-Israel cooperation in
the Central Asian region in two ways,
too. Firstly, Syria, in order to break
the probable influence of Turkey in
the Middle East region as the result
of her attempts in the Central Asian
region, might foster its political support
for PKK. Secondly, Syria might reinforce
its relations with Iran, and Greek Government
of South Cyprus, and even she might
be willingly involved in establishment
of Syria-Iran-Armenia-Greece probable
quadripartite strategic alliance against
Turkish-American-Israel tripartite alliance.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by the Russian Federation Before Strategy
Model II
First of all, Russian Federation,
in order to endanger Turkish-Israel
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
might search the ways for backing Arab
states' anti-Israel policies. By doing
so, she might create problems before
Arab-Israeli peace process, and this
might result in the downgrade in Israel's
concentration on the mentioned cooperation
process; secondly, Russian Federation
might convince Arab states that Turkish-Israel
alliance in the Central Asian region
will in turn help Turkish and Israeli
states become politically and economically
more powerful in the Middle East region
before other states in the same region.
Arab Middle East states, provoked by
Russia, might foster their anti-Turkish
and anti-Israeli policies; thirdly,
she might develop her relations with
the states such as Iran and Syria in
the Middle East region, Armenia in the
Caucasus, Greece in the Balkans, and
Greek Government of South Cyprus, with
which Turkish state has had rather fragile
political relations for years, and she
might suggest these states set up a
kind of strategic alliance against Turkish-Israel
alliance in the Central Asian region;
and last, Russian Federation
might continue to house PKK terrorists
in order to weaken Turkey politically
and economically.
Probable Disadvantage to be Caused
by Islamist and Nationalist Circles
in Turkey Before Strategy Model II
When we take rather fanatic political
discourses developed, and rather severe
political stand adopted by Islamist
and nationalist circles in Turkey just
after the former Soviet republics in
Central Asia had declared their independence
in the beginning of 1990s into consideration,
it can be assumed that these circles
will oppose Turkish officials' attempt
to cooperate with Jewish-populated Israel
state. So, the ones who follow either
Islamist or nationalist ideologies in
Turkey might prevent the emergence of
a fully agreed political consensus in
Turkey, and this might cause the emergence
of some problems in domestic policy,
which might in turn lead lack of concentration
on Central Asian region and Central
Asian republics.
3. Strategy Model III: Turkey -
Iran - U.S. Strategy Model
In Strategy Model III we choose Iran
considering the "political advantages"
she might present to Turkey through
this strategy model; and also Iran's
"political and economic interests"
in its own region, in the Central Asian
region and in world politics. We include
Iran in Strategy Model III assuming
that Iran might look for the ways of
developing good-neighborly relations
with Turkey, behave more carefully in
regard to PKK and Hezbollah terrorist
activities on its own territory against
Turkey and also taking Iran's "political
and economic interests" through
Turkey - U.S.- Iran cooperation in the
Central Asian region into consideration
such as getting rid of international
isolationism prevailing since Islamic
revolution and Iran-Iraq War, improving
relations with the U.S. through this
strategy model, having a share in oil
transportation from the Central Asian
region, reinforcing its political and
economic position in the Middle East
region.
Despite the handicaps before Strategy
Model III we believe that along with
the realization of Strategy Model III;
political, economic and security differences
and expectations of these states related
with the Central Asian region will become
less disturbing, and the mentioned political,
economic and military conflicts among
them will be taken under control although
these conflicts will not be completely
removed because the eventual goal of
Strategy Model III is to minimize political,
economic and security differences and
expectations of the states included
in this kind of cooperation, and to
remove any political, economic or military
conflicts among them in the Central
Asian region. So, along with the realization
of Strategy Model III, Turkish government
will be able to realize its goals in
Central Asia and foster her economic
and social progress at home easier.
It should be also mentioned that Strategy
Model III is mainly based on political
and security concerns of the participating
states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model
III
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model III for Turkey
First of all, along with Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Russian-Iran relations might downgrade
gradually. As the result of this development
Russia might be deprived of one of its
power centers in the Middle East region.
Moreover, Russian-Iran close relationship
in Central Asia will leave the floor
to Turkish-American-Iran partnership;
secondly, Iran, accepted to cooperate
with Turkey in the Central Asian region,
might give up backing PKK and Hezbollah.
