THOUGHTS ON "RELIGIOUS
FUNDAMENTALISM" IDENTITY IN CENTRAL
ASIA
H. B. PAKSOY
Texas Tech University
Department of Philosophy
As a means of focusing our attention,
let us consider two questions:
1) What is the Identity of Fundamentalism?
For example: Is Religion equal to Nationality?
2) Who is more eager for the Central
Asians to be "fundamentalists?"
Now, we can consider a population in
1990, exhibiting the following confessional
attributes: 35,0481 operating churches,
clustered in 219 denominations; 58.6
% of the total population maintaining
church membership; 335,389 pastors in
parishes; 537,379 total clergy. This
country has 203 seminaries with 52,025
students enrolled. One sect alone operating
8,913 schools, not counting other denominational
parochial schools. These figures do
not include resources devoted to overseas
evangelical and missionary activities.
This political entity has 3.5 million
square miles of territory and 145,383,738
out of a total population of 248 million
are church members. The political entity
in question, of course, is the United
States. (1)
There are no comparable statistics with
respect to Central Asia, which has a
land mass akin to that of the U.S.,
but its population of approximately
80 million is clustered in several irrigated
patches separated by uninhabitable expanses.
From the late 1930s until 1990 there
were only two seminaries in Central
Asia, with a student body not more than
several dozen students in attendance.
(2) Total number of operating mosques,
according to varying Soviet statistics,
numbered around one hundred. The holy
book Koran was published less than half
a dozen times until 1984 in limited
quantities. (3) The entire clergy was
under the total control of the state.
The bureaucratic apparatus of the center
selected the seminary students for training
and the graduating clergy were then
assigned by the state apparatus to practice
religion who paid them monthly. All
"official" clergy reported
to one of the four Moslem Spiritual
Boards. In Central Asia the US type
evangelical TV or radio stations are
not indigenous. In the earlier periods,
such as between the 12th and 16th centuries,
the propagation medium of religion and
legitimation of a new ruler was literature,
especially poetry. Instead, especially
during the past two centuries, Central
Asia has been a target of proselytization,
both Islamic and Christian, rather than
a jubilant exporter of religion. The
sources of these efforts to variously
Islamicize or Christianize Central Asians
are diverse, and now continuing with
renewed vigor.
At this point, it may be useful to remind
ourselves of a fundamental difference
between Christianity and Islam: Christianity
generally operates within a set administrative
church apparatus. The Christian sects
have a hierarchy, with a church pastor
answering to a bishop of his denomination
as well as the congregation. The bishop,
in turn, answers to a higher-level cleric,
and so on. And, some of the denominations
maintain a worldwide spiritual leader,
with a suitable supporting state apparatus.
None of this is the fundamental case
with respect to Islam. A prayer leader
only answers to his congregation. This
is because Islam believes that there
ought not be any type of mediation between
a soul and God, a thought that fueled
the Christian Reformation in the 16th
century. Each individual will communicate
with the deity at his own personal level
and receive unconditional salvation.
Again, in its original form, Islam did
not make a distinction between the spiritual
and the profane worlds; religion and
statecraft are of one fabric. That is,
when the mosques are not under the control
of the political state, be it the 8th
century Caliphates or the 21st century
sovereign states. As mentioned above,
on the other hand, the Soviet Union
totally took over religion and placed
it firmly under state control. Nothing
religious, regardless of sect, could
take place without the knowledge or
permission of the security organs. The
purpose, as demonstrated in related
literature, was to remove this religious
influence from the ruling equation,
to make the population more pliable
in general to the demands of the state.
After all, a religion usually has legitimation
issues involving the ruling strata and
may support or oppose a political system
or politician.
Much has been written about the rise
and fall of Islam as a political movement,
military power and distinct civilization.
A great majority of those commentaries
aim to view Islam as a monolith. Indeed,
some of the practitioners and even opponents
of Islam wish to portray it as such---each
for its own benefit. (4) One look at
the record indicates that, much like
Christianity, national interests have
always taken precedence over that putative
unity. Christian Europeans have killed
each other by the tens of millions during
the 20th century World Wars under various
grievances. Likewise, Islamic states
also went to war with each other during
the same period. Were all those wars
fought in the name of religion? At the
time of the fighting, the combatants
claimed so. Further, all parties insisted
that theirs was the true religion, and
the belief of the opposing party was
nothing but heresy. But, everyone, deep
down their hearts could at least sense
that there were other reasons. These
are as varied as the desires and dreams
of all humans. Some can be lumped together
under economic, even political sub-headings.
