THOUGHTS ON "RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM"
IDENTITY IN CENTRAL ASIA
H. B. PAKSOY
Texas Tech University
Department of Philosophy
As a means of focusing our attention, let us consider two questions:
1) What is the Identity of Fundamentalism? For example: Is Religion
equal to Nationality?
2) Who is more eager for the Central Asians to be "fundamentalists?"
Now, we can consider a population in 1990, exhibiting the following
confessional attributes: 35,0481 operating churches, clustered
in 219 denominations; 58.6 % of the total population maintaining
church membership; 335,389 pastors in parishes; 537,379 total
clergy. This country has 203 seminaries with 52,025 students
enrolled. One sect alone operating 8,913 schools, not counting
other denominational parochial schools. These figures do not
include resources devoted to overseas evangelical and missionary
activities. This political entity has 3.5 million square miles
of territory and 145,383,738 out of a total population of 248
million are church members. The political entity in question,
of course, is the United States. (1)
There are no comparable statistics with respect to Central Asia,
which has a land mass akin to that of the U.S., but its population
of approximately 80 million is clustered in several irrigated
patches separated by uninhabitable expanses. From the late 1930s
until 1990 there were only two seminaries in Central Asia, with
a student body not more than several dozen students in attendance.
(2) Total number of operating mosques, according to varying
Soviet statistics, numbered around one hundred. The holy book
Koran was published less than half a dozen times until 1984
in limited quantities. (3) The entire clergy was under the total
control of the state. The bureaucratic apparatus of the center
selected the seminary students for training and the graduating
clergy were then assigned by the state apparatus to practice
religion who paid them monthly. All "official" clergy
reported to one of the four Moslem Spiritual Boards. In Central
Asia the US type evangelical TV or radio stations are not indigenous.
In the earlier periods, such as between the 12th and 16th centuries,
the propagation medium of religion and legitimation of a new
ruler was literature, especially poetry. Instead, especially
during the past two centuries, Central Asia has been a target
of proselytization, both Islamic and Christian, rather than
a jubilant exporter of religion. The sources of these efforts
to variously Islamicize or Christianize Central Asians are diverse,
and now continuing with renewed vigor.
At this point, it may be useful to remind ourselves of a fundamental
difference between Christianity and Islam: Christianity generally
operates within a set administrative church apparatus. The Christian
sects have a hierarchy, with a church pastor answering to a
bishop of his denomination as well as the congregation. The
bishop, in turn, answers to a higher-level cleric, and so on.
And, some of the denominations maintain a worldwide spiritual
leader, with a suitable supporting state apparatus. None of
this is the fundamental case with respect to Islam. A prayer
leader only answers to his congregation. This is because Islam
believes that there ought not be any type of mediation between
a soul and God, a thought that fueled the Christian Reformation
in the 16th century. Each individual will communicate with the
deity at his own personal level and receive unconditional salvation.
Again, in its original form, Islam did not make a distinction
between the spiritual and the profane worlds; religion and statecraft
are of one fabric. That is, when the mosques are not under the
control of the political state, be it the 8th century Caliphates
or the 21st century sovereign states. As mentioned above, on
the other hand, the Soviet Union totally took over religion
and placed it firmly under state control. Nothing religious,
regardless of sect, could take place without the knowledge or
permission of the security organs. The purpose, as demonstrated
in related literature, was to remove this religious influence
from the ruling equation, to make the population more pliable
in general to the demands of the state. After all, a religion
usually has legitimation issues involving the ruling strata
and may support or oppose a political system or politician.
Much has been written about the rise and fall of Islam as a
political movement, military power and distinct civilization.
A great majority of those commentaries aim to view Islam as
a monolith. Indeed, some of the practitioners and even opponents
of Islam wish to portray it as such---each for its own benefit.
(4) One look at the record indicates that, much like Christianity,
national interests have always taken precedence over that putative
unity. Christian Europeans have killed each other by the tens
of millions during the 20th century World Wars under various
grievances. Likewise, Islamic states also went to war with each
other during the same period. Were all those wars fought in
the name of religion? At the time of the fighting, the combatants
claimed so. Further, all parties insisted that theirs was the
true religion, and the belief of the opposing party was nothing
but heresy. But, everyone, deep down their hearts could at least
sense that there were other reasons. These are as varied as
the desires and dreams of all humans. Some can be lumped together
under economic, even political sub-headings.