Parallel to this, Turkey might eliminate
one of the states which houses and gives
political support to the mentioned illegal
groups; thirdly, probability
of the emergence of Russia-Iran-Armenia
tripartite strategic partnership in
the Central Asian region, which is uttered
very often recently by the Russian officials
in order to break the influence of Turkey
in this region, might be removed parallel
to Turkish-American-Iran partnership
in Central Asia. As for the probability
of the emergence of Russian-Armenian
strategic partnership in the Central
Asian region, it can be claimed that
these two sides' partnership will not
be as effective as Russia-Iran-Armenia
strategic partnership since both Russian
Federation and Armenia have been busy
with internal political and economic
problems; fourthly, along with
the realization of Strategy Model III,
Iran might refrain from taking place
in Iran-Syria-Armenia-Greece-Greek Government
of South Cyprus strategic alliance;
fifthly, as mentioned before,
Turkey and Central Asian republics are
not geographically contiguous. Access
to these republics is rather problematic.
Overland routes, which connect Turkey
with Central Asia, traverse Iran, or
pass through the Transcaucasus and Russia,
or run via Transcaucasus and the Caspian
Sea. (Winrow, 1996, p.129) So, it can
be said that along with Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Turkey might safeguard its transportation
route which traverses Iran; and last,
Iranian government expecting to obtain
various political and economic advantages
from the U.S. as the result of Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation might no longer oppose Baku-Ceyhan
route which is supported by Turkey and
America.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model III for the U.S.
Firstly, it seems possible that
U.S. foreign policy on Central Asia,
which is mainly based on isolating Iran
from the Central Asian region, will
lead the mentioned state to cooperate
economically and politically with the
Russian Federation, and in the end to
become politically marginalized. So,
the U.S. government through accepting
to cooperate with Iran might prevent
this state from developing close relations
with Russia, and so, Iran might no longer
remain as a political threat against
the U.S. in the Middle East and Central
Asian regions; secondly, by the
help of Turkish-American-Iran cooperation
in the Central Asian region, U.S. might
eliminate one of the most important
negative factors such as Iran in the
Middle East region. Taking the importance
of economic and political advantages
to be obtained through U.S.-Iran cooperation
into consideration, Iran might soften
its anti-American policies, and adopt
more cooperative political stand in
its own region. This development might
bring two different practical ends.
First of all, U.S. political maneuvers
in the Middle East region might face
less Iranian opposition. Secondly, Iran
might support the Middle East peace
process through obeying the rules of
law, refraining from backing the activities
of illegal groups, removing its negative
political stand against Arab-Israel
peace process. These both might lead
the U.S. government to enlarge its sphere
of influence in the Middle East; and
thirdly, through Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
U.S. will have a chance to become involved
in Central Asia with these two Muslim
countries, which have deep-rooted cultural,
historical and social ties with the
Central Asian republics. By doing so,
U.S. might realize its Central Asian
policies more easily.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model III for Iran
Firstly, Iran, through taking
place in Turkish-American-Iran cooperation
in the Central Asian region might have
a chance to remove political conflicts
with the U.S. As the result of this
promising development Iran might convince
the U.S. government to cancel the prevailing
embargo, get rid of isolation through
reintegrating itself into the world
community, and rehabilitate its economy.
So, it can be assumed that the probable
advantages that Iran will obtain from
Turkish-American-Iran cooperation might
be larger than the probable advantages
that the same state will obtain from
Iran-Russian strategic alliance in the
Central Asian region; secondly,
because of the immense power of Russia
which extends to the north, historically
Iran has always sought to balance off
Russia with other potentially balancing
powers. France (under Napoleon), Germany,
America, and even Japan and China have
functioned as these potentially balancing
powers in some ways in more recent periods.