In order to better understand this puzzle,
it may be helpful to delve into the
identity of the belief systems, stripped
of their outer garments.
It is commonplace to have a person or
polity to have more than one identity.
Political (political party preference),
economic (free market or restricted
forms of daily economic activity), belief
systems (for example, Buddhist or Christian,
etc). But, choices and occurrences do
not stop there. We, as individuals cannot
choose our birth order, an occurrence
that also contributes to one's identity,
much like being a parent, member of
a particular social or service club,
or a graduate of a specific school.
This complexity of identities certainly
contributes, as a package, to the outcome.
Within the foregoing framework, therefore,
it may be necessary to investigate the
needs of various identities and the
interactions among those needs, and
associated costs.
Governance
The statecraft of Central Asia has deep
roots, with surviving manuals from the
tenth century and even earlier. The
nature and identity of political systems
of the region have evolved according
to the needs of the populace and ecological
environment. As it always is the case,
a certain "ruling exhaustion"
(born of long term governance) had already
set in by the time outsiders first "discovered"
Central Asia. These outsiders began
publishing their understanding of the
events, institutions and practices.
However, the visitors---whether they
were traveling in an invading army,
or collecting intelligence or peddling
commercial wares---had arrived with
pre-conceived notions. These prejudices
included both expectations of what to
find and also their own perceptions
of personal worth and capabilities.
Unfortunately, those published works
served to establish the bases for foreign
policy options of a number of neighboring
and far away states. This practice produced
disastrous consequences for all, born
of a mismatch between what is expected
of the central Asians and the conditions
that existed in central Asia. Most of
those issues are still alive and well.
When the polities that come under pressure
from outside sources to modernize, open
up to global trade, their long standing
local values are disrupted. These disrupted
polities will wish to preserve their
identities as a means of preserving
and maintaining their life styles in
many manners they think appropriate.
After all, they realize, this is war
by other means.
Anytime a problem is defined, the mind
wanders about casting for an answer
or solution. There may not always one
ready to hand, other than the invisible
hand that apply to economics. That is
not to say that there ought not be any
communication whatever among polities.
Rather, the question is at what level?
And, what ought be the qualifications
of those communicators? And their numbers,
intentions, objectives? If the designated
communicators are there with the pre-conceived
notions, to impose their will on the
other side, the entire enterprise fails,
and the hostilities commence once again.
It has been suggested that peace, enduring
peace, can only be devised by global
participation of all polities. This
is difficult to defend or demonstrate.
Some governance systems are designed
for perpetual conflict without which
they cannot survive. To quash such particularistic
systems, other polities must arm and
wage real war. The necessity to establish
additional forces and logistics for
the purpose eventually recalls Napoleon's
dictum: "One can do everything
with a bayonet, except sit on it"
The federative model of governance is
a solution advanced to check the excesses
of a overly centralized and overly authoritarian
world government. In that case, the
laws enacted, rules promulgated with
executive decree in the name of the
majority (it those indeed reflect the
clear decisions of the majority), presumably
for the good of all will not suit the
needs and aspirations of the minority
or minorities. Will that mismatch not
constitute a violation of rights pursued
by the majority as well? Will the minority
be forced into submission into a set
of circumstances, for example, buying
a certain product, for the sake of 'efficiency?'
If the producer of, say, genetically
engineered agricultural products have
the right to engineer and market them,
should not the consumers also have the
right to accept or reject them?
Belief
Assaults on belief systems are not uncommon
to Central Asians, who, in the course
of a millennium, have braced themselves
against a number of major campaigns.
However, shamanism is the earliest known
belief system, based on spirituality,
courage, physical prowess, hospitality
and generosity. It has two discernible
basic branches: one of the earliest
known monotheisms, the Tengri; and the
dual diety Erlik and Dirlik (Sky and
Underground gods, respectively). Over
time, the Turk shamanism came into contact
with neighboring belief systems, such
as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Mithraism;
and exchanged tokens (images and lores)
or significant eschalatological aspects.
The entry of Islam into this Shamanist
territory created new traditions, and
in some cases seriously eroded the basics
of both belief systems. There are myriad
poems and stories demonstrating the
shamanist resistance to Islam, from
all over Central Asia. (5) For example:
A Turkmen rider encounters a dismounted
kinsman. The latter had stuck a twig
in the ground, in the vast expanses
of the bozkir (semi desert, arid-lands)
to create a semblance of private space,
and is performing namaz (ritual prayer)
behind it. The rider chides the worshipper:
Anan, atan işidür
çarpmak, yıkmak, talamak
Kim kodu sana
çöpe tapmak, toprak yalamak?