In order to better understand this puzzle, it may be helpful
to delve into the identity of the belief systems, stripped of
their outer garments.
It is commonplace to have a person or polity to have more than
one identity. Political (political party preference), economic
(free market or restricted forms of daily economic activity),
belief systems (for example, Buddhist or Christian, etc). But,
choices and occurrences do not stop there. We, as individuals
cannot choose our birth order, an occurrence that also contributes
to one's identity, much like being a parent, member of a particular
social or service club, or a graduate of a specific school.
This complexity of identities certainly contributes, as a package,
to the outcome.
Within the foregoing framework, therefore, it may be necessary
to investigate the needs of various identities and the interactions
among those needs, and associated costs.
Governance
The statecraft of Central Asia has deep roots, with surviving
manuals from the tenth century and even earlier. The nature
and identity of political systems of the region have evolved
according to the needs of the populace and ecological environment.
As it always is the case, a certain "ruling exhaustion"
(born of long term governance) had already set in by the time
outsiders first "discovered" Central Asia. These outsiders
began publishing their understanding of the events, institutions
and practices. However, the visitors---whether they were traveling
in an invading army, or collecting intelligence or peddling
commercial wares---had arrived with pre-conceived notions. These
prejudices included both expectations of what to find and also
their own perceptions of personal worth and capabilities. Unfortunately,
those published works served to establish the bases for foreign
policy options of a number of neighboring and far away states.
This practice produced disastrous consequences for all, born
of a mismatch between what is expected of the central Asians
and the conditions that existed in central Asia. Most of those
issues are still alive and well.
When the polities that come under pressure from outside sources
to modernize, open up to global trade, their long standing local
values are disrupted. These disrupted polities will wish to
preserve their identities as a means of preserving and maintaining
their life styles in many manners they think appropriate. After
all, they realize, this is war by other means.
Anytime a problem is defined, the mind wanders about casting
for an answer or solution. There may not always one ready to
hand, other than the invisible hand that apply to economics.
That is not to say that there ought not be any communication
whatever among polities. Rather, the question is at what level?
And, what ought be the qualifications of those communicators?
And their numbers, intentions, objectives? If the designated
communicators are there with the pre-conceived notions, to impose
their will on the other side, the entire enterprise fails, and
the hostilities commence once again.
It has been suggested that peace, enduring peace, can only be
devised by global participation of all polities. This is difficult
to defend or demonstrate. Some governance systems are designed
for perpetual conflict without which they cannot survive. To
quash such particularistic systems, other polities must arm
and wage real war. The necessity to establish additional forces
and logistics for the purpose eventually recalls Napoleon's
dictum: "One can do everything with a bayonet, except sit
on it"
The federative model of governance is a solution advanced to
check the excesses of a overly centralized and overly authoritarian
world government. In that case, the laws enacted, rules promulgated
with executive decree in the name of the majority (it those
indeed reflect the clear decisions of the majority), presumably
for the good of all will not suit the needs and aspirations
of the minority or minorities. Will that mismatch not constitute
a violation of rights pursued by the majority as well? Will
the minority be forced into submission into a set of circumstances,
for example, buying a certain product, for the sake of 'efficiency?'
If the producer of, say, genetically engineered agricultural
products have the right to engineer and market them, should
not the consumers also have the right to accept or reject them?
Belief
Assaults on belief systems are not uncommon to Central Asians,
who, in the course of a millennium, have braced themselves against
a number of major campaigns. However, shamanism is the earliest
known belief system, based on spirituality, courage, physical
prowess, hospitality and generosity. It has two discernible
basic branches: one of the earliest known monotheisms, the Tengri;
and the dual diety Erlik and Dirlik (Sky and Underground gods,
respectively). Over time, the Turk shamanism came into contact
with neighboring belief systems, such as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism,
Mithraism; and exchanged tokens (images and lores) or significant
eschalatological aspects. The entry of Islam into this Shamanist
territory created new traditions, and in some cases seriously
eroded the basics of both belief systems. There are myriad poems
and stories demonstrating the shamanist resistance to Islam,
from all over Central Asia. (5) For example: A Turkmen rider
encounters a dismounted kinsman. The latter had stuck a twig
in the ground, in the vast expanses of the bozkir (semi desert,
arid-lands) to create a semblance of private space, and is performing
namaz (ritual prayer) behind it. The rider chides the worshipper:
Anan, atan işidür
çarpmak, yıkmak, talamak
Kim kodu sana
çöpe tapmak, toprak yalamak?