(Fuller, 1991, p.182) So, through cooperating
with the only superpower of the world,
Iran might also have the chance of ensuring
that she will not be entirely at the
mercy of a state such as Russian Federation,
which the political and economic future
is unforeseen; thirdly, as mentioned
before, Iranian Azeris living in northwest
of Iran consist 20% or 30% of Iran population,
and Iran has always had some concerns
about this Azeri population. This concern
is based on Iranian assumption that
Azeris living in Iran might attempt
to unite with the Azeris living in Azerbaijan,
or visa versa. So, through developing
relations with Turkey for the Central
Asian region, Iran might benefit from
close relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan,
and remove this threat; and last; although
Iran has deep-rooted historical ties
with the peoples of Central Asian republics,
there are still some limits which prevent
Iran from enlarging its ideological,
cultural influence through the Central
Asian republics fully. Firstly, Iranians
are Shiites while the peoples of Central
Asian states are Sunnis, secondly, Iranians
strictly follow Islamic traditions while
the peoples of Central Asian states
prefer more 'Asiatic' traditions,
thirdly, historically the states
which existed in the Central Asian region
never belonged to the sphere of influence
of Persia. (Zagorski, Zlobin, Solodovnik,
Khrustalev, 1992, p.8) When compared
to Iran, Turkey has more detailed ties
with the Central Asian peoples in terms
of religion and tradition. So, depending
on these explanations it can be assumed
that through Turkish-Iran cooperation
in the Central Asian region, Iran might
be more influential on the republics
in this region.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy
Model III
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by the Russian Federation Before Strategy
Model III
First of all, as mentioned before
although Russian officials do not declare
openly that Russia houses and gives
political and economic support to PKK,
they do this in a hidden way. So, it
seems highly probable that Russian Federation,
in order to weaken Turkey politically
and economically, and in order to break
the influence of Turkish state on Central
Asian republics, might begin to house
and give political and economic support
to PKK supporters, who might probably
be isolated from Iran following Turkish-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region;
secondly, Russian Federation;
which might think that Turkish-American
cooperation in the Central Asian region
might revive Islamic sentiments in the
region, and that this development might
endanger Russian political stand before
these republics; might upgrade its influence
on them, and force the Central Asian
states to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran
actual involvement in the region; thirdly,
Russian Federation, which will lose
one of her most important partners in
the Middle East region, might concentrate
on developing closer relations with
other Middle East states, such as Syria,
with which Turkey has harsh problems,
and might help these state develop anti-Turkish
policies.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by Israel Before Strategy Model III
Firstly, Israel, surprised before
the U.S.' involvement in a cooperation
process in the Central Asian region
with Iran, might show its reaction against
the U.S. government through affecting
the Jewish lobby in the U.S. congress;
secondly, parallel to Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Israel might also criticize Turkish
political preference, based on including
Iran in such a cooperation process.
And she might not favor the development
of multi-lateral relations with Turkey,
and suspend these relations.
Probable Disadvantages to be Caused
by the Central Asian Republics Before
Strategy Model III
Firstly, as mentioned before
Central Asian republics have some concerns
about Islamic penetration into the region,
and see some Islamic states, such as
Iran, as potential states which favors
to increase their sphere of political
and economic influence in Central Asia
through using Islamic sentiments. So,
it can be said that the fear that these
republics do have in regard to this
issue might lead them to oppose to Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in their own region; secondly,
before Russian Federation's highly probable
negative stand against Turkish-American-Iran
cooperation in the Central Asian region,
Central Asian republics might refrain
from giving support to this cooperation.
4. Strategy Model IV: Turkey - Central
Asian Economic Cooperation Organization
(CAECO)
The Strategy Model IV is inspired by
the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization,
established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan
and Turkey, and became a ten-member
organization after the demise of the
Soviet Union. The ECO is determined
to develop multi-lateral regional cooperation
with a view to creating the conditions
necessary for regular social and economic
development, and to raise the standard
of living of the peoples of the member
states through obtaining maximum benefit
from the social and economic potential
of the region) and the BSEC (Black Sea
Economic Cooperation Organization was
established in 1992 by the states neighboring
the area around the Black Sea. The BSEC
is determined to create an economic
cooperation region in which the free
movement of goods and capital would
be realized. The eleven members of the
BSEC were brought together by the common
realization that extended multi-lateral
cooperation among them is likely to
contribute to speeding up those processes
and fostering the economic and social
progress of everyone of them)
The CAECO, suggested in Strategy Model
IV to maximize Turkey's foreign policy
goals in regard to the Central Asian
region, is intended to include Turkey,
Iran, India, and Pakistan under the
leadership of the U.S. This Organization
is determined to gather the mentioned
states, which have different economic
and political expectations from the
Central Asian region, around the common
goal, which is targeted at obtaining
maximum benefit from the economic potential
of Central Asia.