It is the tradition of your forebearers
to strike, to raid
So, who induced you
to worship the twig and lick the dirt?
In another instance, precepts of Islam
were being explained to a gathering
of Kazaks. The preacher, attempting
to review and reinforce his message,
puts the question to the assembly: "And,
how will the Kazaks enter paradise?"
To which an attendee responds without
hesitation: "On horseback."
(6)
Among some of the Turk groups, reverence
is articulated towards the ancestral
superstars in poetry:
Kök kümbezin kürüldetip,
Ürkütme bizni Biy Temir;
Qaraqaş taşın qımıldatıp,
Qorkutma bizni Biy Temir
Do not scare us Bey Temir
By making your blue dome thunder;
Do not frighten us Bey Temir
By moving your black stone
Haris Sisenbay, c. 1922 (7)
Of course, many an ode was written to
Islam as well as Christianity. (8) The
following is a rare 'fusionist' (combining
Turk Shamanism with Islamic doctrines)
poem, somehow attempting to merge the
two.
Bir kapıdan Baba Ilyas çıktı
Ayak çıplak baş açık sine üryan
Erenler katında ulu kaçıktı
Yarı İslâm idi yarı Şaman (9)
Baba Ilyas emerged from a door
Barefeet, open headed, bare chested
Among the saints, a grand ole holy fool
Half Shaman, the other half Islam
Perhaps the Turk proverb "Avcu
nice al bilse, Adük anca yol bilür"
(As many devices the hunter knows to
hunt with, so does the bear to escape)
is still meaningful.
Economics
In the recent months, works on 'influence
of modernity' on Central Asia began
appearing. According to this observation,
capitalist consumer goods flooded third
world countries as a part of the globalization
process. This caused an outflow of capital
from essentially poor economies to wealthy
ones, leaving the poor countries even
more destitute. Artisans, merchants
and others became unemployed reducing
income generation. Poverty deepened.
The foregoing can be either a Marxist
or a Capitalist view. Only the proposed
solutions differ. The Marxist demand
that all outside intervention to cease,
foreigners to go home. Capitalist require
loans to be made from their financial
institutions to the countries at hand.
Economic, political and military institutions
form an inseparable trivet. Does any
one of these have an absolute superiority
over the other two? Not even in absolute
regimes can they be separated. This,
however, does not stop absolutists from
trying. Marxists demand and fund national
liberation fronts, while the Capitalists---by
now having been converted into Mercantilists
monopolists---insist on joint ventures
and free trade. Both parties will also
desire a military solution, involving
the basing of troops, previous withdrawal
demands notwithstanding, from both sides
on the soil of the third party.
So far, as it is noticed, suggestions
and demands have been pouring from out
side in. No one yet consulted the populace
that became a target of outside theories,
generally hatched without reference
to the practices followed in daily life.
This is where the Identity issues become
clear.
Global Trade is war by other means.
It is an attempt at transferring wealth
and resources from the losing party
to the victor. The party that amasses
the most wealth will be known as the
most noble. Since Second World War,
it has been argued that a world government
is necessary to prevent global wars.
This is in essence an idea first advanced
over two centuries ago, at least in
two different major versions: The Hobbesian
variety relied on a strong central ruler
(as in Leviathan) to impose order. In
the other, Mill foresaw a trade based
mutually dependent environment conducive
to peace. Kant then made an attempt
to combine the two, by means of cosmopolitan
laws. In all cases, the sovereignty
of the nation-states are reduced in
favor of cosmopolitan laws. These writings
greatly influenced the present forms
of the United Nations and the World
Trade Organization.
It can be argued that both approaches
can be associated with a unique transference
of initiative, resources and sovereignty
from the individual to multinational
organizations led by yet to be tested.
One relatively new experiment on these
principles is the formation of the European
Union. In addition to a large bureaucratic
apparatus, the EU also possesses a legislative
body based in Strasbourg. However, the
European Parliament lacks the real means
of regulating the multinational organizations.
If, on the other hand, should the European
Parliament acquires such means, there
is always the danger of that body going
beyond the intention of the population---that
may, perhaps, endow that body with stronger
charter--- in general.