It is the tradition of your forebearers
to strike, to raid
So, who induced you
to worship the twig and lick the dirt?
In another instance, precepts of Islam were being explained
to a gathering of Kazaks. The preacher, attempting to review
and reinforce his message, puts the question to the assembly:
"And, how will the Kazaks enter paradise?" To which
an attendee responds without hesitation: "On horseback."
(6)
Among some of the Turk groups, reverence is articulated towards
the ancestral superstars in poetry:
Kök kümbezin kürüldetip,
Ürkütme bizni Biy Temir;
Qaraqaş taşın qımıldatıp,
Qorkutma bizni Biy Temir
Do not scare us Bey Temir
By making your blue dome thunder;
Do not frighten us Bey Temir
By moving your black stone
Haris Sisenbay, c. 1922 (7)
Of course, many an ode was written to Islam as well as Christianity.
(8) The following is a rare 'fusionist' (combining Turk Shamanism
with Islamic doctrines) poem, somehow attempting to merge the
two.
Bir kapıdan Baba Ilyas çıktı
Ayak çıplak baş açık sine üryan
Erenler katında ulu kaçıktı
Yarı İslâm idi yarı Şaman (9)
Baba Ilyas emerged from a door
Barefeet, open headed, bare chested
Among the saints, a grand ole holy fool
Half Shaman, the other half Islam
Perhaps the Turk proverb "Avcu nice al bilse, Adük anca
yol bilür" (As many devices the hunter knows to hunt with,
so does the bear to escape) is still meaningful.
Economics
In the recent months, works on 'influence of modernity' on
Central Asia began appearing. According to this observation,
capitalist consumer goods flooded third world countries as a
part of the globalization process. This caused an outflow of
capital from essentially poor economies to wealthy ones, leaving
the poor countries even more destitute. Artisans, merchants
and others became unemployed reducing income generation. Poverty
deepened.
The foregoing can be either a Marxist or a Capitalist view.
Only the proposed solutions differ. The Marxist demand that
all outside intervention to cease, foreigners to go home. Capitalist
require loans to be made from their financial institutions to
the countries at hand.
Economic, political and military institutions form an inseparable
trivet. Does any one of these have an absolute superiority over
the other two? Not even in absolute regimes can they be separated.
This, however, does not stop absolutists from trying. Marxists
demand and fund national liberation fronts, while the Capitalists---by
now having been converted into Mercantilists monopolists---insist
on joint ventures and free trade. Both parties will also desire
a military solution, involving the basing of troops, previous
withdrawal demands notwithstanding, from both sides on the soil
of the third party.
So far, as it is noticed, suggestions and demands have been
pouring from out side in. No one yet consulted the populace
that became a target of outside theories, generally hatched
without reference to the practices followed in daily life. This
is where the Identity issues become clear.
Global Trade is war by other means. It is an attempt at transferring
wealth and resources from the losing party to the victor. The
party that amasses the most wealth will be known as the most
noble. Since Second World War, it has been argued that a world
government is necessary to prevent global wars. This is in essence
an idea first advanced over two centuries ago, at least in two
different major versions: The Hobbesian variety relied on a
strong central ruler (as in Leviathan) to impose order. In the
other, Mill foresaw a trade based mutually dependent environment
conducive to peace. Kant then made an attempt to combine the
two, by means of cosmopolitan laws. In all cases, the sovereignty
of the nation-states are reduced in favor of cosmopolitan laws.
These writings greatly influenced the present forms of the United
Nations and the World Trade Organization.
It can be argued that both approaches can be associated with
a unique transference of initiative, resources and sovereignty
from the individual to multinational organizations led by yet
to be tested. One relatively new experiment on these principles
is the formation of the European Union. In addition to a large
bureaucratic apparatus, the EU also possesses a legislative
body based in Strasbourg. However, the European Parliament lacks
the real means of regulating the multinational organizations.
If, on the other hand, should the European Parliament acquires
such means, there is always the danger of that body going beyond
the intention of the population---that may, perhaps, endow that
body with stronger charter--- in general.