At the first glance, the realization
of the CAECO might sound rather unrealistic
due to several reasons. First of all,
some of the participating states have
had rather severe economic, political
and security problems with each other
in various fields. For example, between
Indian and Pakistani governments Kashmir
conflict consists the primary concern
for years. In addition to this, Indian
government feels insecure before Pakistani
governments Islamic initiatives in the
Central Asian region and she fears that
Pakistan might use largely Muslim-populated
Central Asian states against her through
emphasizing Islam. Furthermore, Iran
has been rather discontent about the
Pakistani policies since Pakistani government
backed Pashtun Sunnis in Afghanistan
conflict while Iran backed Shi'ites
and Persian speaking groups in the same
conflict. Iranian government is also
discontent about Pakistani officials'
attempt to develop close relations with
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the U.S. government
disapproves the nuclear attempts of
India and Pakistan against each other
since she believes that this would endanger
the political stability of south Asia.
In addition to this, the U.S. embargo
on Iran still lasts since she still
regards Iran as a terrorist state. As
for Turkey, Turkey has still complaints
about Iran in regard to Iranian governments'
supports to illegal groups, such as
Hezbollah and PKK.
Secondly, the states included in CAECO
have rather different political, economic
and security expectations from the Central
Asian region, and from the mentioned
Organization. For example, while Iran
might prefer to be a member of the CAECO
in order to benefit from the economic
potential of Central Asia, to rehabilitate
her relations with the U.S., and to
break the support given by Pakistan
government for Taliban movement; India
might prefer to be a member of the CAECO
in order to break probable Pakistani
influence (through Islamic initiatives)
in Central Asia, to find new powerful
allies after she had lost the Soviet
Union, which had been one of the most
important economic, political and military
supporter of her during the Cold War
period, and to rehabilitate her political,
economic and social stand through developing
multi-lateral relations with the U.S.
via this Organization. Pakistan might
prefer to be a member of the CAECO in
order to regain the U.S.' economic and
military assistance, to develop some
new security arrangements to gain power
before India, and to reestablish relations
with Iran. U.S. might prefer to be the
motivating power of this Organization
in order to control the nuclear attempts
of India and Pakistan in south Asia,
and to control the Central Asian region.
As for Turkey, Turkish officials might
attempt to set up this kind of Organization
in order to eliminate probable single
attempts of Iran, India, and Pakistan
in the Central Asian region, to set
up a probable Muslim Security Belt via
this Organization in the long run against
Russia and Slavic-Orthodox Balkan states,
and to break Pakistan's Islamic influence
on Central Asian states.
Despite the mentioned handicaps before
Strategy Model IV we believe that along
with the realization of Strategy Model
IV, the mentioned political, economic
and security differences and expectations
of these states will become less disturbing,
and the mentioned political, economic
and military conflicts among them will
be taken under control although these
conflicts will not be completely removed
because the eventual goal of these kind
of Organizations is to minimize political,
economic and security differences and
expectations of the member states, and
to remove any political, economic or
military conflicts among the member
states. So, along with the realization
of Strategy Model IV, Turkish government
will be able to realize its goals in
Central Asia and foster her economic
and social progress at home easier.
It should be also mentioned that Strategy
Model IV is partly based on economic
concern, and partly political and security
concerns of the participating states.
a. Advantages of Strategy Model
IV
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model IV for Turkey
Firstly, along with Strategy
Model IV, Turkey might prevent the states,
such as India, Pakistan and Iran, which
have different economic and political
goals in the Central Asian region, from
realizing their policies in regard to
this region independently, and by doing
so, she might remove different power
centers in Central Asia; secondly,
along with this Strategy Model, Turkish
government might establish a "Muslim
Security Belt" (although this will
remain only in theory in the short-run)
against any probable Russian threat,
or any Slavic-Orthodox upheaval in the
Balkans, or any probable negative Greek
policies, intended to weaken Turkey
economically and politically; and last,
through including Pakistan in Strategy
Model IV, Turkish government might prevent
the realization of fundamentalist policies
of Pakistan in the Central Asian region.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model IV for the U.S.
First of all, since the U.S.
will be the motivating power of Central
Asian Economic Cooperation Organization,
she might safeguard Central Asian region's
security against Russian Federation
via this Organization. The U.S. might
also have the chance of realizing its
foreign policy goals in Central Asia
through placing Turkey at the top of
the mentioned Organization; secondly,
U.S. might control the nuclear attempts
in south Asia since the states, India
and Pakistan, which cause nuclear threat
in south Asian region, will be under
the control of the U.S. via this Organization;
thirdly, through this Organization,
U.S. might enlarge its sphere of influence
in the Central Asian region, and even
she might establish military bases in
this region in long run. When we recognize
the main foreign policy goal of the
U.S. in the establishment of the U.S.-backed
Baghdad Pact by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Pakistan, in 1955, we can understand
the support to be given by the U.S.