As one response, perhaps Consumerism
need to adapt, to consider such agreements
as NAFTA regulations where a grieved
person or company, from a polity outside
of the USA may force the closure of
a US business; in a secret meeting,
closed to the public.
Thoughts on Identity
The issue, at once, becomes cultural;
thus, a matter of Identity. Moreover,
the tussle and the concern is not over
a specific product, but over the pre-eminence
of ideas and approaches to that intellectual
output. A 'problem' is defined in cultural
terms, containing the seeds of a proposed
solution. If a polity is regarded as
the problem, should it be exterminated?
What if the same polity also regards
the earlier one in the same terms? What
is likely to transpire? Mutual annihilation?
For example, when the steel makers of
other polities put the US steel plants
out of business, what was the problem,
and its solution?
During the 1960's and 1970's waves of
international terrorism swept Europe.
Prominent European politicians and businessmen
were kidnapped and killed. When caught,
the perpetrators defended themselves
with the assertion that they had the
right to break the law, and such a right
could not be truncated by any authority.
Some judicial organs and Thought Employers
(10) understood the true nature of the
claim; it was to stress the nature of
the laws and associated intentions.
At the time, no polity was bombed by
the armed forces of any country.
It appears a world government, as has
been proposed, has some issues to resolve
yet. The bow of a boat arrives at its
destination first, ahead of the stern.
But, it is the stern that guides it
there.
Thus, Identity is a composite. (11)
A great many ingredients are stirred
into a solution, which, from the outside
seems a solid unchanging mass. This
makes Identity an extremely fluid structure,
but one with definite parameters. Shifts
in the composition are predictable.
That is, it is definite that anger and
despondency will be exhibited when income
reduced or lost. What we do not know
is when this person or better yet a
group of persons in the same set of
conditions will take some firm action,
such as revolting by various means.
Identity components are strongly influenced
by culture. Culture, by its original
definition, is cultivation of mind.
This is specific to place and time.
What was handed down from the parents
from childhood on? A composite of values
transmitted from one generation to the
next determines the general culture
of a given polity. It is both changeable
and immutable. This seeming contradiction
is best understood by learning the specific
culture.
If a given polity has a culture of unchanging
adherence to certain principles in personal
life, for examples as Amish live, then
there will be a collision, between a
given immutable principle and the society
at large. Literally. In Ohio and Pennsylvania
there are regular accidents between
horse drawn Amish carriages and motorcars.
Does that create a certain tension within
the community?
The consequences of intergenerational
conflict in a large part of the world
have been appearing ever since the first
generation. This shift of emphasis,
or change, is forced by changing conditions
in the immediate vicinity. However,
the reception of the depth and range
of change differs from one polity to
the next. This is not because a polity
cannot handle the change or its speed.
The priority is attached to the leavening
of the given culture. How and what was
learned.
The Marxist culture, for example, equates
"enlightenment" with empowerment,
so that individuals can take their fate
into their hands. The opposing camp,
the capitalists, fervently believe the
solution lies in "education."
Even if the terminology is somewhat
different, both end up with the same
methods and means. So far, however,
it must have become apparent, the real
competition is actually between two
groups who interpret and staunchly practice
their ideologies. The target polity
is a field of contention, the prize,
or, at best, a testing laboratory.
Then, after a while, the target polity,
or its components, begin assessing these
outside factors influencing and affecting
their lives. These alien thoughts appear
to be contrary to their own desires
and expectations, as leavened by their
own culture. As a result, they decide
to take action, in order to remove the
outside obstacles to their own lifestyle.
The methods they choose to obtain will
vary from one polity to the next. But
they will also learn from the methods
directed at them by all camps. And,
they will turn the tables on alien influences.
It will be costly to all parties involved.
Belief systems have always been a part
of human endeavor. In turn, there has
always been a raging competition between
belief systems. Is it the ideas themselves,
or the agents they influence and act
upon that compete? How well do the agents
understand the basic precepts of the
belief systems? Or, did the agents deliberately
distort those tenets, for pecuniary
interest? Central Asia has been, and
still is, a battlefield of belief systems,
with Islam being one of the latest entrants
into the fray. And, many interpretations
of Islam have been fueled not only by
indigenous interest groups, but also
by the outside players. The latter may
have the distinction of constituting
the majority of such initiatives.
The belief systems, once released onto
a polity, begin interacting with the
economic, political and military trivet,
leading to a new set of issues and possible
solutions. What complicates this already
crowded matrix is that most, if not
all, belief systems tend to have subdivisions.