As one response, perhaps Consumerism need to adapt, to consider
such agreements as NAFTA regulations where a grieved person
or company, from a polity outside of the USA may force the closure
of a US business; in a secret meeting, closed to the public.
Thoughts on Identity
The issue, at once, becomes cultural; thus, a matter of Identity.
Moreover, the tussle and the concern is not over a specific
product, but over the pre-eminence of ideas and approaches to
that intellectual output. A 'problem' is defined in cultural
terms, containing the seeds of a proposed solution. If a polity
is regarded as the problem, should it be exterminated? What
if the same polity also regards the earlier one in the same
terms? What is likely to transpire? Mutual annihilation? For
example, when the steel makers of other polities put the US
steel plants out of business, what was the problem, and its
solution?
During the 1960's and 1970's waves of international terrorism
swept Europe. Prominent European politicians and businessmen
were kidnapped and killed. When caught, the perpetrators defended
themselves with the assertion that they had the right to break
the law, and such a right could not be truncated by any authority.
Some judicial organs and Thought Employers (10) understood the
true nature of the claim; it was to stress the nature of the
laws and associated intentions. At the time, no polity was bombed
by the armed forces of any country.
It appears a world government, as has been proposed, has some
issues to resolve yet. The bow of a boat arrives at its destination
first, ahead of the stern. But, it is the stern that guides
it there.
Thus, Identity is a composite. (11) A great many ingredients
are stirred into a solution, which, from the outside seems a
solid unchanging mass. This makes Identity an extremely fluid
structure, but one with definite parameters. Shifts in the composition
are predictable. That is, it is definite that anger and despondency
will be exhibited when income reduced or lost. What we do not
know is when this person or better yet a group of persons in
the same set of conditions will take some firm action, such
as revolting by various means.
Identity components are strongly influenced by culture. Culture,
by its original definition, is cultivation of mind. This is
specific to place and time. What was handed down from the parents
from childhood on? A composite of values transmitted from one
generation to the next determines the general culture of a given
polity. It is both changeable and immutable. This seeming contradiction
is best understood by learning the specific culture.
If a given polity has a culture of unchanging adherence to certain
principles in personal life, for examples as Amish live, then
there will be a collision, between a given immutable principle
and the society at large. Literally. In Ohio and Pennsylvania
there are regular accidents between horse drawn Amish carriages
and motorcars. Does that create a certain tension within the
community?
The consequences of intergenerational conflict in a large part
of the world have been appearing ever since the first generation.
This shift of emphasis, or change, is forced by changing conditions
in the immediate vicinity. However, the reception of the depth
and range of change differs from one polity to the next. This
is not because a polity cannot handle the change or its speed.
The priority is attached to the leavening of the given culture.
How and what was learned.
The Marxist culture, for example, equates "enlightenment"
with empowerment, so that individuals can take their fate into
their hands. The opposing camp, the capitalists, fervently believe
the solution lies in "education." Even if the terminology
is somewhat different, both end up with the same methods and
means. So far, however, it must have become apparent, the real
competition is actually between two groups who interpret and
staunchly practice their ideologies. The target polity is a
field of contention, the prize, or, at best, a testing laboratory.
Then, after a while, the target polity, or its components, begin
assessing these outside factors influencing and affecting their
lives. These alien thoughts appear to be contrary to their own
desires and expectations, as leavened by their own culture.
As a result, they decide to take action, in order to remove
the outside obstacles to their own lifestyle. The methods they
choose to obtain will vary from one polity to the next. But
they will also learn from the methods directed at them by all
camps. And, they will turn the tables on alien influences. It
will be costly to all parties involved.
Belief systems have always been a part of human endeavor. In
turn, there has always been a raging competition between belief
systems. Is it the ideas themselves, or the agents they influence
and act upon that compete? How well do the agents understand
the basic precepts of the belief systems? Or, did the agents
deliberately distort those tenets, for pecuniary interest? Central
Asia has been, and still is, a battlefield of belief systems,
with Islam being one of the latest entrants into the fray. And,
many interpretations of Islam have been fueled not only by indigenous
interest groups, but also by the outside players. The latter
may have the distinction of constituting the majority of such
initiatives.