to the establishment of Central Asian
Economic Cooperation Organization. The
aim of the U.S. in regard to being the
supporter of Baghdad Pact was that through
this Pact U.S. intended to take security
of the Middle East region under control
against Soviet Union's probable attempts
in this region through fostering economic
and political stand of the states included
in this Pact. In the following years
U.S. not only enlarged its political
influence in the Middle East but also
its military influence in this region;
fourthly, through this organization
the U.S. might increase her impact on
Pakistan and this might result in realizing
its Afghanistan policies more easily
via Pakistan. So, depending on this
event we can assume that through being
the supporter of Central Asian Economic
Cooperation Organization, U.S. might
enlarge its sphere of its economic influence
in the region in the short run, and
political and military influence in
the long run.
Probable Advantage of Strategy Model
IV for Iran
Through taking part in Central Asian
Economic Cooperation Organization actually,
Pakistan might accelerate to back the
U.S. in regard to Taliban movement about
which both the regional powers and the
Central Asian republics fear. And this
might lead Pakistan government to suspend
its foreign policy goal, determined
to carry Turkmenistan's gas to Pakistan
via Afghanistan. As the result of this
development, Iran might eliminate both
the probability of the emergence of
Pakistan as an economic rival in Central
Asia against her, and one of the negative
factors, which causes threat for its
national security.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model IV for India
Firstly, along with this Organization,
India might prevent Pakistan from using
Islamic sentiments in Central Asia.
This might also eliminate probable negative
policies of Pakistan, intended to gain
power before India with a view to developing
multi-lateral relations with Central
Asian republics through using Islam;
secondly, India might compensate
the gap, emerged after she had lost
Russian back following the demise of
the Soviet Union, through developing
bi-lateral economic relations and establishing
multi-lateral security arrangements
by the help of the mentioned Organization;
and last, it is obvious that
slow economic development, internal
conflicts, decreasing importance in
international platforms motivate India
to concentrate on developing foreign
relations. So, it can be assumed that
India might partly remove these handicaps
by the help of Central Asian Economic
Cooperation Organization.
Probable Advantages of Strategy
Model IV for Pakistan
Firstly, Pakistan might regain
the U.S. political and economic assistance,
which is regarded as quite important
by Pakistani officials for the future
of Pakistan state. In addition to this
it can be assumed that Pakistani government
might never face any severe U.S. punishment
such as Pressler Amendment of 1990 (5)
in her relations with the U.S.; secondly,
even though Pakistani government can
not succeed to regain the U.S. political
and economic support, she might feel
secure against India via being a member
of this kind of economic organization.
Because its is obvious that the eventual
aim of establishing CAECO-type economic
organizations has been to remove political
conflicts among the participating states
through raising the economic potentials
of the member states. So, it can be
said that Pakistan might safeguard herself
in south Asia against India through
integrating herself in this kind of
economic-security arrangement; thirdly,
through being a CAECO member, Pakistani
officials might remove the prevailing
discontent between Pakistani and Iranian
governments, emerged as the result of
Pakistani attempts to develop relations
with Saudi Arabia and as the result
of the support given by Pakistani officials
to Pashtun Sunnis during Afghanistan
conflict while Iranian government supported
Shi'ites and Persian-speaking groups
in the mentioned conflict.
b. Disadvantages Before Strategy
Model IV
Probable Disadvantages to be caused
by the Russian Federation before Strategy
Model IV
Firstly, Russian Federation
might transform the CIS, established
as an economic and political organization
to keep her control over the former
Soviet states after disintegration,
into a military organization following
the establishment of Turkish-American
led CAECO. The Central Asian states,
which completely refrain from annoying
Russian officials, might adopt a negative
stand before CAECO, and they might prefer
remaining outside this kind of economic
(in short run) and political-military
(in long run) grouping; secondly,
Russian officials, in order that they
could put obstacles before the development
of this kind of Organization, might
threaten Central Asian states in the
way that they would be deprived of Russian
economic assistance and security guarantee
in case they get actively involved in
CAECO.
Probable Disadvantage to be caused
by the Central Asian Republics before
Strategy Model IV
Central Asian states, which have been
strictly dependent on Russian economic,
political and military assistance or
support, might present indifference
toward taking place in this kind of
Economic Organization in order not to
annoy Russian officials.