These internal components of a belief
system may and do contain self-contradictory
doctrines in themselves. The existence
of such bifurcations are an ideal opening
for outside forces to exploit, for the
purpose of influencing the affairs of
target polities. When the target polity
objects to the outside entities and
their aims and methods, these outsiders
may and will resort to clandestine methods.
They will, essentially, insist on getting
their way.
All throughout recorded history one
warlike visit begat a return of the
same upon the initial aggressor. As
an extension, when clandestine operations
become known---and they will invariably
become public---the same response can
be expected. These responses need not
be on the same level of the outside
offenders. The targeted polity will
choose its timing and methods. Even
after a long wait, lasting decades.
If the clandestine forces of the outside
polities choose to concentrate on bifurcations
of belief, governance or economic systems
to exploit, that does not mean that
the target polity will respond in kind.
But, respond, they will.
Both the authoritarian and the mercantilist
systems, while competing against each
other, will also initiate paramilitary
operations. At a certain activity level,
these operations will be penetrated
and compromised. This is exactly the
case with respect to Afghanistan and
the rest of Central Asia. Not only the
immediate neighbors of Afghanistan in
Central Asia, but also polities from
other regions have been partaking in
this process of exploitation of bifurcated
belief and governance systems. A portion
of the targeted population, originally
grieved by economic and political depredations,
will respond decisively to the provocation.
This will be in the direction of military
action. This includes, necessarily,
the struggle waged between the 17th
and 20th century struggle between the
mercantilist and the capitalist governance
systems; the latter attempting to change
the world, as the former doggedly resisting.
Central Asia, even if the term implies
a block of land, is not a monolith in
cultural terms. Afghanistan has a different
history and culture than Iran or the
Newly Independent States of Kazak, Kirghiz,
Tajik, Turkmen, Ozbek. Even within the
NIS, the experience, for example, of
Tajikistan is different than the adjacent
neighbor Ozbekistan. For example, Afghanistan
did not exist as a state before the
20th century. The five states of Central
Asia were part of a much larger entity,
named Turkistan. Languages spoken in
Afghanistan, that is, the existence
of large minorities are not the same
elsewhere.
What To Expect
The issue at hand, then, becomes: 1)
Will the polity at hand evolve politically
and economically, if left to its own
devices 2) How much external interference
in whatever form will be tolerated a)
by the governance strata of the target
polity b) the people of the polity.
The political systems of the region,
prior to the arrival of outside authoritarianism
in the form of various external clandestine
services, were designed or evolved according
to local realities. These "eastern"
or "Oriental" governance systems,
labeled 'unsophisticated,' 'primitive,'
so on, were in existence for millennia
or more, when they were discovered or
designed for the past two hundred years
within the "western" reaches
of the world. When Bismarck, in late
19th century was designing his Governance
Participation Units (factory unions;
workplace representatives, etc) or multi-party
and coalition initiatives were taking
place in their neighborhood, such systems
have been functioning in places such
as Afghanistan and in the east for quite
sometime. They were established institutions
long before university based social
scientists created books of terminology
to explain them.
All these old and new systems of Governance
Participation Units came into being
for the obvious reason: to share in
the resources, to keep the polity in
balance. Every Governance Participation
Unit, through its membership strength
and leadership skills, sought to obtain
what they deemed a fair share of what
is available. In terms of functions,
who gets how much water and who gets
to build a golf course or travels to
space as a tourist work on the same
principles.
One of the implications of this (often
is regarded euphemistically as a resource
sharing arrangement by the outsiders)
is that the polities targeted by authoritarian
or mercantilist polities will assess
the relative merits of what is being
imposed on them. In the end, the target
polity members may reject what is on
offer from the outside, in favor of
keeping what is and has been there as
far back as the existence of the polity.
The more the pressure on a target polity,
the more energetic the objections and
resultant counter-measures.
Corruption, under many guises will
take place, despite prescribed safeguards.
Corruption is basically an attempt at
subverting the rules of governance.
It is a dash to jump the queue, divert
resources for the benefit of a sub-group
or individual at the expense of the
rest of the polity. If the polity does
not have effective recourse to enforcement
of the rules, corruption will cause
the eventual collapse of the system,
and the polity. Some polities engage
their secret services, in full force,
to deal with corruption. To eradicate
it, other polities' secret services
fully cooperate with the players of
corruption and become corrupt themselves.
The entire polity suffers from a range
of ills, including human rights abuses
and distortions in income distribution.