The belief systems, once released onto a polity, begin interacting
with the economic, political and military trivet, leading to
a new set of issues and possible solutions. What complicates
this already crowded matrix is that most, if not all, belief
systems tend to have subdivisions. These internal components
of a belief system may and do contain self-contradictory doctrines
in themselves. The existence of such bifurcations are an ideal
opening for outside forces to exploit, for the purpose of influencing
the affairs of target polities. When the target polity objects
to the outside entities and their aims and methods, these outsiders
may and will resort to clandestine methods. They will, essentially,
insist on getting their way.
All throughout recorded history one warlike visit begat a return
of the same upon the initial aggressor. As an extension, when
clandestine operations become known---and they will invariably
become public---the same response can be expected. These responses
need not be on the same level of the outside offenders. The
targeted polity will choose its timing and methods. Even after
a long wait, lasting decades.
If the clandestine forces of the outside polities choose to
concentrate on bifurcations of belief, governance or economic
systems to exploit, that does not mean that the target polity
will respond in kind. But, respond, they will.
Both the authoritarian and the mercantilist systems, while
competing against each other, will also initiate paramilitary
operations. At a certain activity level, these operations will
be penetrated and compromised. This is exactly the case with
respect to Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia. Not only
the immediate neighbors of Afghanistan in Central Asia, but
also polities from other regions have been partaking in this
process of exploitation of bifurcated belief and governance
systems. A portion of the targeted population, originally grieved
by economic and political depredations, will respond decisively
to the provocation. This will be in the direction of military
action. This includes, necessarily, the struggle waged between
the 17th and 20th century struggle between the mercantilist
and the capitalist governance systems; the latter attempting
to change the world, as the former doggedly resisting.
Central Asia, even if the term implies a block of land, is
not a monolith in cultural terms. Afghanistan has a different
history and culture than Iran or the Newly Independent States
of Kazak, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Ozbek. Even within the NIS,
the experience, for example, of Tajikistan is different than
the adjacent neighbor Ozbekistan. For example, Afghanistan did
not exist as a state before the 20th century. The five states
of Central Asia were part of a much larger entity, named Turkistan.
Languages spoken in Afghanistan, that is, the existence of large
minorities are not the same elsewhere.
What To Expect
The issue at hand, then, becomes: 1) Will the polity at hand
evolve politically and economically, if left to its own devices
2) How much external interference in whatever form will be tolerated
a) by the governance strata of the target polity b) the people
of the polity.
The political systems of the region, prior to the arrival of
outside authoritarianism in the form of various external clandestine
services, were designed or evolved according to local realities.
These "eastern" or "Oriental" governance
systems, labeled 'unsophisticated,' 'primitive,' so on, were
in existence for millennia or more, when they were discovered
or designed for the past two hundred years within the "western"
reaches of the world. When Bismarck, in late 19th century was
designing his Governance Participation Units (factory unions;
workplace representatives, etc) or multi-party and coalition
initiatives were taking place in their neighborhood, such systems
have been functioning in places such as Afghanistan and in the
east for quite sometime. They were established institutions
long before university based social scientists created books
of terminology to explain them.
All these old and new systems of Governance Participation Units
came into being for the obvious reason: to share in the resources,
to keep the polity in balance. Every Governance Participation
Unit, through its membership strength and leadership skills,
sought to obtain what they deemed a fair share of what is available.
In terms of functions, who gets how much water and who gets
to build a golf course or travels to space as a tourist work
on the same principles.
One of the implications of this (often is regarded euphemistically
as a resource sharing arrangement by the outsiders) is that
the polities targeted by authoritarian or mercantilist polities
will assess the relative merits of what is being imposed on
them. In the end, the target polity members may reject what
is on offer from the outside, in favor of keeping what is and
has been there as far back as the existence of the polity. The
more the pressure on a target polity, the more energetic the
objections and resultant counter-measures.
Corruption, under many guises will take place, despite prescribed
safeguards. Corruption is basically an attempt at subverting
the rules of governance. It is a dash to jump the queue, divert
resources for the benefit of a sub-group or individual at the
expense of the rest of the polity. If the polity does not have
effective recourse to enforcement of the rules, corruption will
cause the eventual collapse of the system, and the polity. Some
polities engage their secret services, in full force, to deal
with corruption. To eradicate it, other polities' secret services
fully cooperate with the players of corruption and become corrupt
themselves. The entire polity suffers from a range of ills,
including human rights abuses and distortions in income distribution.