Probable Disadvantage to be caused
by the NATO before Strategy Model IV
Turkey, which voluntarily accepted
to be covered by common security umbrella
through being a NATO member in the beginning
of 1950s, might face with NATO members'
opposition following the establishment
of CAECO, which is intended to raise
economic potentials of the member states
in the short run, and to set up regional
political and security arrangements
in the long run.
Following the presentation of four
cooperation strategy models for the
Central Asian region in the first part
of this article, we will explain probable
positive and negative impact of these
cooperation strategy models on Turkey's
position in regard to the Middle East
region, U.S., Russian Federation, Greece
and EU through developing some positive
and negative future scenarios in the
next volume of Stradigma.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Sergei Kortunov, in his article
"Russia in search of allies",
published in International Affairs (Moscow),
regards nations in the Balkans such
as Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians and
Greeks as the peoples of the Balkan
countries who may potentially become
allies to Russia depending on long historical
and cultural ties with her. He mentions
that "With the threat of Moslems
and Catholics consolidating in the Balkans,
the formation of a Slavic-Orthodox quasi-coalition
under the aegis of Russia is becoming
likely, which, of course, will not be
able to be formed, but is necessary
to have in mind when conducting corresponding
diplomatic, military and political activities".
(Kortunov, 1996, p.159)
2. Dr. David Nissman, in his article
"Kurds, Russians, And The Pipeline",
published in Eurasian Studies, Spring
1995, explains the historical ties between
the Russians and Kurds, and between
the Armenians and Kurds since late 18th
century. He also points out the reasons
why Russian Federation and Armenia are
deeply involved with Kurdish issue.
In the mentioned article, the issues
such as the support given by Russian
and Armenian officials to both the Kurdish
population living in Turkey and to the
activities of Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) are also explained. (see Nissman,
1995, pp.30-34)
3. The explanations of Abdulaziz Tunç,
archive responsible of Hezbollah group
caught by Turkish security forces in
Diyarbakır city in 1999, is quite satisfactory
in order to emphasize the ties of Iranian
government with Hezbollah group, which
is aimed at establishing an Iranian
model Kurdish state in southeastern
Anatolia in Turkey. In his prosecution
Tunç said that "In 1988, with Velioğlu
(Hüseyin Velioğlu, the leader of Hezbollah,
shot in the operation organized by Turkish
security forces in January 2000, in
Istanbul) and two other friends we arrived
in Kelareşe village in Iran. In this
village Iran Revolution Guards met us.
We arrived in Tehran over Urmiye, Salmas
and Tebriz. We settled in a house next
to the Turkish Consulate General. Here
Iran Security Guards trained us. Then
the guns and bombs trainings were provided
in the area near Tehran. We came back
to Turkey in 1989..." (Durukan,
18 June 1999, Milliyet)
4. Turkish academic Professor Ümit Özdağ
in his article "İsrail'in Kuzey
Irak Politikası" ("Israel's
Policy on Northern Iraq") sets
up a correlation between the political
stand of the Israel state in regard
to the Kurdish state project in Northern
Iraq and the share of Israel's political
stand in regard to this issue in the
determination of Turkey's relations
with Israel. He puts it in that way:
"In terms of Turkey, elimination
of an Israel-backed Kurdish state project
in Northern Iraq and termination of
PKK terror consist the primary importance
in the development of relations with
Israel...The main goal of Turkey's policy
on Israel is to help Israel succeed
to remove the psychology shaped by insecurity
through proposing strategic security,
and to terminate the Kurdish state project
of both Israel and Jewish lobby in U.S.A..."
(Özdağ, 1999, p.231)
5. The mentioned Act ended all economic
and military assistance to Pakistan
since the U.S. Congress believed that
Pakistan government had assembled a
nuclear bomb. The mentioned amendment
embargoed delivery of F-16 and P-3C
Orion. However, the Pressler Amendment
did not forbid aid to NGOs (Non-governmental
Organizations), joint military exercises
(if no U.S. funds were used to support
Pakistani participation), commercial
arms sales, or any service fully paid
for by Pakistan government with its
own national funds. In 1996, modified
the Pressler Amendment through passing
the Brown Amendment. The Brown Amendment
permitted the U.S. government to deliver
368 million dollars of non-embargoed
F-16 equipment, exempted transfer of
military equipment, technology or defense
services other than F-16 aircraft, extended
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics
assistance, authorized some forms of
peacekeeping assistance, facilitated
humanitarian and civic assistance projects,
and allowed military-to-military contact
authorized outside of the International
Military Education Training program.
(Smith, 1996, p.27)
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Editor's
Note