When the corruption is exported along
with a political and economic system,
the recipients not only may not appreciate
the incoming product, but also resent
the defective nature of the process
and choose to fight it with tools at
their own disposal.
The abusers of belief systems are rather
adept at exploiting all of the above
ideas and means. As usual, when a new
system arrives, it has to do battle
with the existing one. The new recruits
or converts will be more eager to prove
their worth than the rest who have been
in it for a longer period. Similarly,
adherents of an old system will seek
revenge. The methods of the revenge
are not necessarily salient; revenge,
itself, is.
The so-called fundamentalism is a hybrid.
First there exists a body of disgruntled
people. Second, there are individuals
and groups who abuse the belief system
for either institutional or personal
gain. Third, the interest groups from
the outside place unwanted pressure
on the same people. The resultant cocktail
can well be overly potent. And, one
fundamentalism, regardless of its origin
and location, will fuel others; just
like one-armed visit will begat a military
invasion in return.
Central Asian political movements emerging
at the beginning of the 20th century
stressed a separation between religion
and state, before the coercive Soviet
methods were put into place. This can
be observed from the platforms and programs
they issued over time. When the Bolsheviks
militarily incorporated Central Asia
into what became the Soviet Union, all
plans for a secular and independent
Central Asian state were also postponed.
In closing: to place the issue of fundamentalism
into perspective, perhaps the two initial
questions need to be reiterated: 1)
Is religion equal to nationality? 2)
Who is more eager for the Central Asians
to be "fundamentalists?" (12)
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1. Constant H Jacquet, Jr. Editor,
Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches
1990 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, Communications
Unit of the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the USA, 1990).
2. "In 1900, it was estimated that
in Turkestan alone, without counting
the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, there
were 1503 congregational mosques and
11230 parish mosques with a total of
12499 imams (prayer leaders) to minister
to 6 million persons, that is, one mosque
for every 471 believers." See Geoffrey
Wheeler, The Modern History of Central
Asia (New York: Praeger
3. H. B. Paksoy, "Deceivers."
Central Asian Survey Vol. 3, N. 1, 1984.
4. H.B. Paksoy, "Nationality or
Religion?: Views of Central Asian Islam"
AACAR Bulletin (of the Association for
the Advancement of Central Asian Research)
Vol VIII, No. 2, 1995; Reprinted in
International Journal of Central Asian
Studies Volume 3, 1998; Translation
in Central Asia and the Gulf, Masayuki
Yamauchi, ed. (Tokyo: Asahi Selected
Series, 1995) . Original reprinted in
Essays on Central Asia (Lawrence, KS:
Carrie, 1999) also accessible at: http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/cae02.html
5. H. B. Paksoy, "Sun is also Fire"
Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis,
1992).
6. With many thanks to Dr. Buğra Atsız.
7. Z.V. Togan, Hatıralar (Istanbul,
1969) . Sisenbay was the Başkurt orderly
to Z.V. Togan (1890-1970) during the
Turkistan National Liberation Movement
of the 1920s and 1930s. See "The
Basmachi Movement From Within: An Account
of Zeki Velidi Togan" Nationalities
Papers Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995. Pp.
373-399. Reprinted in CENTRAL ASIA READER:
The Rediscovery of History H.B. Paksoy,
Editor, Translator (New York/London:
M. E. Sharpe, 1994). 'Biy Temir' (or
Temur Bey) is the correct spelling of
what has been rendered as 'Tamarlane:'
And the 'black stone' is the very large,
very dark green jade marking Timur's
burial location, inside the moseleum
known as Kök kümbez 'Sky Blue Dome'
('sky blue' or 'Turquoise' has been
the primary royal color among Turks).
8. See Peter B Golden "Codex Comanicus'"
in Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul:
ISIS Press, 1992).
9. http://www11.ewebcity.com/ahibirlikleri/aef.html
10. H.B. Paksoy, "Dusunce Isvereni"
Turk Tarihi, Toplumlarin Mayasi, Uygarlik
(Izmir: Mazhar Zorlu Holding, 1997)
http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-3/turk15.html
11. H.B. Paksoy, Identities: How Governed,
Who Pays? (Lawrence: Carrie, 2001).
Simultaneous print and e-book release.
Accessible at http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-7/
12. The Question of Religious Fundamentalism
in Central Asia http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/cae03.html
H.B. Paksoy, Essays on Central Asia
(Carrie, 1999) http://www.ukans.edu/~ibetext/texts/paksoy-6/