When the corruption is exported along with a political and economic
system, the recipients not only may not appreciate the incoming
product, but also resent the defective nature of the process
and choose to fight it with tools at their own disposal.
The abusers of belief systems are rather adept at exploiting
all of the above ideas and means. As usual, when a new system
arrives, it has to do battle with the existing one. The new
recruits or converts will be more eager to prove their worth
than the rest who have been in it for a longer period. Similarly,
adherents of an old system will seek revenge. The methods of
the revenge are not necessarily salient; revenge, itself, is.
The so-called fundamentalism is a hybrid. First there exists
a body of disgruntled people. Second, there are individuals
and groups who abuse the belief system for either institutional
or personal gain. Third, the interest groups from the outside
place unwanted pressure on the same people. The resultant cocktail
can well be overly potent. And, one fundamentalism, regardless
of its origin and location, will fuel others; just like one-armed
visit will begat a military invasion in return.
Central Asian political movements emerging at the beginning
of the 20th century stressed a separation between religion and
state, before the coercive Soviet methods were put into place.
This can be observed from the platforms and programs they issued
over time. When the Bolsheviks militarily incorporated Central
Asia into what became the Soviet Union, all plans for a secular
and independent Central Asian state were also postponed.
In closing: to place the issue of fundamentalism into perspective,
perhaps the two initial questions need to be reiterated: 1)
Is religion equal to nationality? 2) Who is more eager for the
Central Asians to be "fundamentalists?" (12)
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1. Constant H Jacquet, Jr. Editor, Yearbook of American
and Canadian Churches 1990 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, Communications
Unit of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the
USA, 1990).
2. "In 1900, it was estimated that in Turkestan alone,
without counting the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, there were
1503 congregational mosques and 11230 parish mosques with a
total of 12499 imams (prayer leaders) to minister to 6 million
persons, that is, one mosque for every 471 believers."
See Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Central Asia (New
York: Praeger
3. H. B. Paksoy, "Deceivers." Central Asian Survey
Vol. 3, N. 1, 1984.
4. H.B. Paksoy, "Nationality or Religion?: Views of Central
Asian Islam" AACAR Bulletin (of the Association for the
Advancement of Central Asian Research) Vol VIII, No. 2, 1995;
Reprinted in International Journal of Central Asian Studies
Volume 3, 1998; Translation in Central Asia and the Gulf, Masayuki
Yamauchi, ed. (Tokyo: Asahi Selected Series, 1995) . Original
reprinted in Essays on Central Asia (Lawrence, KS: Carrie, 1999)
also accessible at: http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/cae02.html
5. H. B. Paksoy, "Sun is also Fire" Central Asian
Monuments (Istanbul: Isis, 1992).
6. With many thanks to Dr. Buğra Atsız.
7. Z.V. Togan, Hatıralar (Istanbul, 1969) . Sisenbay was the
Başkurt orderly to Z.V. Togan (1890-1970) during the Turkistan
National Liberation Movement of the 1920s and 1930s. See "The
Basmachi Movement From Within: An Account of Zeki Velidi Togan"
Nationalities Papers Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995. Pp. 373-399.
Reprinted in CENTRAL ASIA READER: The Rediscovery of History
H.B. Paksoy, Editor, Translator (New York/London: M. E. Sharpe,
1994). 'Biy Temir' (or Temur Bey) is the correct spelling of
what has been rendered as 'Tamarlane:' And the 'black stone'
is the very large, very dark green jade marking Timur's burial
location, inside the moseleum known as Kök kümbez 'Sky Blue
Dome' ('sky blue' or 'Turquoise' has been the primary royal
color among Turks).
8. See Peter B Golden "Codex Comanicus'" in Central
Asian Monuments (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992).
9. http://www11.ewebcity.com/ahibirlikleri/aef.html
10. H.B. Paksoy, "Dusunce Isvereni" Turk Tarihi, Toplumlarin
Mayasi, Uygarlik (Izmir: Mazhar Zorlu Holding, 1997) http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-3/turk15.html
11. H.B. Paksoy, Identities: How Governed, Who Pays? (Lawrence:
Carrie, 2001). Simultaneous print and e-book release. Accessible
at http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-7/
12. The Question of Religious Fundamentalism in Central Asia
http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/cae03.html H.B.
Paksoy, Essays on Central Asia (Carrie, 1999) http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/